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Introduction 
  
The question of Being, in some form or another, has occupied philosophy since its 
inception. It is, as Heidegger suggests, ‘the fundamental question’1, an approach to 
which has often been used as a launch site for developing theories about all elements of 
human existence and beyond. Of particular interest to this study will be the relationship 
between the responses to the question of Being and politics – the extent to which 
ontology and political philosophy are directly connected. Implicit to this, as we shall 
see, is the assumption that responses to the question of Being are politically important. 
In particular, the study will discuss philosophical responses to the objectivity of 
Hegelian thought. In this introduction, we shall first turn to the reasons for this focus on 
those writing against the tendencies Hegelianism. After this, criteria for inclusion will 
be discussed, followed by an introduction to those thinkers to be covered and an 
explanation of some notable absentees. 
 In explaining the reasoning for the focus upon thinkers reacting against 
Hegelianism, the emphasis here necessarily needs to fall upon the deficiencies of 
Hegelianism. At this point the qualification should be added that this should not convey 
the impression of the opinion that philosophy would have been better off if Hegel had 
never existed. Karl Popper, for instance, is utterly wrong to write of Hegel that ‘his 
philosophy exemplifies… a terrible decline in intellectual sincerity and intellectual 
honesty… his philosophical arguments are not to be taken seriously’.2 Popper seeks to 
connect the philosophy of Hegel to the ideologically driven barbarism of the Second 
World War, but such innuendo-laden slurs cannot help but suggest that Popper’s own 
intellectual sincerity and honesty is somewhat doubtful on this subject. Yet despite this, 
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there are still misgivings to be had regarding both Hegel’s philosophy and its 
consequences. The Hegelian philosophical system – here used in the most general 
sense – aims at encompassing the entirety of existence. The aim of this is for 
philosophy to finally provide a scientific objective understanding not only for the 
present, but for the very movement of history. There are two main issues to be raised at 
this point with such a worldview. The first is its inherent impersonalism – the progress 
of the self-realisation of the Absolute (the whole) is such a massive world-shaking 
event that there is little heed paid to those existents whose cumulative existence makes 
up this process. The second issue is the mind-set displayed by the Hegelian approach. 
Whilst not wanting to follow Popper’s example and extrapolate from Hegel’s 
philosophy to the evils of the modern world, the attempt of Hegelian philosophy to 
explain the totality of existence within a single system is a precursor of the 
technological worldview. These are worldviews in which all existents are resources to 
be manipulated in order to achieve the potentially alien objectives of a system, in which 
contingencies and differences are considered problems which will in time be eradicated 
by the gradual perfection of the system, and in which those who create and guide the 
development of the worldview are somehow able to stand outside the system which 
encompasses the whole. The philosophical tendencies which are being fought against 
will become clearer once we turn to the thinkers whose works will be discussed in the 
study. 
 The area of philosophy the study will discuss are the subjectivist reactions 
which emerged in the wake of Hegelian objectivism. Here the term “subjectivist” is 
being used in a loose manner to encompass those philosophers who, working in the 
shadow of Hegel, attempted to restate the position of the individual person within 
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philosophy. The scope of the study should become clearer after discussing the criteria 
for inclusion, followed by the specific thinkers to be included within the study. As with 
all such studies of this nature, the criteria will be rough and imperfect. Despite this, it 
should still begin to provide clear indication for why certain thinkers are considered to 
be under the purview of the study, and others are not. 
  
Qualifiers for inclusion. 
 
The first qualifier for inclusion is an ontological support for the formal distinction of 
selves. This point is important because this is how persons experience themselves to be. 
The best justification for insisting on the formal distinction of selves will be to briefly 
discuss the inherent flaws found in monistic alternatives. This is not to accuse Hegel of 
monism – although it is arguable that absolute idealism does have a monistic strand – 
but to reject a move towards monism as a corrective on Hegelianism. Schaffer indicates 
two main – though not sole – strands in monistic philosophy: existence monism and 
priority monism.
3
 Existence monism, Schaffer explains, ‘holds that exactly one 
concrete object token exists (the one).’4 This “one” is the world. The justification for 
holding that the world is the sole concrete existent is derived from the argument that 
this position provides ‘the simplest sufficient ontology.’5 As all other potential existents 
are part of the world, they can tell us nothing over and above what can be explained by 
the world as the one concrete existent. For this reason, there is no need to posit these 
“parts” within the ontological theory. It is the relationship to these parts which 
separates existence and priority monism. Priority monism, whilst agreeing that the 
world is the sole basic concrete existent, accepts that ‘there may be other concrete 
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objects, but these only exist derivatively… the whole is prior to its parts.’6 This latter 
position is not unlike Bernard Bosanquet’s arguments for absolute idealism, which we 
shall turn to later in the study. There are reasons for taking monistic arguments 
seriously, but this does not therefore imply that a form of monism should be adopted. 
The suggestion that the monistic position provides the simplest sufficient ontology can 
be challenged on two fronts. Its claims of simplicity are flawed as the world is a near-
infinite object which can only be grasped as a whole in simplified terms, and secondly, 
to conceive the world as a single concrete object also necessarily involves an 
abstraction as the thinker is inescapably, inextricably part of this whole. That a non-
concrete component part should be able to grasp the complexities of the Being of the 
whole whilst never being fully concrete in their own right is difficult to accept. The 
previous criticism that the approach fails to account for the ways in which individual 
persons experience their existence to Be is also relevant to this point. Monism is 
arguably at best a fascinating thought experiment, and at worst a largely meaningless 
abstraction from reality. 
 Arguments advanced in the previous section lead to the second qualifier for 
inclusion, namely that the philosopher’s thought should be existentialist in character. 
The term “existentialist” can be troublesome because of the numerous varied ways in 
which it has been adopted – particularly in the twentieth century – as a description of 
others’ work and occasionally as a label for self-identification. Because of this, it is 
important to be clear when terms like “existentialism” and its derivatives are used, 
precisely what is meant. In this context, the term is being used broadly, and not solely 
to refer to the early to mid-twentieth century existentialist movement which had Jean-
Paul Sartre as its figurehead (equally, figures from this movement are not to be 
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summarily excluded). Instead the term is being used to highlight philosophical 
positions which have a basis in, and focus on, man’s existence as it is experienced. It 
must be accepted that the best source of knowledge on the existence of man is through 
man’s existence itself and his experiences of it. Recognition must be made of the 
necessarily subjective position that philosophers take when they encounter the Being of 
beings. The Being of another is always viewed through the prism of one’s own Being. 
 The third qualifier for inclusion is that the thinker ought not to engage in grand 
system-building. Some of the greatest thinkers in the field of philosophy, perhaps most 
notably Hegel, have set out to provide an all-encompassing completed philosophical 
system. Such attempts to provide what Pringle-Pattison described as ‘a closed circle’7 
are seen by subjectivist philosophy as inevitably destined, if not to outright failure, then 
to fall short of such an ambitious objective. That this is the case is due at least in part to 
the subjective and temporal nature of man, and the limited nature of even the ablest 
minds. This point is well illustrated by Emmanuel Mounier’s lengthy elucidation of 
why his philosophy of personalism is not a system. He explains, 
 
Personalism is a philosophy, it is not merely and attitude. It is a philosophy but not 
a system. Not that it fears systemisation. For order is necessary in thinking: 
concepts, logic, schemes of unification are not only of use to fix and communicate a 
thought which would otherwise dissolve into obscure and isolated intuitions; they 
are instruments of discovery as well of exposition… But its central affirmation 
being the existence of free and creative persons, it introduces into the heart of its 
constructions a principle of unpredictability which excludes any desire for a 
definitive system. Nothing could be more profoundly repugnant to it than the taste, 
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so common today, for an apparatus of thought and action functioning like an 
automatic distributor of solutions and instructions; a barrier to research; an 
insurance against disquiet, ordeal and risk. Moreover, a movement of original 
reflection should not be too quick to tie up the sheaf of its findings.
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As Mounier insists, to deny the desirability and utility grand philosophical systems is 
not to reject any and all forms of systemisation. It is rather to suggest - as Kierkegaard 
does with the title of his Philosophical Crumbs
9
 - that it is better to offer up crumbs 
which point the way for further philosophising than to promise an illusory banquet. 
 The fourth qualifier for inclusion is a non-deterministic conception of man. As 
with systemisation, this is not to deny all forms of determinism. Biological, 
psychological and social factors, particularly as knowledge in these fields has 
increased, should be accepted to have a degree of determinism over human freedom. 
However, to deny any form of free will and to rely solely on biological, psychological 
and social determinants is to remove from man any responsibility for his actions. Just 
because we are in some way conditioned towards a certain inclination does not 
necessarily mean that we should or will follow it if, for example, it is something we 
know to be wrong (here leaving aside the categorisation of right and wrong actions). 
The degree of freedom an individual has over his actions has been debated, and will 
continue to be debated for a very long time. Whilst definitive proof of this freedom is 
still lacking – it is questionable whether is possible to “prove” the existence of freedom 
– it is best to assume that we do have at least a degree of free will. Without the ability 
to freely choose our actions, life becomes a spectator activity and the pursuit of 
knowledge would lose its appeal. Unless a fully deterministic outlook on life can be 
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proved beyond question, it seems for these reasons and more that it is more edifying 
and more in tune with our existence as we experience it to assume that such an outlook 
is mistaken. 
 The fifth and final qualifier for inclusion is that the philosopher ought to be 
post-Hegelian. The impact of the work of Hegel on philosophy over the nearly two 
centuries since his death has been immense, though his greatest influence has not been 
direct. Whilst Hegel directly inspired numerous great philosophical minds, wider 
groups of philosophers have set out to reject large sections of his philosophical system. 
As Kaufman illustrates, 
 
One of the few things on which the analysts, pragmatists and existentialists agree 
with the dialectical theologians is that Hegel is to be repudiated: their attitude 
toward Kant, Aristotle, Plato and the other great philosophers is not at all 
unanimous even within each movement; but opposition to Hegel is part of the 
platform of all four, and of the Marxists, too.
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The first three qualifiers discussed previously are all Hegelian themes and their 
counterparts are subjectivist ripostes (though it would be a mistake to accuse the great 
philosopher of absolute determinism
11
). It would also be a mistake to assume that 
subjectivist philosophers writing against Hegel reject each and every aspect of his 
philosophy. For the sake of the post-Hegelian qualifier it may be more accurate to insist 
that the philosopher in question be working in the shadow of Hegel. Hegel’s 
importance as a milestone in Western philosophy is even acknowledged by some of his 
most vehement critics. Karl Popper’s somewhat bilious rant against Hegel in his The 
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Open Society and Its Enemies decries the fact ‘that Hegel’s influence has remained a 
most powerful force’.12 Whilst we may not agree with all the negative implications of 
Popper’s observation, it is an example of the way in which Hegel’s influence and 
importance is almost unanimously agreed upon. As we shall see, in the aftermath of 
Hegel, a number of subjectivist approaches emerged which aimed at overcoming the 
faults of the dominant strand of Hegelian objectivity. 
  
Max Stirner. 
 
The first thinker to be included is perhaps also the most idiosyncratic – Max Stirner. 
Max Stirner was the pseudonym of Johan Kaspar Schmidt, deriving from a nickname 
he received because of the peculiar shape of his forehead.
13
 Stirner was an attendee of 
the Free, a group of Young Hegelians led by Bruno Bauer which also counted Friedrich 
Engels amongst their number.
14
 At this time Stirner was leading what Leopold 
describes as a ‘double life’15 engaging with the bohemian discussion group by night 
and teaching at a Berlin girls’ school by day. Yet even at this time, Stirner’s radical and 
strongly atheistic views were not in tune with the mainstream of Young Hegelian 
thought. Leopold cites Stirner’s reputation amongst the Free for ‘hostility to religion, 
intolerance of moderation, and ability to provoke fierce argument.’16 Stirner’s first 
forays into writing were unspectacular pieces for the Rheinische Zeitung (prior to Karl 
Marx’s arrival as editor), most notable amongst these being The False Principle of Our 
Education. The False Principle… focuses upon pedagogical matters, arguing that 
educators should bring about ‘the elimination of knowledge without will and the rise of 
the self-conscious knowledge which accompanies the sunburst of free personality’.17 
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Despite the merits of the article, it is likely that it and Stirner himself would have been 
relegated to a footnote of the Young Hegelian movement were it not for his sole major 
work The Ego and His Own. In the lead up to the publication of the work, Stirner had 
indicated to contemporaries that he was working on a book, but few had taken much 
notice.
18
 The arrival of The Ego and His Own shortly after Stirner left his teaching post 
and the commotion it caused suggests that in hindsight they would have been wiser to 
do so. 
 The Ego and His Own stands as Max Stirner’s single notable contribution to 
philosophy. Yet, the revolutionary work caused more clamour than most philosophers 
do in their whole careers and continues to influence philosophical and political 
movements to this day. Whilst the left-leaning Young Hegelians Stirner associated with 
rejected the conservatism in Hegel’s philosophy, Stirner himself reacted against Hegel 
in a much more radical way. The peculiar nature of The Ego and His Own is reflected 
in its structure. After a short preface entitled “All Things Are Nothing to Me”, the work 
is split into two sections: “Man” and “I”. The first section consists of one relatively 
short chapter and one very long chapter, whilst the second section bookends another 
very long chapter with two short chapters. Stirner’s writing style also betrays his 
individualistic approach and, as Leopold suggests, appears ‘calculated to disconcert.’19 
He eschews traditional methods of philosophical exposition, a method which ‘reflects a 
conviction that both language and rationality are human products which have come to 
constrain and oppress their creators.’20 Despite these stylistic quirks, The Ego and His 
Own offers an often engaging alternative to Hegelian thought, with arguments which 
should not be ignored, even if they are eventually to be rejected. Stirner’s criticisms of 
Hegelian philosophy in The Ego and His Own are often directed at contemporary 
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Hegelian philosophers who he fears are ‘preparing the world for the new secular 
Leviathan.’21 Whilst rejecting Hegel’s conservatism, Stirner is equally unenamoured 
with any form of communistic alternative.
22
 Stirner’s work demands the philosophical 
and political recognition of the absolute freedom of the individual. Stirner’s egoism, 
Scruton explains, rejects ‘all institutions, all values, all religion, and indeed all 
relations, except those which the individual ego could appropriate to itself.’23 His 
consistently anti-institutional nature dictates that whilst Stirner argues for the freedom 
of all, his aim is for personal uprising in place of communal revolution.
24
 The non-
prescriptive nature of Stirner’s conception of freedom means that he necessarily avoids 
any temptation of providing a blueprint for an egoistic future, likening such attempts to 
predicting the actions of emancipated slaves.
25
 
 Stirner’s total written output, even including the minor and largely 
inconsequential works which appeared after The Ego and His Own, was very small. 
This and his idiosyncrasies are not reason enough to reject the discussion of his thought 
in this study. Stirner’s consistency in following his rejection of Hegelian institutions 
and his own beliefs regarding human freedom to their logical conclusion are to be 
applauded. Stirner’s at times bizarre work has stood the test of time, and remains to this 
day a key intellectual precursor for the individualist anarchist movement.
26
 
  
Søren Kierkegaard. 
 
The second thinker to be discussed within the study is also perhaps the most prolific. 
Søren Kierkegaard wrote and published extensively during his lifetime, both under his 
own name and under a multitude of pseudonyms. Typically there is within a 
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philosopher’s large body of work several works which are generally accepted as being 
“the key works”, but the situation with Kierkegaard is more nuanced and complicated. 
Scruton describes it as being a near impossible task ‘to distinguish between the central 
and peripheral among Kierkegaard’s many and varied writings.’27 Despite this 
difficulty, Kierkegaard himself indicated how his writings ought to be read in his 
posthumously published The Point of View for My Work as an Author. In the work 
which is described by Garff as the text of Kierkegaard’s other texts, a ‘meta-text’28, the 
philosopher highlights that he has always been a religious author. He explains: 
 
my whole authorship pertains to Christianity, to the issue: becoming a Christian, 
with direct and indirect polemical aim at that enormous illusion of Christendom, or 
the illusion that in such a country all are Christians of sorts.
29
 
 
The challenging of the state of Christendom and the denial of the assumption that one 
could be a Christian without personal striving are indeed the unifying themes explicit 
or implicit in all of Kierkegaard’s works. The theme of personal choice is explicitly 
depicted in Either/Or, which explores ethical and aesthetical lifestyles through the 
correspondence of the fictional “A” and Judge Vilhelm in papers discovered by the 
fictional editor of the work Victor Eremita. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous approach 
stretches to include a sermon on why against God, man is always wrong and a salacious 
diary of a seducer by two further fictional authors. The effect brings to mind the 
method of the Platonic dialogues, and leaves the reader to judge the merits of the 
protagonists’ contrasting viewpoints. Hannay cites Kierkegaard’s only stipulation for 
the reading of Either/Or being that reader ought to read both Either and Or, or 
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neither.
30
 Kierkegaard’s refusal in the work to indicate that either pseudonymous 
creation personifies the correct approach to life underscores his belief that the nature of 
man’s existence dictates that individuals must actively make decisions for themselves. 
This is nowhere truer than with regards to religious matters. In works such as 
Philosophical Crumbs Kierkegaard expounds the paradoxical nature of Christianity and 
decries attempts to prove the existence of God as being inherently flawed.
31
 In Fear 
and Trembling, a work discussing the binding of Isaac,
32
 Kierkegaard applauds 
Abraham’s faith and the way biblical patriarch ‘believed the absurd.’33 Lack of 
personal Christian faith is to suffer from what was discussed in the work The Sickness 
Unto Death. In this text Kierkegaard, through the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, sets out 
his theory of selfhood. He explains that ‘the self is intensified in proportion to the 
standard by which the self measures itself, and infinitely so when God is the standard. 
The more conception of God, the more self; the more self the more conception of 
God.’34 The position of man’s faith as being the key to selfhood is the most important 
feature of Kierkegaard’s position on Being. It sets out to each individual the 
responsibility for their own salvation through their own relationship with God.
35
 
 Kierkegaard’s relationship with the works of Hegel is certainly one of reaction, 
and finds its clearest expression in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Though 
maintaining a respect for Hegel’s thinking, Kierkegaard repudiates Hegelian mediation 
as an attempt to dilute Christianity by subsuming it into philosophy rather than 
correctly creating Christian philosophy after accepting Christianity.
36
 In the Postscript 
Hegel’s system is rejected, with Kierkegaard arguing that whilst it is conceivable that 
life can be understood as a system for God, it ‘cannot be that for any existing spirit.’37 
Kierkegaard’s subjectivism leads him to reject Hegel’s philosophy of history for the 
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reason that the individual able to systematise six-thousand years of history would still 
be no nearer to understanding his own existence.
38
 Scruton argues that Kierkegaard’s 
criticisms on this point rightly highlight ‘the deification of history and the loss of 
individual responsibility towards events.’39 Kierkegaard’s writings on explicitly 
political matters are scarce, but political implications of his existential Christianity are 
present throughout his works. His A Literary Review appeared at a time when 
retirement from writing seemed imminent (this was not to be the case), and was, as the 
title suggests, a review of a contemporary novel Two Ages. Kierkegaard used the novel 
as a springboard to attack his own age for its lack of passion.
40
 The philosopher 
criticises the culture of envy which followed the transition into popular government, an 
envy lacking in character which ‘does not understand that excellence is excellence.’41 
Kierkegaard finds this envy personified in what he calls levelling. 
 
This self-establishing envy is levelling, and while a passionate age accelerates, 
raises and topples, extols and oppresses, a reflective, passionless age does the 
opposite – it stifles and impedes, it levels. Levelling is a quiet, mathematically 
abstract affair that avoids all fuss... levelling at its peak is like a deathly stillness 
over which nothing can raise itself but into which everything impotently sinks 
down.
42
 
 
The connections between Kierkegaard’s Christian existentialist ontology and his social 
criticism will be particularly of interest. 
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Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison.  
 
The third thinker to be included is also the least well known, but this does not detract 
from the importance of his thought. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison was perhaps the 
greatest British advocate of personalism, a philosophy best known from the French 
school of Emmanuel Mounier and the Boston personalism of Borden Parker Bowne. 
Pringle-Pattison’s personal idealism was a reaction to the Hegelianism of the wider 
school of British idealism. Often when describing such a reaction against a dominant 
philosophical trend it seems apt to use violent militaristic metaphors (“attack”, “fired 
the first shot”, “stormed the barricades of”, and so on), but this would be wholly 
inappropriate given Pringle-Pattison’s quiet, understated and wholeheartedly polite 
approach to philosophical discourse. Scottish Philosophy and Hegelianism and 
Personality contained Pringle-Pattison’s two series of Balfour Lectures, delivered at 
the University of Edinburgh. The first series contained, as the subtitle explains, A 
Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to Hume. Hegel is discussed in the 
sixth lecture entitled The Possibility of Philosophy as a System: Scottish Philosophy 
and Hegel, in which Hegelian universalism is criticised for omitting the nature of 
individual existence.
43
 The lectures in Hegelianism and Personality continue the 
themes of this final lecture and, Barbour explains, ‘had a polemical character not 
previously seen in [Pringle-Pattison’s] writings.’44 The term polemical here should not 
be interpreted in the sense of the writings of Stirner or Nietzsche, but rather indicates a 
new more critical tone in Pringle-Pattison’s writing. Despite having been viewed as an 
adherent of Hegelianism, Barbour explains that Pringle-Pattison had ‘a growing sense 
that certain tendencies in Hegel and post-Hegelian idealism imperilled those ethical and 
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religious positions to which he always firmly adhered.’45 The philosopher’s criticisms 
of Hegel expand on the comments in the final lecture of Scottish Philosophy regarding 
personal existence. 
 
The radical error both of Hegelianism and of the allied English doctrine I take to be 
the identification of the human and the divine self-consciousness, or, to put it more 
broadly, the unification of consciousness in a single Self… Though selfhood… 
involves a duality in unity… it is none the less true that each Self is a unique 
existence, which is perfectly impervious… in its character of self it refuses to admit 
another self within itself.
46
 
 
This rejection of Hegelianism is, as we have noted, both due to the philosophical 
dignity Pringle-Pattison accorded to the person and the detrimental effects on the 
individual responsibility of these persons for their actions. 
 The later, and perhaps greatest, exposition of Pringle-Pattison’s philosophical 
thinking on issues such as personal existence and responsibility is found in his Gifford 
Lectures which were published as The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, 
and in a debate with the absolute idealist Bernard Bosanquet which followed. In The 
Idea of God, the two lectures on ‘The Absolute and the Finite Individual’ present 
Pringle-Pattison’s personalist conception of the self against the Hegelian notion. 
Pringle-Pattison insists that the finite self is, as he argued briefly in Hegelianism and 
Personality, un-mixable with other finite selves. Whilst much of the content the two 
minds contain may be identical and be said to “overlap” in this way – ‘they can not 
overlap at all in existence; their very raison d’être is to be distinct and, in that sense, 
19 
 
separate and exclusive focalisations of a common universe.’47 The Aristotelian Society 
symposium Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of 
Being? allowed Pringle-Pattison and Bosanquet to debate the issues raised in these two 
lectures further. Mander highlights the significance of the debate as the single ‘direct 
head-to-head debate’48 to have occurred between the absolute idealist and personal 
idealist strands in British idealism. The outcome of the debate – consisting of an 
original paper by Bosanquet, a paper by Pringle-Pattison and a reply to the symposium 
by Bosanquet – has been understood differently (Mander sides with Bosanquet,49 
Sheldon with Pringle-Pattison,
50
 whilst Thomas is more neutral
51
). No matter which 
philosopher’s arguments were strongest, the debate actively highlights the differences 
in position on the subject of existence between the explicitly Hegelian absolute 
idealism of Bosanquet and the reformist personalist reaction to Hegel of Pringle-
Pattison. Pringle-Pattison’s position on personal responsibility is, as we have seen, 
closely tied to his religious beliefs. The closest Pringle-Pattison got to writing at length 
on explicitly political issues was in the collection of essays The Philosophical Radicals. 
He cites ‘the prominence throughout of the social and political aspects of philosophical 
theory’52 as providing the link between these essays which handle topics such as 
utilitarianism and the works of Herbert Spencer and Benjamin Kidd. Above all, the 
importance of Pringle-Pattison’s thought is that it provides a subjective response to 
Hegelianism whilst still remaining within the Hegelian sphere. The successes and 
failings of Pringle-Pattison’s reformist approach will be of particular interest in 
comparison to the more antagonistic approaches of the other thinkers. 
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Martin Heidegger. 
 
The fourth and final thinker to be included is Martin Heidegger. Controversial both for 
his radical philosophy and his brief adherence to National Socialism, Heidegger has 
been the recipient of both immense praise and similar levels of derision. His reputation 
largely rests on his first book and magnum opus Being and Time though, as we shall 
see, there is much of value to be found in Heidegger’s numerous writings which 
appeared after this. The notoriously dense and at times seemingly impenetrable Being 
and Time sets out to clear the philosophical ground in order to better address the 
question of the meaning of Being. This is to be achieved through the ‘destruction of the 
history of ontology’.53 Such destruction is necessary because of the ways in which the 
primordial essence of Being has been covered over by layers upon layers of previous 
assertions – these need to be stripped away in order to be able to approach the meaning 
of Being correctly. Heidegger explains that our closeness to Being – it is a reality we 
encounter daily – has not rescued the question of what it means to Be from being lost.54 
This loss is explained by the ascension of three prejudices about the question of Being: 
the universality of the question, Being’s indefinable nature, and Being’s self-
evidence.
55
 Heidegger rejects these prejudices in turn, concluding that they both 
indicate the lack of an answer to the question of Being and also that ‘the question itself 
is obscure and without direction.’56 Throughout Being and Time Heidegger attempts to 
approach the question of Being in a ‘phenomenologically concrete manner’57 by 
sketching a ‘preparatory analysis of everyday existence’58 in the form of Dasein 
(Being-there). Despite its many merits, Being and Time (or at least, the originally 
projected form of Being and Time) was never fully completed. The introduction 
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contains the layout for the envisaged whole – consisting of two parts, each containing 
three sections. What exists consists only of the first two sections of the first part 
interpreting Dasein ‘in terms of temporality’.59 The final section of the first part was to 
offer the ‘explication of time as the transcendental horizon of Being.’60 The elusive 
second part was to set out the ‘basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the 
history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue.’61 That the work 
remains incomplete – acknowledged as a permanent feature in a preface to the seventh 
edition
62
 – takes nothing away from its insight in restating the importance of the 
question of Being. The relationship between Being and Time and Heidegger’s later 
works has been subject to much scholarly debate. Heidegger himself denied that there 
had been a turning in his thought.
63
 Krell provides some support for such an 
interpretation, highlighting that whatever the philosopher’s later relationship to aspects 
of his magnum opus, Being and Time ‘provides the impetus for all the later 
investigations’.64 Yet, as we shall see, there is a distinctive shift in Heidegger’s 
thinking between his earlier and later positions, even if the focus of this thinking 
remains the same. 
 Heidegger’s later works continue to explicitly work towards the question of 
Being, though as time progresses this is now in a much less subjectivist and 
anthropocentric fashion.
65
 Before reaching this stage, there is a brief period – largely 
coinciding with Heidegger’s National Socialism – which might best be referred to as 
“middle Heidegger” (as opposed to the early Heidegger of Being and Time and the anti-
anthropocentric later Heidegger). Most notable of these middle period works is his 
Introduction to Metaphysics which was deemed by Heidegger to be a companion piece 
to Being and Time.
66
 The lectures contained in the work trace ‘the gradual 
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impoverishment of the meaning of Being beginning in Greek times.’67 Introduction to 
Metaphysics is particularly notorious for its allusion to Heidegger’s Nazism, references 
to which sparked much controversy upon the work’s publication in the 1950s.68 
Heidegger’s later period is marked by works such as The Letter on Humanism, which 
appeared following the end of the Second World War. This work criticises Sartrean 
(and other forms of) humanism for its subjectivity. This attack is often cited as an 
example of the later Heidegger criticising the early Heidegger (of Being and Time) 
through the early-Heideggerian elements of Sartre’s philosophy as stated in 
Existentialism and Humanism.
69 Heidegger’s thinking has generally been classified as 
conservative.
70
 Yet despite this, Heideggerian philosophy has influenced thinkers from 
all over the political spectrum. The relationship between Heideggerian thought and 
National Socialism has spawned a vast array of literature – much of it inspired by 
Victor Farías’ Heidegger and Nazism.71 The positions taken in these works vary from 
suggesting Heidegger’s philosophy and Nazism are separable,72 and suggesting that the 
natural conclusion of Heidegger’s philosophy is Nazism, and therefore it must be 
avoided.
73
 What is clear at this point is that the relationship between Heideggerian 
ontology and politics is of key importance in Heidegger’s thought, even if the 
philosopher himself rarely addressed the latter directly. 
 The four thinkers discussed above should allow us to understand the variety of 
subjectivist approaches which emerged in opposition, in one way or another, to the 
dominant tone of objectivism in the post-Hegelian age. Max Stirner offers an 
anarchical alternative in which all values are transcended by the self-owning individual 
and the supremacy of his will. Søren Kierkegaard offers a similarly individualistic 
alternative, but it is an alternative with the relationship between God and each unique 
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individual which is achieved through faithful strivings at its heart. Andrew Seth 
Pringle-Pattison offers an attempt to reform Hegelianism from the inside. He believed 
that the impersonalism of Hegel’s philosophy could be improved upon through 
modifying, instead of rejecting, Hegelian thought. Heidegger instead insists that not 
only has Hegelianism clouded over the question of Being, but that this has been a 
continuous process since the time of Plato. In order to get closer to the understanding of 
Being, we need to return to the insights from philosophy’s pre-Socratic roots. The 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach, with particular regard to Being and 
politics, will be assessed in order to determine the extent to which of these 
subjectivisms proffer a successful alternative to objectivism. Before turning to the 
content of the conclusion, we must first address those thinkers not included within the 
study. 
  
Some thinkers not included within the study. 
 
The study covers thinkers operating within a particular timeframe. Earlier we addressed 
that the philosophers should be post-Hegelian – they are operating after Hegel. The 
endpoint of this time period was not addressed then, but instead is a result of the 
findings in the concluding chapter. As such, the end of the post-Hegelian age is 
interpreted as coming about with the emergence of Heidegger (in particular, the later 
Heidegger). We will turn to this point in slightly more detail later, for the time being it 
is merely useful to acknowledge the existence of the upper temporal ceiling, with the 
promise that it will later be justified. 
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This upper ceiling automatically disqualifies the likes of Sartre, Foucault, Marcuse, 
and so on, all of whose philosophies might have provided another variation on the 
subjectivisms covered. Schopenhauer, a contemporary of Hegel, was also one of his 
most vehement critics. Despite this, the overlap between the timings of Hegel’s and 
Schopenhauer’s publications marks the two men as being contemporaries, rather than 
suggesting that Schopenhauer is in some way post-Hegelian. Schopenhauer was once 
an intellectual hero to Nietzsche, who has also been excluded from the study. Sharing 
much of the literary prowess and insights of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche’s thought has 
influenced the developments of Heideggerian philosophy. Pringle-Pattison’s discussion 
of Nietzsche’s thought in Man’s Place in the Cosmos was amongst the first discussions 
of this in English. Whilst there are many lessons to be learnt from Nietzsche’s work, its 
veneration of the will is already represented in the study by Stirner. Where Nietzsche 
will be important to this study is through Heidegger’s reading of his work, which 
provides an important understanding of the links between earlier and later 
Heideggerian thought. The leaders of the French and American schools of personalism 
– Mounier and Parker Bowne, respectively – have been excluded as their philosophies 
add little to the personal idealism developed by Pringle-Pattison whose direct 
interaction within the wider school of British idealism makes the interrelationship 
between personalism and Hegelianism more explicit. Later British personalists such as 
John Macmurray have been excluded for similar reasons, with Pringle-Pattison’s earlier 
personalism being closer to typical personalism as a whole.
74
 Nikolai Berdyaev’s form 
of Christian existentialist personalism offers little advance upon either the Christian 
existentialism of Kierkegaard or the personalism by Pringle-Pattison. Whilst certainly 
being an interesting figure, his somewhat informal writing style does little to assist both 
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the dissemination and comparison of his ideas. More orthodox reactions to Hegel, such 
as the British Absolute Idealists Bradley and Bosanquet are excluded as their reaction 
cannot easily be deemed subjectivist. Despite being less orthodoxly Hegelian, Marx 
similarly was in no way subjectivist despite the comparative libertarianism of his 
earlier writings. 
  
Conclusion. 
 
Earlier it was indicated that in the concluding chapter it would become clear that 
Heidegger marked the end of the post-Hegelian era imposed upon the study. This will 
be done by using the later Heidegger against both the early Heidegger, and the 
subjectivist approaches more generally. It will be found that whilst subjectivism does 
make positive advances against objectivity as embodied in Hegelian philosophy, we are 
still left with a flawed or partial approach to Being and politics. In his later writings, 
Heidegger realises that the anthropocentrism of subjectivist approaches remains a 
barrier to gaining a closer understanding of Being. In contrast to the attempt to think of 
Being through beings (Dasein) in Being and Time, Heidegger now attempts to think of 
Being without reference to beings. Through doing this Being is no longer thought of as 
merely being a characteristic of beings, but can be approached in its own right. We 
shall also see that the radical philosophy of the later Heidegger results in political 
consequences more far-reaching, and ultimately more satisfactory, than either the 
objectivist or subjectivist approaches. 
 Before turning to the first thinker, several minor but important points need to be 
made. Throughout the study, the words “Being” and “Be” have been capitalised when 
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they refer to the concept of Being wherever they appear in order to ensure a 
consistency throughout. This has included capitalisation even in quotations when the 
writer or translator has not followed this convention. This has only been done when the 
meaning of the quotation has not been altered by imposing the capitalisation. All 
biblical quotations cited in the footnotes are taken from the Oxford edition of the King 
James Bible.
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Key Concepts within the Study 
 
Before turning to the first thinker it will be of use to clarify some of the concepts 
crucial to the study, namely what is meant by the use of the terms Hegelian, post-
Hegelian and politics. The explanations found here must necessarily be preliminary, 
but should aid in the illumination of the later arguments and positions taken. 
 
Hegelian. 
Put simply, a thinker or philosophy can be considered to be Hegelian if he or it adheres 
to the line of thought present in the works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This 
initial explanation opens up two further questions: what the Hegelian line of thought is 
and to what degree a thinker or philosophy must adhere to it in order to have the 
adjective “Hegelian” bestowed upon them. It may actually be of more use to address 
the latter point first, as from this we can ascertain the depth of understanding of Hegel’s 
thought we require at this point in order to progress. For the sake of the study, it is 
necessary to differentiate roughly between two forms of Hegelianism: orthodox and 
unorthodox. A sliding scale of Hegelian orthodoxy is assumed, rather than a binary 
distinction. This scale depends upon the extent to which the Hegelian thinker sets out to 
either accept, reform, or reject elements of Hegel’s philosophical system. As a brief 
illustration, within the context of this study, Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison’s personal 
idealism is an example of unorthodox Hegelianism as it aims at achieving the 
substantial task of reforming Hegelian thought’s impersonal streak. Max Stirner is 
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neither an orthodox nor unorthodox Hegelian as he rejects all of the key tenets of 
Hegelian philosophy, even if his rejection may sometimes mirror Hegel’s writings in its 
structure. Within the confines of the study, Bernard Bosanquet is understood to be an 
orthodox Hegelian as although his absolute idealism is not a facsimile of Hegel’s 
writings, his position is comparatively closer to Hegel than is Pringle-Pattison’s, just as 
Pringle-Pattison is comparatively more Hegelian than Stirner. 
 It will now be necessary to approach the not insignificant task of addressing the 
key tenets of Hegelian philosophy. Redding cites two differing readings of Hegel: the 
metaphysical and non-metaphysical.
1
 The latter of these is the post-Kantian tendency to 
claim ‘that either particular works… or particular areas of Hegel’s philosophy… can be 
understood as standing independently’2 of a grand metaphysical system. Redding also 
explains the much more controversial post-Kantian non-metaphysical reading of Hegel 
which insists he ‘is, in fact, in no way committed to the bizarre, teleological “spirit 
monism” that has been traditionally attributed to him.’3 Whilst it is utterly acceptable, 
and perhaps also entirely advantageous, to rescue from Hegelian thought that which is 
valuable, it cannot be accepted that Hegel intended his thought to be understood as 
such a buffet from which one can pick and choose according to one’s tastes. Even if 
there were cause to insist that Hegel could have been persuaded to acquiesce to a non-
systematic reading of his works, these works as written retain their systematic 
character. As such, this post-Kantian non-metaphysical reading of Hegel is rejected by 
the study, not because it lacks merit but because it represents an unorthodox rather than 
orthodox Hegelianism. 
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 The study adheres to the metaphysical reading of Hegel. Redding distinguishes 
between traditional and more recent metaphysical views of Hegel – it will be useful to 
address both of these in order to gain as full of a picture as possible at this stage of 
what is being understood as being Hegelian philosophy. The traditional metaphysical 
view sees Hegel ‘as offering a metaphysico-religious view of God qua “Absolute 
Spirit,” as the ultimate reality that we can come to know through pure thought 
processes alone.’4 Redding explains that ‘in short, Hegel’s philosophy is treated as 
exemplifying the type of pre-critical or “dogmatic” metaphysics against which Kant 
had reacted... and as a return to the more religiously driven conception of philosophy to 
which Kant had been opposed.’5 What we have called the more recent metaphysical 
view of Hegel condemns the traditional metaphysical view in an almost identical 
manner as did the non-metaphysical post-Kantians mentioned above. The key 
noticeable difference between the two positions appears to be that the more recent 
metaphysical view does not see in the rejection of the traditional metaphysical view of 
Hegel a rejection of all metaphysics, but rather insists that the existing dogmatic 
metaphysics needs to be replaced with a non-dogmatic metaphysics.
6
 Within the study, 
the traditional metaphysical view of Hegel’s thought is understood as being orthodox 
Hegelianism, with the more recent approach being understood as another form of 
unorthodox Hegelianism. 
 Despite his own adherence to the more recent (unorthodox) metaphysical view, 
Robert Stern admits ‘that Hegel can write as if he has much greater sympathy for the 
traditional approach [to metaphysics] than the Kantian one.’7 He cites the passage from 
the introduction to the Greater Logic in which Hegel praises ancient metaphysics over 
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contemporary reflective understanding as an example of this.
8
 It will be useful to quote 
from this section at length to gain a clearer view of the traditional metaphysical view of 
Hegel. 
 
Ancient metaphysics had… a higher conception of thinking than is current today. 
For it based itself on the fact that the knowledge of things obtained through 
thinking is alone what is really true in them, that is, things not in their immediacy 
but as first raised into the form of thought, as things thought. Thus this metaphysics 
believed that thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to the object, 
but rather is its essential nature, or that things and the thinking of them… are 
explicitly in full agreement, thinking in its immanent determinations and the true 
nature of things forming one and the same content.
9
 
 
Hegel attacks the reflective trend in philosophy which ‘in general… stands for the 
understanding as abstracting, and hence as separating and remaining fixed in is 
separations. Directed against reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes 
its view that truth rests on sensuous reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning 
that it is sense perception which first gives them filling and reality… In this self-
renunciation on the part of reason, the notion of truth is lost.’10 It is such reflective 
approaches upon which this study focusses, contrasting what Hegel disparaged as ‘only 
subjective truth, only phenomena, appearances, only something to which the nature of 
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the object itself does not correspond: knowing… lapsed into opinion’11 with the 
machinations of the Hegelian metaphysical system. 
 
Post-Hegelian. 
In part, the use of the term “post-Hegelian” marks the chronological period in which 
the study operates. Yet it does not serve solely as a temporal marker, for otherwise any 
arbitrary date could have been proposed instead. There are commonalities shared by the 
many varied philosophies which can be considered to be post-Hegelian. Here an 
attempt will be made to elucidate the features of post-Hegelian thought in order to 
clarify precisely what it is that makes the thinkers covered within the study post-
Hegelian. 
 Post-Hegelian philosophers are those working in the aftermath of Hegel. As was 
described before, just as Socrates marked the end of the pre-Socratic period and Plato 
marked the beginning of philosophy’s Platonism, the work of Hegel was so momentous 
as to commence a new era of philosophy: the post-Hegelian.
12
 Such a claim can be 
supported by the ways in which after Hegel, very few philosophical schools were able 
to avoid taking a position for or against Hegelianism. The thinkers covered within the 
study are all in some way antagonistic to Hegelianism, but the term post-Hegelian 
ought not to be thought of as being the source of this antagonism – the more orthodox 
British idealists are equally as post-Hegelian as the phenomenologists and personalists. 
The thinkers within the study, to varying degrees, reassert the reflective philosophical 
approaches Hegel condemned above. Yet it will be remarked upon that these post-
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Hegelians may also offer a form of metaphysics in opposition to Hegelian metaphysics. 
It will be useful here to explain what is meant by references to this post-Hegelian 
metaphysics. 
 As will be seen, some of the thinkers in the study are utterly repulsed by 
Hegelian metaphysics, yet their own philosophy is still metaphysical. This is not due to 
taking a post-Kantian metaphysical viewpoint, but rather because of the inherent 
difficulties in overcoming metaphysics. The later Heidegger was to remark that ‘a 
regard for metaphysics still prevails in the intention to overcome metaphysics’.13 For 
this reason, the opposition to Hegelian metaphysics is not always particularly clear-cut. 
As a thinker’s philosophy may not be a form of Hegelian metaphysics, whilst still 
being metaphysical, it will be worthwhile here to attempt to provide a definition for the 
metaphysical. 
 A discussion of what precisely is meant by the term metaphysics could easily 
fill out the entire thesis. The term has been used throughout the history of philosophy to 
highlight myriad tendencies. The common use of the term as a form of abuse has 
placed those willing to reclaim the title metaphysics (Stern with regards to Hegel is a 
good example
14
) squarely in the minority. As this study deploys the term metaphysics, 
often negatively, it is important to show that firstly metaphysics is not a meaningless 
term to designate something the author disagrees with, and secondly that the term 
metaphysics itself has no inherent value judgement. Peter van Inwagen is correct to 
highlight that ‘the word “metaphysics” is notoriously hard to define.’15 We should not 
attempt to overcompensate for this difficulty with an overly prescriptive or limited 
definition. The difficulty is of key importance to understanding the successes and 
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failures of thinkers to transcend metaphysics (it should be added that not all the 
thinkers covered within this study make such an attempt or have such a wish) – to 
camouflage over this difficulty here would be an injustice to these thinkers. In his 
Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger explains that the fundamental question of 
metaphysics is ‘why are there beings at all instead of nothing?’16 A metaphysical 
philosophy is one which seeks to render reasons or causes for beings (or Being). The 
causal chain implied by such a search for a first cause (often thought of as that which 
does not change
17
) necessarily leads to some form of systemisation of the totality of 
existence. Such a systemisation may be explicit as in the form of Hegelian 
metaphysics, or – as will become clear – may be an unstated, unintended consequence 
of a supposedly anti-systematic metaphysical theory. 
 
Politics. 
Finally, an explanation must be made of what is meant by the term “politics” in the 
context of the study. As with metaphysics, though perhaps less opaquely, politics is a 
term which has been subject to a number of varying uses throughout the history of 
philosophy. The understanding of politics within the study derives from a slightly 
modified reading of Robert Nozick’s famous opening lines to his Anarchy, State and 
Utopia. These lines state that ‘individuals have rights, and there are things no person or 
group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are 
these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials 
may do.’18 Rather than starting with a priori rights, this study begins with the 
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assumption that it is from our understanding of the nature of Being that the state must 
look for its justification and direction. As a rough example, if the nature of individual 
Being is such that authenticity is derived from our directing of our own choices and our 
taking responsibility for those choices, an authentic politics must account for and adapt 
to this. As with Nozick’s individual rights, the importance of the nature of Being to the 
study is such that ‘the nature of the state, its legitimate functions and its justifications’19 
must flow from the source that is our understanding of our Being. 
 The completeness of Hegel’s philosophical system led him to outline his 
brilliantly detailed political philosophy in his Outlines of the Philosophy of Right in 
which he declared that ‘what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’.20 We 
must prepare at this point for the understanding that a more limited philosophy – a 
philosophy more modest about the limits of philosophy – may, or indeed must, result in 
an equally modest contribution to political theory. The absence of a detailed political 
theory ought not to be misconstrued as a void in need of being filled in, for it may be 
that for an ontology which understands individuals as self-creating no political morality 
is any more justifiable than any other. Neither should it be surprising if a philosopher 
whose focus is upon the individual’s relationship with God devotes little space to the 
formation of parliaments or the responsibilities attached to universal suffrage. It should 
be accepted that what may seem to be a dearth of political theory may in fact be a 
deliberately apolitical stance. Within the study, references to politics should be 
understood to refer to both the arrangements of nation states (within and without), as 
well as any other grouping with a power structure mirroring that of a state from which 
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individuals cannot extract themselves without penalty (tribal structures for example – 
the family and workplace should not be considered examples of this). 
 The initial inspiration for the study centred upon the perceived need for the 
dignity of the individual person to be reasserted within the realm of philosophy. The 
politics to be discussed within the study are the political implications of the various 
forms of this reassertion. Politics is taken to be the conclusion of philosophical 
reasoning rather than the driving force behind this reasoning. Political positions must 
be moulded to fit the shape of philosophy, rather than philosophy being twisted to 
reflect political prejudice. As the focus of the study is upon thinkers who have 
reasserted the position of the person and subjectivity in the light of Hegelian 
objectivity, it should not be surprising that the implications of their thought tend 
towards political approaches which similarly respect and assert the dignity of the 
person and their subjectivity. 
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Max Stirner: The Self-Owning Individual 
 
The rebellion against Hegelianism to be found in Max Stirner’s sole major work The 
Ego and His Own is of such a scale that, in comparison, the other thinkers discussed 
within this study may appear to be orthodox Hegelian idealists. Whereas Hegel’s 
conception of freedom in his Philosophy of Right finds full realisation through the 
structures of the family, civil society and the state, Stirner rejects these structures and 
others as barriers, rather than routes, to individual freedom. Such a view is easy to 
characterise as Hegel did as a form of evil.
1
 Indeed, if we were not aware of the twenty-
eight year gap between the publication of Philosophy of Right and The Ego and His 
Own, it would seem as if Hegel had Stirner in mind when he rails against ‘subjectivity 
which conceives itself as the final court of appeal’.2 Hegel continues to argue that such 
a view ‘not only substitutes a void for the whole content of ethics, right, duties, and 
laws… but in addition its form is a subjective void, i.e. it knows itself as this 
contentless void and in this knowledge knows itself as absolute.’3 There are discernible 
echoes between Hegel’s complaints of a philosophy which says ‘I enjoy only myself’4 
and the statement at the end of The Ego and His Own’s introductory chapter 
proclaiming ‘Nothing is more to me than myself!’5 This is a sure indication that Stirner 
was unconcerned with the controversy his work might provoke amongst more orthodox 
Hegelians, and suggests a willingness to offend those holding such views. In this 
chapter we shall discuss the interrelationship between Stirner’s conception of 
individual Being, and the form and degree of political interaction he deems to be 
acceptable because of this understanding. 
  
43 
 
Man. 
 
Stirner’s philosophical egoism necessarily insists that when discussing Being, it is 
always the author’s personal Being which takes centre stage. This is particularly 
unsurprising as to have loftily discussed the nature of the Being of Man after having 
separated the individual from this construct within the first few paragraphs of the work 
would have immediately demolished Stirner’s impassioned line of argument.6 Equally, 
Stirner’s individual “I” ought not to be conceived of as a separation of the author from 
the remaining mass of mankind, but rather as a call for all individuals to free 
themselves.
7
 The first part of The Ego and His Own (‘Man’) discusses the development 
of a man as an individual, and then of mankind itself from ancient to contemporary 
times. First, however, we must turn to Stirner’s description of the transition of child 
into old man in the chapter ‘A Human Life’, a chapter during which a sense of Stirner’s 
view of the nature of individual Being comes to the fore. Stirner describes how a child 
‘seeks to find out himself and get hold of himself out of its confusion in which he, along 
with everything else, is tossed in a motley mixture.’8 However, the child soon finds that 
everything he makes contact with ‘defends itself in turn against his attacks, and asserts 
its own persistence.’9 In the face of these experiences the child endeavours to gain the 
upper hand – dominance – in battle against these external things, with the only 
alternative being submission. Stirner explains, 
 
In childhood liberation takes the direction of trying to get to the bottom of things, to 
get at what is “back of” things… we like to smash things, like to rummage through 
hidden corners, pry after what is covered up or out of the way, and try what we can 
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do with everything. When we once get at what is back of the things, we know we 
are safe; when we have got at the fact that the rod is too weak against our obduracy, 
then we no longer fear it… Back of everything we find our courage, our 
superiority… the more we feel ourselves, the smaller is that which before seemed 
invincible.
10
 
 
This conquering of external things is referred to by Stirner as “mind”. Whilst the child 
overcame external obstacles by self-discovery, the next stage of development – the 
youth – must battle against the enemy within, ‘his own conscience.’11 Fear of the rod is 
replaced with fears of being ‘unreasonable, unchristian [or] unpatriotic’.12 The young 
man, the next stage of development, is different from the youth as now he realises ‘that 
one must deal with the world according to his interest, not according to his ideals’.13 
Just as the first self-discovery entailed the child getting back of external things, the 
self-discovery of the young man entails getting back of his own thoughts. Whereas the 
conscience led the youth into submission to ideas – be they ideas of God, nation, or 
other – the young man must recognise this as being thought, and importantly, thought 
of his own creation. Taking ownership of these thoughts, getting back of them, deprives 
them of their assumed corporeity. Stirner explains how the young man declares himself 
the only corporeal thing, and takes ‘the world as what it is to me, as mine, as my 
property; I refer all to myself.’14 Stirner offers the possibility of a further stage beyond 
the development of the egoistic young man, the old man, but with characteristic wit 
explains that ‘when I become one, there will still be time enough to speak of that.’15 
Unfortunately no such passage ever materialised. 
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 Developmental psychologists would undoubtedly understandably baulk at 
Stirner’s idealised and simplistic depiction of human development, however this short 
section of The Ego and His Own begins to form a picture of Stirner’s views regarding 
individual Being in relation to both the external world and to thought. As Leopold 
highlights, the stages of child, youth and man are epochs of individual realism, idealism 
and egoism, respectively.
16
 One could argue that these stages betray an 
autobiographical content, suggesting Stirner’s own worldview shifted from realist to 
idealist, before settling in the egoism of The Ego and His Own. More importantly for 
this study, and more important philosophically, is the way in which Stirner’s 
developmental stages of a man serve as a metaphor for the development of Western 
philosophical thought. The stages of realism and idealism are discussed in the lengthy 
second chapter of the first part, whilst the egoistic future is handled in the second part 
of the work, ‘I’. As such, Stirner’s work implies that the Western philosophical 
tradition had overcome the first point of self-discovery (the transition from child to 
youth), but had yet to overcome and reclaim individual ownership of thought. 
  
The ancients. 
 
The chapter ‘Men of the Old Time and of the New’ is separated into three sections: 
‘The Ancients’, ‘The Moderns’ and ‘The Free’. The final section, Stirner explains, is 
effectively a subsection of the second section, as it concerns the ‘more modern and 
most modern among the “moderns”’.17 That the “free” have a separate section to the 
“moderns” is due to the former grouping representing the present, the philosophy 
contemporaneous to Stirner, and the latter grouping representing the recent, post-
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ancient, past. The pre-Christian “ancients” is a category used by Stirner largely to 
discuss ancient Greek thought, whilst also making passing references to Judaism and 
pre-Christian Rome. Stirner associates the ancients with his metaphorical child from 
the previous section, yet simultaneously acknowledges their position as ‘our good old 
fathers.’18 Just like Stirner’s child, the ancients are portrayed as being in the throes of 
attempting to get back of the physical world.
19
 The spiritual alienation from the world 
of Christianity is contrasted with the ancient Greek and Jewish striving to realise the 
best life possible on Earth. Just as the strivings of the child led to self-discovery and the 
transition to youth, the development in Greek thought is shown by Stirner to have sown 
the seeds for the transition to the thought of the Christian moderns. The Sophists use of 
understanding and mind against the world is improved upon by Socrates’ assertion that 
a pure heart is also necessary if this work of the mind is to have value.
20
 Stirner 
contrasts the Stoics’ and Epicureans’ differing interpretations of the proper relationship 
between the man of thought and the world, with the former preferring contempt and 
isolation, and the latter recommending movement and engagement.
21
 It is only with the 
Sceptics, Stirner suggests, that the decisive break from child to youth is made. The 
Sceptics marked the shift in Greek thought from there being an emphasis on the spirit 
to the truly spiritual. Stirner quotes various Sceptic figures, such as ‘Pyrrho’s doctrine 
[that] the world is neither good nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly, but these are [only] 
predicates which I give it.’22 Stirner argues that through such realisations, the ancients 
have got back of the world of things into the world of spirit, in which ‘Christianity then 
begins.’23 It is on this note that Stirner moves to discuss – at much greater length – the 
moderns. 
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The moderns. 
 
In comparing the ancients and moderns, Stirner explains that whilst the former saw the 
world as a truth, the latter saw the spirit as a truth (just as was the case for Stirner’s 
idealistic youth).
24
 Just as the ancients were shook up by the revelations of Socrates, 
Stirner posits the moderns’ decisive point as the emergence of Luther and the 
Reformation. He explains: 
 
as in the time of the Sophists… so the most brilliant things happened in the time 
of Humanism… At this time the heart was still far from wanting to relieve itself 
of its Christian contents. But finally the Reformation, like Socrates, took hold 
seriously of the heart itself, and since then hearts have kept growing visibly—
more unchristian.
25
  
 
It is this process Stirner charts through the remainder of the section, first discussing 
spirit. The egoist, he argues, is castigated by others for emphasising the personal over 
the spiritual, yet for the non-egoist, the emphasis on spirit is an emphasis towards a 
foreign power. He explains, ‘spirit is your ideal, the unattained, the other-worldly; 
spirit is the name of your—god, “God is spirit.”’26 This conception of spirit leads 
Stirner to suggest that the non-egoist is in some way possessed.
27
 
 Stirner moves to discuss in greater depth the individual’s relationship to spirit, 
and to offer evidence for his claims of possession. He metaphorically interrogates the 
non-egoist about his thoughts. Thoughts are not things, but spiritual entities, ‘the spirit 
of things, the main point of all things, the inmost in them, their—idea.’28 When one 
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does not err from accurately recognising the idea of the thing, this is the truth. The truth 
is sacred to the non-egoist, ‘nothing transcends it, it is eternal.’29 The sacred, Stirner 
argues, is never present for the sensual man, but only for faith and spirit.
30
 Stirner 
suggests that it is not only the religious who defer to the sacred – an act unbecoming of 
the egoist – for atheists are just as guilty. In the place of God as supreme spirit, Stirner 
accuses the atheists of deifying Man.
31
 He explains, 
 
Whether then the one God or the three in one, whether the Lutheran God or the 
être supreme or not God at all, but “Man”, may represent the highest essence, 
that makes no difference at all for him who denies the highest essence itself [i.e. 
the egoist], for in his eyes those servants… are one and all—pious people… In 
the foremost place of the sacred then stands the highest essence and the faith in 
this essence, our “holy faith”.32 
 
Stirner likens the pious holding of fixed ideas about the sacredness of laws, morality 
and so on, to a form of madness. He argues that they are akin to fools in a madhouse, 
totally unaware of their captivity as the asylum covers such a wide space allowing the 
impression of being able to roam freely.
33
 Only the egoist freed from the bounds of the 
sacred is truly free. 
 On the similarity of religious and atheistic piety Stirner attacks Feuerbach for 
exchanging the religious standpoint for the moral standpoint. This exchange involves 
the inversion of the belief that “God is love” into “love is divine” or “love is sacred”.34 
The inversion has clearly replaced God with a more humanistic conception, but despite 
this Feuerbach is still stuck, in Stirner’s view, with the fixed idea. Stirner explains that 
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this move has expelled God from the heavens only to be ‘chased into the human breast 
and gifted with indelible immanence.’35 The fixed ideas of the non-egoist do not even 
form an internally consistent system for, Stirner suggests, there are often times when 
fixed ideas come into conflict. For instance, an act may be judged to be good in its 
intentions and outcome, but yet be judged immoral if it transgresses the fixed idea of 
the law.
36
 Stirner decries the way in which opposition parties fail to flourish due to 
being weighed down by the sacred fixed ideas of law and morality, suggesting they 
‘renounce will in order to live to love, renounce liberty—for love of morality.’37 He 
also rails against those reformers who wish to have free will without having to 
renounce the moral will.
38
 Stirner’s implication is clear: choose a free will or a moral 
will. You cannot have both. This point is linked to Stirner’s arguments about education 
which are covered in more detail in his earlier work The False Principle of Our 
Education.
39
 It is not stretching too far into speculation to suggest that Stirner’s 
previous position as a teacher highlighted the importance of education on helping to 
form the individual’s nature.40 Stirner argues that the tendency of education is to 
attempt to produce feelings in the student, a method which is in tune with the moral 
will. The alternative to this is for the students to be involved themselves in the 
production of feelings, instead of receiving them ready-made from a third party.
41
 This 
latter model is entirely in keeping with Stirner’s wider views on the freedom of the 
individual, albeit expressed in a less radical fashion. 
 To end the section on the moderns, Stirner moves to a discussion of hierarchy. 
After using a somewhat strained and outdated metaphor of different races as the 
different stages of development of spirit, Stirner explains the way in which the idea of 
the sacred enforces hierarchy. Sacred is, as we have seen previously, ‘everything which 
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for the egoist is to be unapproachable, not to be touched, outside his power—above 
him… every matter of conscience’.42 What is sacred is not the thing, but the thought 
about the thing. Sacredness demands objectivity as all must treat the sacred with the 
same veneration and subservience. By raising the objective thought above all else, 
Hegel’s philosophical system is condemned as ‘the extremest case of violence on the 
part of thought, its highest pitch of despotism and sole dominion, the triumph of the 
mind, and with it the triumph of philosophy.’43 This triumph ends with the positioning 
of Man at the summit of the hierarchy, with Man serving whichever sacred cause is 
deemed necessary for the times, be it morality, patriotism or religiousness. Stirner’s 
main contention with this impersonal concept of Man is that ‘he who is infatuated with 
Man leaves persons out of account’.44 The discipline necessary to maintain the stability 
of the hierarchy, Stirner explains, was originally maintained through the imparting of 
the fear of God into individuals. Now this same effect is achieved through the fear of 
Man, this impersonal concept personifying the law, morality, country, and so on.
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Luther and the break from the medieval, instead of reversing this trend, internalises it. 
Stirner compares the state of the individual in Protestantism to that of a man living in 
an authoritarian police state. 
 
The spy and eavesdropper, “conscience”, watches over every motion of the 
mind, and all thought and action is for it a “matter of conscience”, that is, police 
business. This tearing of man into “natural impulse” and “conscience”… is 
what constitutes the Protestant… The Catholic finds himself satisfied when he 
fulfils the command; the Protestant acts according to his “best judgement and 
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conscience”. For the Catholic is only a layman; the Protestant is himself a 
clergyman… the spiritual became complete.46 
 
The completion of the spiritual is achieved when the Protestant is controlled no longer 
by earthly powers, but by his own conscience – the thought, the idea, the spiritual. 
Stirner associates Hegel with the Lutheran, for just as in Protestantism, Hegel’s system 
carries the idea through everything. In Hegelianism, ‘in everything there is reason… for 
the real is in fact everything; as in each thing, for instance, each lie, the truth can be 
detected: there is no absolute lie, no absolute evil, and the like.’47 
  
The free. 
 
The free, the most modern of the moderns, are separated by Stirner into three 
categories: political liberals, social liberals and humane liberals. These categories form 
the progressive movement in political philosophy after the end of the absolute 
monarchy. Political liberalism heralded the advent of commonality (or “citizenhood”) 
and the rights of man.
48
 In reaction to the behaviour of the nobility under absolute 
monarchy, the principle is adopted that individual interest ought to be rejected and 
replaced with a focus on the general interest.
49
 This spirit of egalitarian commonality is 
emphasised through equality of political rights.
50
 The objectivity inherent in political 
liberalism is heavily criticised by Stirner, who likens it to Hegel’s succeeding ‘in 
glorifying the dependence of the subject on the object… [putting] the individual in 
irons by the thought of humanity.’51 Stirner decries the political liberal’s zealous faith 
in reason, which is just as strong and fanatical as the Christian faith which preceded 
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it.
52
 He attacks political liberty for producing freedom for the state rather than freedom 
for individuals. Similarly, freedom of religion and freedom of conscience entail 
religion being free and conscience being free, not individuals themselves. Stirner 
explains, ‘it does not mean my liberty, but the liberty of a power that rules and 
subjugates me… state, religion, conscience, these despots, make me a slave, and their 
liberty is my slavery.’53 Under political liberalism, even the ruler is depersonalised. The 
absolute king is replaced with the impersonal constitutional monarch, and where there 
once were orders there is now the law.
54
 Both are equally oppressive to Stirner, as one 
is the will of the ruler, the other is the will of Man – neither are initiated by the will of 
the actor. In disparaging the law, Stirner is not imagining a utopian vision in which the 
creativity of the individual’s will is the only limit. The sole limit on the individual 
according to Stirner is power.
55
 If the individual has the power needed to carry out a 
particular action he can, if the individual is not powerful enough he cannot. Qualms 
brought about by morality, law, the tastes of the majority of citizens, and so on, are to 
Stirner an anathema. Stirner finds that, as is a tendency of all social orders, political 
liberalism fails by its own terms of reference. Political equality fails to address the 
issue of labour slavery, leading to the advent of social liberalism.
56
 
 Social liberalism adds to the political equality of political liberalism an equality 
of property. Whereas in political liberalism, the property of the elite is protected from 
the masses by the state, social liberalism puts all property in the impersonal hands of 
society.
57
 Stirner argues that the reshaping of society in social liberalism has its 
grounds in a mistaken assumption that faults in society can be solved by implementing 
a new model of society. ‘This is only the old phenomenon – that one looks for the fault 
first in everything but himself, and consequently in the state, in the self-seeking of the 
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rich, and so on, which yet have precisely our fault to thank for their existence.’58 The 
society envisaged by the social liberal has labour as its sole value. All labour for the 
good of society is of value – of equal value for ‘he who accomplishes something useful 
is inferior to none’.59 If all labourers and labours are equal, it takes no great logical leap 
to conclude that all wages – shares of the property of society – must also be equal. 
 Humane liberalism counters that political and social liberalism both maintain an 
unacceptable strand of egoism. Whilst social liberalism recognised and amended some 
of the egoism in political liberalism, the socialist labourer ‘will utilise society for his 
egoistic ends as the commoner does the state.’60 This is because whilst the socialist 
labours equally for the sake of society, in his leisure time he is an egoist. The socialist 
has endeavoured to equalise man’s drudgery but has failed to realise that man’s leisure 
must also be equal. For the humane liberal, the victory over egoism will only be 
complete when man achieves ‘completely “disinterested” action, total 
disinterestedness. This alone is human, because Man is disinterested, [whilst] the egoist 
is always interested.’61 Stirner counters that the humane liberal fails to account for the 
possibility that everything possible to a man should be considered human. By 
attempting to synthesise how Man should be, the humane liberal has ignored the fact 
that human beings already exist. ‘I do not need to begin producing the human being in 
myself, for he belongs to me already, like all my qualities.’62 Stirner continues to 
reemphasise his belief that Man is only an idea existing through individual men.
63
 He 
rejects any suggestion that his egoism is based on a claim to rights not recognised by 
the progressive strains of liberalism. Stirner declares,  
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I want to be all and have all that I can be and have. Whether others are and have 
anything similar, what do I care? The equal, the same, they can neither be nor have. 
I cause no detriment to them, as I cause no detriment to the rock by being “ahead of 
it” in having motion. If they could have it, they would have it.64 
 
Others are to Stirner objects to be utilised, if possible, for his ends. The only limits 
which are of any interest to the individual are his own, for ‘he who overturns one of his 
limits may have shown others the way and the means’.65 Whether the other uses this 
example to his own benefit is of no direct interest to Stirner – self-interest is always the 
egoist’s one and only end. 
  
The egoistic alternative. 
 
Having indicated the flaws he finds inherent in the changing trends of impersonal 
thought, Stirner moves to explain his own egoistic alternative in the second half of the 
work which is entitled in a suitably egoistical fashion “I”. Stirner describes how both 
spirit and body thirst for freedom, but explains that freedom alone is not enough.
66
 
Freedom alone is a void – a vacuum to be filled by the individual becoming an owner.67 
To Stirner the cravings for particular freedoms are cravings for new dominion. For 
instance, freedom from arbitrary rule led to the dominion of laws.
68
 He criticises 
freedom for its inherent negativity – freedom is always freedom from something. 
Egoism, and the self-ownership it entails, ‘calls you to joy over yourselves’.69 
Ownership over oneself is the state into which each individual is born, but must be 
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actively reclaimed.
70
 Stirner explains that freedom from the external world is achieved 
to, 
 
the degree that I make the world my own, “gain it and take possession of it” for 
myself, by whatever might, by that of persuasion, of petition, of categorical 
demand, yes, even by hypocrisy, cheating, etc; for the means I use are determined 
by what I am. If I am weak I have only weak means, like the aforesaid, which yet 
are good enough for a considerable part of the world.
71
 
 
If Stirner did not find the concept of rights completely abhorrent, his position on 
gaining ownership of the external world might best be summarised by the adage “might 
is right”. He explains that ‘freedom becomes complete only when it is my—might’.72 
This freedom necessary for self-ownership cannot, Stirner contends, be given as a gift 
or contractual right; it must be taken by the individual himself. He scathingly attacks 
those who might claim to give the individual his freedom. These “liberators” ‘are 
simply knaves who give more than they have… they give you nothing of their own, but 
stolen wares: they give you your own freedom’.73 Stirner is insistent that we must 
always remember that the freedom we must claim for ourselves with our might is no 
ultimate end, but only a means. All things are means to the egoist, with the only 
legitimate end being himself and his self-ownership. 
 The status of the self-owning individual – the owner – is the subject of the 
second section of The Ego and His Own’s second and longest chapter. It is in this 
chapter that Stirner makes his brief yet tantalising reference to ‘the Union of Egoists’74 
which offers a small insight into what political arrangements might be if Stirner’s 
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vision for the future was enacted. As Stirner goes little further in explicitly explaining 
the shape and structure of human relations after the present societal configuration has 
been obliterated, it is unsurprising that the union of egoists has tended to receive a great 
deal more discussion from academics than it did from Stirner himself.
75
 The lack of 
systematic development of the union of egoists ought not necessarily be thought of as 
an omission by Stirner. From the philosophical positions expounded in The Ego and 
His Own which have been discussed above (and will be discussed below), various 
aspects of the union are implied. As Stepelevich explains, Stirner’s union of egoists 
would be ‘a voluntary collective against an ideological communality.’76 Any further 
prescription than this would be in direct contradiction of Stirner’s conception of the 
self-owning individual. To proscribe a mandatory alternative to current societal 
structure would be to replace one dominion with another. If individuals are to use 
whatever means seem most suitable to them to reach their own individual ends, it 
would be an act of prophecy to assume to know what these means will be. It seems 
likely that individuals might collect together in a union of egoists on specific measures 
when this appears the most efficient manner of reaching each of their individual ends. 
The exact agreements these unions would be based upon would be as numerous and 
limitless as the myriad ideas individuals might have. This would necessitate the egoist 
philosopher being omniscient in order to make accurate predictions of all the private 
agreements self-owning individuals might consent to. Although it is likely Stirner 
would not wholly have agreed with the wording, Milton Friedman sums up well the 
problem the philosopher of individualism has in prescribing social structures. 
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In a society, freedom has nothing to say about what an individual does with his 
freedom; it is not an all-embracing ethic. Indeed, a major aim of the liberal is to 
leave the ethical problem for the individual to wrestle with.
77
 
 
This is perhaps why, as we have seen and will continue to see, Stirner’s emphasis for 
his philosophy is himself. If others choose to do otherwise it is likely to be to their 
detriment, but is their business to choose to do so if they have the might. 
 Power or might, as we have seen, is a key feature of Stirner’s conception of the 
self-owning individual. He summarises his position in the following series of 
statements, 
  
My power is my property. 
 My power gives me property. 
 My power am I myself, and through it am I my property.
78
 
 
For Stirner power is the sole legitimate limit on the individual and his ambitions. If you 
have the might required to be something, then you have every right to be it – be this the 
owner of a particular thing, the holder of a certain status amongst other individuals, or 
the creator of a magnificent work of art or invention. As he explains, ‘I am entitled to 
everything that I have in my power.’79 Stirner tackles the ethical concerns which may 
arise from this proposition, in particular with regards to the issue of murder. He insists 
that murder ought not to be dismissed as wrong, for “wrong” is an idea – a spook – 
which is a barrier to the egoist’s self-ownership. Stirner argues that if the egoist has the 
might and permits himself to murder, this is the sole permit required.
80
 Stirner’s 
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attitude, consistent with his philosophy, is that if an individual lacks the might and 
impetus to protect his property – including his life – from being taken by another, and 
another wishes to take ownership of this property, then this is what he deserves. 
Property belongs to the individual who is willing and able to take it.
81
 This does not 
however mean that Stirner is averse to the act of punishment – indeed he regards it to 
be a sensible way to protect one’s own property. Unlike Hegel, Stirner does not view 
punishment as being automatically the right of the criminal or murderer, for if the 
criminal is able to escape punishment this is his right.
82
 Stirner posits punishment as the 
individual’s right against the criminal.83 Punishment is the wronged person or persons 
getting the upper hand against the person or persons who have tried to take away or 
damage their property. Whether punishment is on an individual basis, or the action 
taken by a union of egoists working to achieve the constituent members’ mutual 
interests is immaterial – punishment is the use of might by the wronged upon the 
wrong-doer. Stirner’s views on crime and punishment are probably best summarised by 
his pithy remark, ‘defend yourself, and no one will do anything to you!’84 Whilst for 
ease of discussion on these points we have utilised the term “crime” to discuss actions 
deigned to be infractions against the individual and his property, Stirner questions the 
value of the term. By being an egoist, the individual is already a criminal against sacred 
ideas such as state, religion and ethics from birth.
85
 As such, Stirner explains how ‘only 
against a sacred thing are there criminals: you against me can never be a criminal, but 
only an opponent.’86 
 Stirner continues to examine the relationships between the egoist and others in 
the section “My Intercourse”. He heavily criticises society for being a spook which 
fails to satisfy the wants of the egoist whilst at most satisfying the needs of the 
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human.
87
 Stirner argues that societies as they currently exist can never satisfy the wants 
of the egoist as egoism itself is viewed as a corrupting agent within society.
88
 Stirner 
contrasts society with his suggested union of egoists, with the former unsurprisingly 
coming up short.
89
 Societies’ overruling of the individual’s needs with common needs 
is rejected by Stirner as the ‘furthest extremity of self-renunciation’,90 as this 
necessarily involves the egoist accepting that there are ends higher than his own – ends 
for which his own ends must be sacrificed to achieve. Stirner uses the example of 
Socrates’ refusal to escape for captivity before his execution as he recognised his 
society’s right to put him to death. Socrates’ society, like all societies, is to Stirner 
merely an idea – a spook. As such Stirner describes Athens’ most revered thinker as a 
fool for his actions, and holds the position that Socrates deserved to be killed for he 
lacked the will and might to protect his own property – his life.91 
 Moving from society to state, Stirner rejects even the most tolerant of states as 
lacking the freedom required by the egoist, for this tolerance only tolerates that which 
is of no threat to the state.
92
 The individual is free to do as he likes as long as the status 
of the state and the position of the individual within it remains undamaged and 
unchanged. The constitutionally limited state is viewed by the philosopher as being a 
conflict of absolutism.
93
 This duality between the absolutism of the people through the 
constitution and the absolutism of the state is unlikely to result in much more than 
continuing tension. As ever, a victory for either absolutist position or the status quo of 
continued tension would be a defeat for the egoist for whom himself and his ends are 
the only recognisable absolute. This is not to suggest that Stirner envisages the egoist 
embarking on a war against the state wherever it exists, as this would involve placing 
an ideal – in this case, the ideal of all being free from the state – above his own self. 
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Stirner explains, ‘only when the state comes into contact with his ownness does the 
egoist take an active interest in it.’94 This active interest may include involvement 
within a political party, but never the tribalism associated with party systems. For the 
egoist, the political party is a union he freely joins as a means for advancing his own 
purposes, and from which he can and will choose to leave whenever membership is no 
longer to his benefit.
95
 Stirner’s egoist is unpartisan, working with whichever party will 
at that time best serve his needs. If this party changes he has little qualms in switching 
sides – the egoist never binds himself to any grouping.96 
 Stirner’s continual theme of refusing to recognise anything as sacred begins his 
extended discussion of property. He argues that the deification of property rights by 
civic liberals ‘deserves the attacks of the Communists and Proudhon’,97 yet the basis of 
these attacks is fundamentally flawed. Proudhon is attacked for declaring himself as 
being against all property whilst simultaneously advocating some forms of property 
within his own theory. As Stirner summarises, ‘Proudhon, therefore, denies only such 
and such property, not property itself.’98 Even Proudhon’s most renowned designation 
of property as theft contains within itself the presupposition of property. Without the 
existence of property, the accusation of theft loses not only its cutting power but also 
any comprehendible meaning.
99
 As we have previously seen, the only right Stirner 
accepts over property is the might to take possession of property and the might to 
defend this from the might of others.
100
 Cooperation with others within a union of 
egoists is suggested as one of the means for protecting this property. The union acts to 
protect its members’ property from the incursions of others not because of a belief that 
once held, the individual’s connection with his property is sacred, but because this 
cooperation is for the benefit of each member of the union.
101
 If it is no longer the case 
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that the individual finds his interests best served within the union, he is free to leave 
and join another, or to join none at all. Stirner’s riposte to Proudhon and the 
communists is that property ‘should not and cannot be abolished; it must rather be torn 
from ghostly hands and become my property; then the erroneous consciousness that I 
cannot entitle myself to as much as I require will vanish.’102 Vanish, that is, as long as 
the individual has the means to acquire all he requires – with infinite means the 
individual can satisfy infinite requirements. Stirner moves from abstract theoretical 
property rights in the abstract to attack what is referred to within the state as being “free 
competition”. Free competition is anything but free according to Stirner, as the state 
insists that it must first qualify individuals to compete. Without the grace of the state, 
for instance the requisite certification to practise medicine or the appropriate permit to 
trade certain objects, the individual has no freedom to compete.
103
 Stirner suggests that 
within a union of egoists, all should take an interest in the production of their 
requirements. If one requires bread, he should not leave this to the guild or competing 
producers. If the egoist does not make it his activity to actively pursue his affair (in this 
case bread) he ‘must be content with what it pleases others to vouchsafe’104 him. 
 Written during a time of state censorship, The Ego and His Own’s discussion of 
press freedom appears to be an example of Stirner’s sailing very close to the rocks. He 
discusses the fundamental difference to be found in press freedom granted by state and 
that taken from the state, namely that the latter is a truer victory for the egoist.
105
 The 
press, as is the case with other things, is for the egoist his property. It is a means to 
achieving his end, over which no other is recognised as a judge regarding its 
utilisation.
106
 For Stirner, action by the state to recognise the liberty of the press 
presupposes that the state has the right to decide who may and may not be thought of as 
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possessing a particular right. On this point the philosopher cites the example of France 
in which freedom of the press is viewed as being a right of man. The government does 
not gift this right to individuals, but solely to the spook Man. As such, the state is able 
to limit freedom of the press to individuals by insisting that these individuals act and 
think in a way which fails to correspond with the designation “Man”.107 The individual 
again becomes ‘the retainer of mankind, only a specimen of the species’.108 
 Max Stirner’s reputation for hard-nosed self-serving egoism might suggest that 
he had little time for matters of the heart, yet when discussing the egoist’s relations 
with others he devotes several pages to questions of love. Stirner explains, ‘I love men 
too—not merely individuals, but every one. But I love them with the consciousness of 
egoism; I love them because love makes me happy… it pleases me.’109 This love for 
other individuals includes finding joy from their joy, and pain from their pain. Stirner 
rejects the conception of love as being any form of commandment, but a part of his 
property for which he explains he fixes ‘the purchase price… quite at my pleasure.’110 
Stirner draws a distinction between what he calls egoistic love, and religious and 
romantic love. The latter forms of love contain a sense of obligation, whilst egoistic 
love is the egoist’s own as the object of this love is the egoist’s object – the egoist’s 
property.
111
 Stirner is under no illusions about the consequences of his view of the 
loved one as being the lover’s property. He explains, 
 
I would rather be referred to men’s selfishness than to their “kindnesses”, their 
mercy, pity, etc. The former demands reciprocity… does nothing “gratis”, and may 
be won and—bought. But with what shall I obtain the kindness? It is a matter of 
chance… The affectionate one’s service can be had only by—begging, be it by my 
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lamentable appearance, by my need of help, my misery, my—suffering. What can I 
offer him in return? Nothing!
112
 
 
For Stirner, if love is based on generosity rather than ownership, the loved one is 
beholden to the whims of the lover, just as the individual may be beholden to the state, 
family or God. The egoist’s relation to others in this way lends itself to Stirner’s 
suggestion of a union of egoists in which limitations on the liberty of the members 
would still be inevitable, but greatly minimised in comparison with current societal 
relations.
113
 Perhaps the greatest single reason for this difference is that ‘the society is 
sacred, the union your own; the society consumes you, you consume the union.’114 
Within the union of egoists the egoist’s satisfaction, and nothing else, dictates his 
relationship with others.
115
 
 Stirner discusses the nature of Being of the individual, arguing that one must 
always be anxious not only to live, but to enjoy life.
116
 He dismisses the philosophical 
and theological trend of searching for man’s true self, insisting that what a man is now 
is his true self already.
117 The search for man’s true or higher self is an attempt to 
replace individuals’ actual existences with an idea in service of religion, 
humanitarianism or some other alien spook. These idealised visions of man make the 
individual’s life a means for duty or morality, whilst for Stirner it is all other things 
which should be turned into the means for furthering the individual’s enjoyment of 
life.
128
 Having rejected that the egoist’s life should be considered a means to fulfil duty, 
Stirner further denies that individuals have any form of calling or destiny at all.
119
 
Whilst Stirner has throughout The Ego and His Own implored the egoist to use his 
force to obtain the property to satisfy his needs, he rejects that this is a calling. The use 
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of might is the egoist’s act, ‘real and extant at all times.’120 A calling is an ideal or 
possibility for the future, whilst for Stirner the egoist is real, now – what is real and 
now is all that matters. Stirner argues that ideals and callings for man are pure 
possibilities, adding that ‘if something which one imagines to be easily possible is not, 
or does not happen, then one may be assured that something stands in the way of the 
thing, and that it is—impossible.’121 Possibility, Stirner asserts, is ‘nothing but 
thinkableness’.122 Stirner decries the waste of life and energy throughout history spent 
on attempting to reach an impossible ideal, arguing that ‘no sheep… exerts itself to 
become “a proper sheep”’.123 The true egoist should forget all concepts of what he 
ought to be and focus upon being the best his might allows him to be – the former 
places the individual in service of a spook, the latter in service of himself. To focus on 
Being, Stirner explains, is to strive after an abstraction.
124
 Being is always personal 
being, ‘it is my being’.125 The absolute abstract thought of Hegel is similarly rejected, 
for this fails to account for the personal thinker – Hegel’s philosophy is the 
personification of thinking.
126
 Both Being and thinking must be conquered and made 
the property of the egoist.
127
 
 Stirner’s philosophy in The Ego and His Own displays a pragmatism in which 
the sacredness of certain objects and thoughts is never replaced with considering them 
as profane, for both the sacred and profane possess individuals.
128
 Using the example of 
the Bible, which may be used differently by a believer (as the word of God), a child (as 
a plaything) and by a non-believer (as an object of ridicule), Stirner celebrates that each 
of these deals with the Bible to their heart’s pleasure.129 Just as with other objects, the 
Bible is used as a means for different people to achieve whichever ends they have 
chosen to follow. Similarly, supposedly sacred ideas such as God and truth hold no 
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strength for Stirner, who approaches both indifferently. He explains, ‘it is very much 
the same to me whether God or truth wins; first and foremost I want to win.’130 Indeed, 
Stirner later highlights that truth – an idea – can never truly win a victory as it is a 
spook. As with other ideas, other spooks, truth is merely one of many available means 
for the egoist to utilise to achieve his own victory.
131
 Stirner rejects the idea of sin, and 
that certain acts and those who commit them are profane. Sinners are created by those 
who believe in sin, those whose lives are in service to morality. If there is no morality, 
there can be no sin. If there is no sin, ‘there is no sinner and [hence] no sinful 
egoism!’132 
 For the final short chapter of The Ego and His Own, “The Unique One”, Stirner 
reiterates several central points which have been made in the work. The conflict to be 
found in much of the history of philosophy between ‘the real and the ideal is an 
irreconcilable one, and the one can never become the other… The opposition of the two 
is not to be vanquished otherwise than if some one annihilates both.’133 This third party 
is the egoist, and the method of annihilation is by a shift in emphasis from the 
impersonal to the personal – from “it” to “I”. The egoist as the unique one – for each 
individual is unique – turns the question from “what is man?” to “who is man?” With 
the former ‘the concept was sought for… with “who” it is no longer any question at all, 
but the answer is personally on hand at once in the asker: the question answers 
itself.’134 With the rejection of the ideal, Stirner imagines that as with God, the unique 
individual may be thought of as being perfect, with ‘no calling to strive after 
perfection.’135 Echoing the beginning of the work Stirner concludes stating, 
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Every higher essence above me, be it God, be it man, weakens the feeling of my 
uniqueness, and pales only before the sun of this consciousness. If I concern myself 
for myself, the unique one, then my concern rests on its transitory, mortal creator, 
who consumes himself, and I may say:  
All things are nothing to me.
136
 
 
This final section summarises Stirner’s philosophy in a short paragraph, yet does not 
seem to carry the philosopher’s attitude as strongly as an earlier passage explaining 
why he writes what he does. Stirner begins rhetorically, 
 
Do I write out of love of men? No, I write because I want to procure for my 
thoughts an existence in the world; and, even if I foresaw that these thoughts would 
deprive you of your rest and your peace, even if I saw the bloodiest wars and the 
fall of many generations springing up from this seed of thought—I would 
nevertheless scatter it. Do with it what you will and can, that is your affair and does 
not trouble me… not even for truth’s sake do I speak out what I think… I sing 
because—I am a singer. But I use you for it because I—need ears.137 
 
Stirner expounds his philosophy of egoism not as some sort of public service, nor 
because it is a truth which must be spread amongst the masses. Stirner writes because 
he wishes to do so, and considers each subsequent reader in some way his object, for 
each provides him with his audience from which he derives his pleasure. 
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Conclusion. 
 
Despite the often extreme philosophical positions adopted by Max Stirner, his egoism 
does offer a possible solution to the problems of individuality arising from 
Hegelianism. Stirner’s anti-systemic theory sets out to reject not only the all-
encompassing philosophical system of Hegel, but all systems altogether – not 
withstanding his own system of placing self-enjoyment as the sum and goal of the 
individual’s actions. The value of Max Stirner’s philosophy for the purpose of this 
study can be divided into two sections: the extent to which Stirner recognised and 
highlighted problems inherent in Hegelianism and the rest of Western philosophy, and 
the extent to which Stirner’s egoism provides a satisfactory solution to these problems. 
Despite the lengthy and often sarcastic attack on “Saint Max” and The Ego and His 
Own in Marx and Engels’ posthumously published The German Ideology, Stirner’s 
criticisms helped shape and strengthen the communists’ philosophical positions. In his 
work Stirner had recognised and addressed the Hegelian tendency to dress the human 
in the robes of the theological, maintaining the same levels of religiosity as many of 
their hated opponents. Marx’s reaction to Stirner’s criticisms of the Young Hegelians in 
this area has been described by Stedman Jones as the ‘recourse to a thermo-nuclear 
response’138 of removing from all ideas any self-contained sacredness. This step 
allowed the continuance of the communistic criticism of the religious and ‘at the same 
time any association between socialism and ethics could be brutally denied.’139 Marx 
and Engels’ ‘ingenious but disingenuous’140 philosophical movement in response to 
Stirner may have later been followed by shifts away from the undesirable consequences 
of this new position (of the overemphasis of the economic above all other motivations 
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for communism
141
), but the existence at all of the movement highlights the strengths of 
Stirner’s insight. The attacks on the religious tone of Hegelianism struck much more 
keenly against the Young Hegelians against whom it was aimed than against the 
Lutheran Hegel, whose aim was to reconcile religion and philosophy within his 
philosophical system.
142
 Despite the hypothetical likelihood of Hegel being 
unconcerned about the accusation that his philosophy encouraged the deification of 
ideas and generally engaged in religiosity, this does not necessarily mean Stirner’s 
criticisms in this area have no bearing against Hegel. The deification of the idea must 
lead to the denigration of the individual who becomes little more than a container for 
this idea. The personal and individual – the unique – is lost in the glorifying of the 
objective. That Stirner recognised and highlighted this throughout The Ego and His 
Own guarantees the work’s value, regardless of the strengths of the philosopher’s 
prescriptions for change. 
 Stirner’s reassertion of the status of the individual and his relations with other 
individuals contains much which would be abhorrent to the other thinkers to be 
discussed within this study. His rebellion against the depersonalising effect of the 
ascendancy of ideas involves not only throwing the baby out with the bathwater, but a 
personal mission to destroy all baths whenever and wherever he encounters them. 
Stirner denies all values beyond that of self-enjoyment, yet never addresses why self-
enjoyment is a measure of action more valuable than all others. Ownership of self and 
the consideration of all other things and people as property (or potential property) to be 
used as a means to achieve one’s ends may be an internally consistent approach to 
understanding and guiding individuals’ actions, yet involves a great deal of over-
simplification. Leaving aside any qualms with the assumption that self-enjoyment is 
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inherently a good thing for all individuals to strive towards, Stirner’s theory may well 
have the effect of reducing the total amount of enjoyment to be enjoyed by individuals. 
This, Stirner would argue, is not his concern for if the individual does not have the 
might to grasp and hold onto enjoyment, he does not deserve it. Stirner’s philosophy 
continually has the appearance of being written from the perspective of one with 
enough might to satisfy his desires, never satisfactorily addressing the lot of those 
without this might. Stirner’s seeming confidence in his own ability to maintain 
ownership over his objects seems ill fitting with his actual position as the moderate 
outsider former-schoolmaster. The worldview of The Ego and His Own, if enacted, 
bares closer resemblance to the Hobbesian state of nature than anything else.
143
 There 
is nothing to suggest that a small group of the mighty elite will not group together in a 
union of egoists to ensure that life for everyone else remains ‘solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.’144 Stirner may, as we saw above, be unconcerned how his ideas 
effect other individuals, but his holding fast to a doctrine which may well herald the 
destruction of any hope of his own self-enjoyment if followed by all seems, 
paradoxically, to be an act of self-sacrifice in service to the egoistic ideal. 
 In perhaps the best book length study of Max Stirner in English so far, R. W. K. 
Paterson argues that he should be thought of as a precursor to atheistic existentialism in 
the same way that Søren Kierkegaard is accepted as the precursor to Christian 
existentialism.
145
 Many of the problems diagnosed by Stirner in The Ego and His Own 
foreshadow the concerns raised by phenomenology and existentialism. Stirner’s 
individual-centred philosophising – his insistence that he is writing always about 
himself rather than some abstract Man or mankind as a whole – has distinct similarities 
with Heidegger’s later insistence in Being and Time that ‘in each case Dasein is 
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mine’.146 Stirner is right to highlight the tendency in Hegelian thought (and elsewhere) 
to depersonalise the subject of the philosophising, placing the philosopher over and 
above their subject matter as a disinterested spectator. Stirner is also correct to question 
the reverent way in which the philosophical tradition has tended to take certain values 
as being unquestionable, and thus without need for justification. Examples of these at 
various times have included morality, law, the state and Christianity. In philosophy, all 
elements of existence should and must be open to question. Deference to tradition 
ought not become a barrier to questioning. A philosopher may conclude that it is 
justified that something which is valued by tradition is so valued, but this justification 
is required, and must not be assumed a priori. 
 Perhaps the strongest feature of Stirner’s philosophy is his insistence that each 
individual creates himself. There is no preordained duty for a man to complete, nor a 
role for him to play – he must choose himself. Whilst Stirner’s over-reliance on the role 
of might as the tool for achieving self created goals is flawed, it does provide an 
acceptance that whilst each individual must choose what he is to Be, this choice is not 
limitless. In Stirner’s theory, each man must make the most of the resources (might) at 
his disposal in order to satisfy his own ends. If anything, Stirner’s insistence on the 
egoist’s focus on self-enjoyment as the end to all his decisions seems much too 
prescriptive. For a philosopher who refuses to accept preordained status and duty, it 
seems inconsistent to assert a preordained goal. Either self-enjoyment is a narrow 
measure of success and thus restrains the individual’s possibilities for Being, or it is a 
term so wide and vague as to lack any real meaning. As such, Stirner’s self-enjoyment 
appears to suffer from many of the same errors as the utilitarians’ insistence on 
measuring the utility (whatever this means) of a given action. 
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 It has been suggested that Stirner’s anti-social philosophy is a projection of his 
dissatisfaction with his own rather unspectacular demeanour.
147
 Whether this is or is 
not the case is immaterial to this study in which Stirner’s philosophical worldview is 
being considered quite apart from any autobiographical inspiration. Stirner’s egoist’s 
relations with others seem almost to be a form of reverse solipsism. Instead of being 
unsure of the existence of other actors within the world, Stirner suggests that the egoist 
should act as if he is the only actor within the world. At no point does he suggest that 
this is objectively the case (quite the opposite), but the egoist’s treatment of others as 
solely an object divests them of their personality – they become just another resource 
within the world to be ordered and organised in order to achieve a goal which is not 
their own. The egoist is not immune from this depersonalising act, for if another has the 
might, he too can use the egoist as a tool for achieving his own goals. Rather than being 
beholden to a spook, every individual in Stirner’s theory runs the continuous risk of 
being torn from the state of self-ownership, and being put to use as a disposable means 
to reaching a foreign end. As such it can very easily be argued that instead of arresting 
the process of depersonalisation which he had so skilfully diagnosed, Stirner’s 
prescription accelerates it. Supporters of Stirner’s worldview might argue that in the 
current arrangement of human relations, the individual is already restrained. As such, 
even if only the few with the very most might regain their personality in the egoist 
world, this is better than none. Yet a worldview in which the great mass of mankind are 
treated as nothing but disposable fodder for the use of an elite surely cannot be the only 
response to the depersonalising tendency in Western metaphysics. 
 Where later phenomenology and existential philosophy in the form of 
Heidegger greatly advances on Stirner’s worldview is the assertion that it is possible 
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for the individual to have an authentic existence with others. Whilst ‘Stirner considers 
all human relationships to be founded on exploitation, in one form or another’,148 
Heidegger suggests that this is in no way inevitable. We will be discussing 
Heideggerian philosophy in detail later in this study, so we shall only briefly touch 
upon the subject here. Heidegger argues that it is possible for Dasein to ‘become 
authentically bound together [with another Dasein], and this makes possible the right 
kind of objectivity, which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.’149 This greatly 
advances on the somewhat nightmarish vision of total war of all against all, separated 
by occasional agreement on matters of mutual benefit. 
 Stirner’s conception of responsibility is also lacking. He asserts the egoist’s 
self-ownership, and the way in which the individual creates himself, but his theory is 
let down by its explicit nihilism. Paterson advances a strong argument that we should 
interpret Stirner’s philosophy as being ‘philosophy at play’.150 Stirner argues in The 
Ego and His Own that the only reason the egoist should do something is for his own 
self-enjoyment – the writing of a philosophical manifesto is not exempted from this. 
Yet what value can be attached to a work which its own creator implies has been 
created solely for his own amusement? Paterson refers to Stirner’s philosophy as being 
‘a private metaphysical ‘world’’.151 It is possible that in creating this private world, 
Stirner has raised pertinent questions (much like an artist who paints for fun, or a 
musician who composes for fun) which have received clearer analysis in later 
philosophy, but that his positive suggestions should be taken less seriously. Stirner’s 
egoist is responsible for his actions in that he is their sole author, but here responsibility 
ends. There is none of the guilt or anxiety present in the works of Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger and Sartre. Instead the consistent nihilist must refuse ‘to take anything or 
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anyone seriously’.152 This includes both nihilism itself and the egoist himself. Not only 
does Stirner’s egoist refuse to be held to account as responsible for actions by anyone 
else, he must also refuse to hold himself to account. Without this dimension, Stirner’s 
conception of responsibility must ultimately, like all forms of nihilism, be meaningless. 
 Stirner’s clearest lasting political influence has been upon the individualist 
strand of anarchism in its most extreme form.
153
 Peter Marshall explains how whilst 
typically anarchists make ‘a sharp distinction between the State and society, and reject 
the former in order to allow the peaceful and productive development of the latter’,154 
Stirner rejects both. Marshall highlights the clearest doubt raised by Stirner’s politics to 
be why the self-serving egoist would not make a power grab and in doing so 
reintroduce a form of state.
155
 Despite this, Stirner’s influence on individualist 
anarchism has given it the emphasis of the existing individual’s enjoyment over the 
utopian abstractions and vagueness of much of anarchist theory. Stirner’s 
understanding of human nature certainly seems more realistic and pragmatic than the 
hopes of many anarchists that with the state gone, society will flourish in general 
harmony without any coercive guiding hand. However, without the utopian 
romanticism of a Bakunin or a Tolstoy, what is left is much less appealing. Stirner’s 
work may warn us explicitly of the dangers of overwhelming social control through the 
state and society, but implicitly it suggests (despite Stirner’s intentions) that individual 
freedom needs to be tempered somewhat if each individual is to have the freedom to 
create himself. By taking individualism to its absolute extremes, Stirner has shown the 
importance in there being at least some form of social control – not necessarily in the 
form of a state – if each person is to remain free to Be themselves. 
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 Stirner’s overly simplistic conception of human existence is perhaps the source 
of his worst excesses. He correctly criticises the tendency to force the individual to be 
what he ought to be (due to morality, state loyalty, religion, etc), yet Stirner himself 
fails to account for individual Being as it really is. By simplifying the myriad 
complexities of the human condition into a form of pure hedonism, Stirner has done the 
individual little justice. Our friendships, work relationships, family, nation, history, and 
much more, all play a role in shaping our identity and providing us with the 
possibilities for what we can choose to Be. By focussing solely on the individual’s 
present, and ignoring his past and future, Stirner’s egoist is a two-dimensional 
caricature. As such, his self-owning egoist is difficult to take seriously as anything 
other than as a literary creation, for this is all it ever was. Despite the utter failure of his 
positive philosophical and political worldviews, Stirner’s incisive diagnosis of the 
problems of Hegelianism (in particular) and Western metaphysics (in general) still 
form a very important part in the development of a more personalistic philosophy 
which better reflects human existence as it really is. 
 If metaphysics is that calculative thinking which seeks to ground the existence 
(as opposed to non-existence) of beings, it may initially appear that Max Stirner has in 
some way overcome metaphysics. Yet Stirner’s thought remains within the realms of 
calculation and machination, as demonstrated by his hedonistic utilitarian politics. 
Whereas utilitarianism, that most calculative of creeds, usually insists upon achieving 
the greatest amount of utility for the greatest number of people, Stirner retains the 
utilitarians’ measure of success whilst jettisoning their conception of community. This 
may seem to indicate a wide gulf between these two worldviews, but it is an illusion. 
Just as the materialist politics of the capitalists and the socialists whose opposition 
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revolves upon the distribution of wealth fail to question the merit of such a 
measurement, Stirner’s great refusal of the history of metaphysics entails a similar 
shifting of the proverbial deckchairs. Stirner’s supposed radicalism questions the 
distribution of those things valued by the metaphysicians of old, placing them firmly in 
the hands of the individual egoist, yet he fails to question why the egoist wants these 
things in the first place. Why does Stirner’s egoist look upon the revered and think “I 
want these for myself” instead of rendering unto the metaphysical Caesar what is his. 
Only then could the egoist begin to truly overcome philosophy’s two millennia 
travelled metaphysical detour. Stirner’s egoist himself is a metaphysical construct, and 
as such could never be expected to achieve such a necessary task. Stirner’s politics, 
because they derive from such a mistaken and lacklustre understanding of human 
interaction can be nothing other than similarly underwhelming. 
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Søren Kierkegaard: The Individual before God 
 
Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is perhaps most popularly known as the “father 
of existentialism”. His vast body of published works on myriad topics were highly 
influential in the development of the later school of existentialist thought, despite 
Kierkegaard’s inherent religiousness and existentialism’s typically atheistic reputation.1 
In a retrospective piece on his life’s work to that point, Kierkegaard explains the 
guiding theme linking all his writings as being ‘the task of becoming a Christian’.2 
Arguably Kierkegaard’s works have also been a continuous act of individual protest 
against the barriers placed in the way of the individual becoming a Christian, such as 
the dominance of Hegelian philosophy, contemporary Danish society, the state Church, 
and Christendom as a whole. As will be made clear in the following discussion, 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy, although often failing to follow many of the conventions 
expected of philosophic discourse, offers a compelling reaction and alternative to the 
totalising tendencies of Hegelian thought. 
The vast and sprawling nature of Kierkegaard’s written output has led to some 
debate over which ought to be considered the philosopher’s primary works and which 
are of secondary interest.
3
 In The Point of View for My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard 
excludes his first two works
4
 from what he considers to be his authorship.
5
 This 
discussion will accept and follow this convention, with the same acceptance being 
granted to Kierkegaard’s decision to group his writings into three distinct chronological 
divisions: 1. the aesthetic writings, 2. the transitional period marked by Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, and 3. the solely religious writings.
6
 The acceptance of 
Kierkegaard’s divisions in no way means that works published after the writing of The 
84 
 
Point of View…, and hence excluded these divisions, should be excluded from 
discussion.
7
 Kierkegaard also fails to mention A Literary Review which was published 
after Concluding Unscientific Postscript and before the renewed literary activity of the 
third division, yet to exclude this short work from this discussion would be to exclude 
one of Kierkegaard’s most damning and thorough critiques of contemporary society, 
and one of his longest continuous ruminations on explicitly political matters. The direct 
relation of the topics covered in A Literary Review to this discussion means that 
Kierkegaard’s apparent decision to consider the work effectively apocryphal to the 
works of his authorship will be respectfully overruled. 
 
Either/Or. 
 
Kierkegaard’s “official” authorship begins with one of his best known works, 
Either/Or. The work is split into two volumes, the first consisting of papers written by 
the aesthete “A” and the second consisting of writings in response to these papers by 
the moralist Judge Vilhelm. These two volumes of writings by the pseudonymous “A” 
and Vilhelm are introduced by the similarly pseudonymous editor, and supplemented 
by the works of two further pseudonyms – a diary by the seducer Johannes and a 
sermon by a pastor friend of Vilhelm. Even for a writer with a reputation for a vast 
array of intertwining identities, Either/Or’s internal discourse has led to a great deal of 
debate over what Kierkegaard intended by the work, and how it should be interpreted. 
Hannay highlights a common modern existentialist reading of the work, which views 
Either/Or as depicting the radical and criterionless choices thrust upon the individual 
by life.
8
 A second view is to see the work as representative of the uncertainties to be 
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found in the young Kierkegaard’s own private life at the time of writing.9 The latter 
view can be avoided – if not entirely ignored – for despite what may have influenced 
the writing of the work, once written, it becomes a self-contained entity on its own.
10
 
With the second view put to one side as largely irrelevant in the context of this study, 
the first view of the work as an articulation of criterionless choice must now be refuted. 
The discourse to be found between the protagonists in Either/Or in no way supports a 
reading of the work as an expression of valueless arbitrary choice, for both “A” and 
Judge Vilhelm argue passionately for their own worldview and the values which each 
entails. The pseudonym with whom Kierkegaard’s own sympathies lay is unimportant 
when one considers the main message implicit in Either/Or – that one must choose how 
to live one’s life, and that the individual is fully accountable and responsible for the 
decisions he makes. In a later draft work, Kierkegaard would explain that ‘before the 
decisively religious is introduced a beginning must be made maieutically with aesthetic 
works, yet ethically oriented: Either/Or.’11 Before focussing more strongly on what he 
felt was the individual’s need for Christianity, Kierkegaard first needed to make the 
possibility and necessity of choice abundantly clear to his readers. His insistence that 
the reader must be made aware of the arguments in both volumes of Either/Or to fully 
comprehend the work is made clear in a piece he wrote in his journal in the year of 
Either/Or’s publication. He explains that ‘if a man begins his discourse with Either – 
and in addition does not leave the listener unaware that the preliminary part will be 
very long – then one owes it to him to either to request him not to begin or to hear his 
Or along with it. One cannot call for silence in the same way with a printed work titled 
Either/Or, but the issue remains the same: one must either read it in its entirety or not 
read it at all.’12 Kierkegaard’s existentialist approach to religion and to philosophy 
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insists that the individual must be aware of the choices at hand, and must choose. One 
cannot become a Christian purely by accident of birth into a Christian family or state; 
one must choose and strive to achieve this. It does not take much of a leap in order to 
extend the lessons of Either/Or to beyond the realm of adhesion to the Christian 
worldview. More generally, the work posits the individual as a self-creating entity 
whose choices are steps in this process of creation. What we choose now opens up and 
closes off future possibilities. We must not allow fear of this to lead us into trying to 
take cover from this fact of our existence – we must choose and we must live with and 
take responsibility for the consequences of these choices we make. 
  
Repetition. 
 
Repetition continues Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms as a literary device, this time 
being narrated by Constantine Constantius, emphasising the centrality of the constant to 
the work. The short work explores the theme of repetition as opposed to Platonic 
recollection and hope for the new. Constantius addresses “A’s” assertion in Either/Or 
that ‘only recollection’s love is happy’,13 arguing that this is partially correct only ‘if 
one also remembers that it first makes a person unhappy.’14 “A” acknowledges this 
shortly before the section Constantius refers to. Recollection, “A” explains, ‘is the most 
perfect life imaginable; recollection is more richly satisfying than all actuality, and it 
has a security that no actuality possesses.’15 Despite this resounding toast to the 
pleasures of recollection, “A” describes its pitfalls. ‘For me nothing is more dangerous 
than to recollect. As soon as I have recollected a life relationship, that relationship has 
ceased to exist. It is said that absence makes the heart grow fonder. That is very true, 
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but it becomes fonder in a purely poetic way… A recollected life relationship has 
already passed into eternity and has no temporal interest any more.’16 It is perhaps with 
this in mind that Constantius proposes repetition as an alternative to the withdrawal 
from the temporal of recollection and the step into the unknown of hope. In Repetition, 
Constantius aims not only to theoretically extol the virtues of repetition, but to enact 
and test repetition in his own life. The narrator sets out to repeat a previous trip to 
Berlin, yet finds his efforts dashed – it is simply impossible to re-enact the minutiae of 
past experiences. After several days, Constantius returns home ‘bitter, so tired of 
repetition… I made no great discovery, yet it was strange, because I had discovered 
that there was no such thing as repetition. I became aware of this by having it repeated 
in every possible way.’17 Even at home Constantius discovers his love for the constant 
offended, as his servant had taken to cleaning his living quarters against the narrator’s 
expressed will. After brief diversions into discussions of aging and happiness, the 
second half of Repetition re-joins Constantius’s theory of repetition. Constantius 
describes receiving monthly letters from a young man which contain neither the 
sender’s name nor an address for replies. In the young man’s letters Constantius is 
referred to as ‘My Silent Confident’,18 indicating the narrator’s role as a spectator in the 
man’s attempts at repetition in rekindling a relationship with a lover he had previously 
jilted in order to recollect her aesthetically. A recurring theme in the young man’s 
letters are references to the story of Job, whose faith was tested by losing everything he 
held dear before eventually ‘the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before.’19 The 
young man’s willing for such a repetition as Job’s leads Constantius to the realisation 
that true repetition involves a religious transcendence which he is personally unable to 
make.
20
 In fact, by the final letter from the young man he realises he has achieved 
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repetition, yet not by reuniting with his lost love but instead by finding out she has got 
married. Upon discovering this news, the melancholy to be found in his previous letters 
is gone, instead he declares himself to be ‘back to my old self…. I understand 
everything, and existence seems more beautiful than ever’.21 The young man has come 
to the realisation that the only repetition that matters is the spiritual, rather than the 
worldly. Constantius explains his discovery – ‘what is a repetition of worldly goods, 
which have no meaning in relation to spiritual matters… Only Job’s children were not 
returned to him twofold, because human life does not allow itself to be doubled in this 
way. Here only a spiritual repetition is possible, even though it cannot be so complete 
temporarily as in eternity where there is true repetition.’22 Repetition concludes with a 
letter from Constantius to the reader in which he likens his relationship with the young 
man to a mother giving birth to a child – both he and the mother pale into 
insignificance once the child/poetic young man has been brought into the world.
23
  
Constantius explains that he believes the young man to be an example of the 
exception which exists in struggle with the Hegelian universal.
24
 The relation between 
the universal and the exception is explained in the following passage: 
 
The exception grasps the universal to the extent that it thoroughly grasps itself. It 
works for the universal in that it works through itself. It explains the universal in 
that it explains itself. The exception thus explains the universal and itself, and when 
one really wants to study the universal, one need only study a legitimate exception, 
because it will present everything much more clearly than the universal would 
itself. The legitimate exception is reconciled with the universal; the universal is at 
its basis polemically opposed to the exception. It will not reveal its infatuation with 
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the exception until the exception forces it to do so. If the exception does not have 
the strength to do this, then it is not legitimate, and it is therefore very shrewd of the 
universal not to reveal anything too quickly.
25
 
 
Here Constantius is expounding a continuous theme found throughout Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy – the only true route to authentic philosophical and religious understanding 
is existentially through the individual. Through Constantius, Kierkegaard launches a 
barely veiled attack on the ‘interminable… boring and vapid’26 chatter of the Hegelian 
mainstream, and its insistence that its grand system building is the true route to 
philosophical truth. It is difficult to wholly ignore parallels between the actions of 
Constantius’s poetic young man and Kierkegaard’s own calling off of his engagement 
with Regine Olsen.
27
 Yet the work’s positioning of spiritual gains over the temporal 
and the exceptional individual against the universal highlight key themes in 
Kierkegaard’s thought, offering some of his first criticisms of Hegelian totalising. 
These criticisms themselves are not particularly strong in detail – as previously 
mentioned, Kierkegaard does not often engage in traditional philosophical criticism. 
Instead he uses the example of the striving individual who eventually attains a 
beneficial relationship with the spiritual to illustrate what he feels to be missing from 
all-encompassing philosophical systems, namely the experience of the single 
individual. It is not some abstract absolute which is working towards self-realisation, 
but individuals with their mixture of glory and failings. The exception is much more 
than just a contingent in relation to the universal, the exception could (perhaps 
paradoxically) be each and every one of us if we strove authentically for such an 
outcome. 
90 
 
  
Fear and Trembling. 
 
Published simultaneously with Repetition, Fear and Trembling is less aesthetic and 
more explicitly religious than the former work (whilst still falling under Kierkegaard’s 
later designation as an aesthetic writing
28
). Whilst both works take Old Testament 
figures as inspiration for their narrative, Fear and Trembling has, according to Garff, ‘a 
very firm structure, which is to some extent attributable to the fact that Johannes de 
silentio (the “writer” of this piece) is not personally implicated in his work to the same 
degree as was Constantine Constantius.’29 Garff continues to explain Johannes’s role as 
that of roaming ‘freely about the outer boundaries of his work, frequently uttering 
comments that proclaim his personal limitations with respect to the Old Testament 
story he is retelling.’30 Fear and Trembling takes as its basis the story of the binding of 
Isaac from Genesis, in which Abraham is instructed by God to sacrifice his only son 
Isaac on top of a mountain in Moriah.
31
 It is only at the last moment that Abraham is 
informed that the instruction had been a test of his faith, when a ram is provided in 
place of Isaac for use as a sacrifice. Fear and Trembling serves the two purposes of 
firstly reintroducing the religious terror originally associated with the binding of Isaac, 
and secondly exploring the necessary religious paradox associated with the story. In 
Kierkegaard’s later writings his criticisms of comfortable bourgeois Christendom were 
to become more direct, whilst here there is more implication than polemic. As is typical 
with Kierkegaardian pseudonyms, Johannes’s name indicates much about the work 
attributed to him. The silence implied by “de silentio” refers, according to Garff, to 
Fear and Trembling’s obsession ‘with the impotence of language, with nonverbal 
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communication, with signals, and with the far-reaching signification of the silent 
gesture.’32 The work begins with the claim that ‘not just in commerce but in the world 
of ideas too our age is putting on a veritable clearance sale. Everything can be had so 
dirt cheap that one begins to wonder whether in the end anyone will want to make a 
bid.’33 In particular, Johannes has in mind the cheapening of faith from the demands of 
the New Testament to those of contemporary Christendom. The use of a commercial 
analogy – the “selling” of faith – is one that Kierkegaard would return to several times, 
with his implications becoming more and more explicit. In The Concept of Anxiety
34
 
and later, when embroiled in his final battle against the state Church, in a newspaper 
article entitled ‘The Religious Situation’,35 Kierkegaard tells the story of a barkeeper 
selling his wares a penny below cost price. When asked by bewildered observers why 
he is engaging in such behaviour, he explains ‘it is the quantity that does it’.36 Two 
months later a similar analogy is used again in the article ‘A Monologue’, this time 
accusing pastors of attempting to sell eternal happiness at a rate well below the level of 
faith demanded by the New Testament.
37
 Using Abraham as a model, Fear and 
Trembling sets out to demonstrate just how high the bar of Christian faith is truly set.  
After the work’s preface, Johannes sets out an “Attunement”. This tells the story of 
a man who throughout his life maintained an interest in the feats of Abraham. As he 
reached old age, the man yearned to actually be a witness to the events surrounding 
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac. Using direct description alongside the analogy of 
weaning a child off its mother’s breast milk, several possible scenarios are described of 
how the events might have progressed. In one scenario Abraham attempts to horrify 
Isaac with tales of his sinfulness as a mother might blacken her breast with soot, in 
another Abraham is about to commit the deed, yet Isaac sees his father’s trembling 
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hand and loses his faith forever.
38
 Despite all these possibilities, all fall short. His 
experiences lead him to the exclamation that ‘no one was as great as Abraham; who is 
able to understand him?’39 After this slight detour has enabled Johannes to prepare the 
reader’s mind for the difficulty of the task ahead, there then follows a “Speech in Praise 
of Abraham”. In this the relationship between the hero and the poet is explored, with 
Abraham being cited as an example of the former and Johannes implying that he has 
the more humble role of the latter. The poet ‘has none of the skills of the latter, he can 
only admire, love, take pleasure in the hero… He is the spirit of remembrance, can only 
bring to mind what has been done… he wanders round in front of everyone’s door with 
his song and his speech, so that all can admire the hero as he does’.40 The remainder of 
Johannes’s speech does exactly this – it glorifies Abraham’s actions and strength of 
faith.  
 The speech is followed by Fear and Trembling’s longest section, the 
“Problemata”. Johannes begins by arguing that unlike in the temporal world where 
contingency plays a great role in the allocation of goods and ills, in the world of spirit 
each gets his just desserts – ‘only one who works gets bread’.41 Johannes decries the 
cheapening of the story of Abraham through downplaying the true terror involved – the 
story has been made commonplace in order for it to appear more fathomable to 
everyone. He emphasises that Abraham, when asked by God, was willing to sacrifice 
the best he had, Isaac. The best Abraham had ‘is a vague expression… one can quite 
safely identify Isaac with the best, and the man who so thinks can very well puff on his 
pipe as he does so, and the listener can very well leisurely stretch out his legs.’42 The 
fault of this utterly bourgeois picture Johannes paints is that all sense of anguish is 
missing. He describes how ‘anguish is a dangerous affair for the squeamish’,43 so the 
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story is toned down. To illustrate the point a tragicomic scene is used, depicting a man 
being severely admonished by a priest (‘loathsome man, dregs of society’44) for 
sacrificing his son having being influenced by the binding of Isaac. Johannes notes the 
irony that the same priest ‘had felt no signs of heat or perspiration while preaching 
about Abraham’.45 On the gulf between the content of the sermons preached in Church 
and the actions to be found in the outside world, Johannes exclaims, ‘In olden days 
people said, “What a shame things in the world don’t go in the way the priest 
preaches.” But the time may be coming, not least with the help of philosophy, when we 
shall be able to say, “How fortunate that things in the world don’t go in the way the 
priest preaches, since at least there’s a little meaning to life, but none in his sermon.”’46 
That the man killing his son in order to emulate Abraham is taken to be horrific and 
deranged, whilst Abraham is hailed as a hero of faith necessarily must mean that there 
is some occurrence which makes Abraham an exception – Johannes cites arguments for 
why this may have been the case. 
For Abraham, there may have been ‘a teleological suspension of the ethical.’47 
Against Hegelian universalism, Johannes posits faith as the paradox which entails that 
‘the single individual is higher than the universal… having been in the universal, the 
single individual now sets himself apart as the particular’.48 If this is not the case and 
this is not what faith is, Johannes continues, faith has never existed because it would be 
universal rather than the exception. In such circumstances, ‘Abraham is done for’.49 
This paradox cannot be solved by Hegelian mediation, for such a process must occur 
within the universal, whilst the individual in faith is positioned outside the universal.
50
 
If the paradox were to be mediated, ‘Abraham will have to admit that he is in a state of 
temptation… so he must return repentantly to the universal.’51 Johannes insists that 
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there is no possibility that Abraham can be thought of as a tragic-hero – ‘a tragic-hero 
stays within the ethical’.52 As such Abraham is either a man of faith or a murderer; 
there can be no mediated middle ground.
53
 Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac is both the will 
of God as a proof of Abraham’s faith, and the will of Abraham to prove his faith. 
Abraham is not here being tempted by God, but being tempted by the ethical not to 
carry out his duty.
54
 In the case of Abraham there has been a teleological suspension of 
the ethical. As the knight of faith, he walks a ‘narrow path [on which]… no one can 
advise, no one understand.’55 
 That the ethical has been suspended in order for Abraham to carry out his duty 
to God leads to Johannes’s second enquiry of whether there is ‘an absolute duty to 
God.’56 Johannes here takes the New Testament instruction that ‘if any man come to 
me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and 
sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple’57 as a basis for the enquiry. 
Johannes decries the softening of the passage entailed by interpreting “hate” as actually 
meaning “love less than God”. He argues that the parallels between this and the story of 
Abraham ‘seems to suggest precisely that the words are to be taken in as terrifying a 
sense as possible’.58 Here again Johannes highlights the necessary paradox involved, 
for in the universal, for Abraham to murder Isaac would be to follow the duty of hating 
one’s children, yet if Abraham hates Isaac it is no longer a sacrifice. Abraham only 
sacrifices Isaac ‘in the moment when his act is in absolute contradiction with his 
feeling… but the reality of his act is that in virtue of which he belong to the universal’59 
in which his actions make him a murderer. This convinces Johannes that there must be 
an absolute duty to God, ‘that the single individual as the particular is higher than the 
universal and as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute’,60 for 
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otherwise Abraham is not an exception – not a knight of faith – but a murderer. Now 
Johannes has accepted that for Abraham there was a teleological suspension of the 
ethical, and that there is an absolute duty to God, he moves onto his third and final 
enquiry: ‘was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose from Sarah, 
from Eleazar, from Isaac?’61 
Typically ethics favours disclosure, and as such it might be expected that Abraham 
had a duty to inform his wife, his servant and (in this case perhaps most importantly) 
his son about what he was going to do. That there is concealment again informs us that 
we are facing ‘the paradox, which cannot be mediated, just because it is based on the 
single individual’s being… higher than the universal’.62 Abraham’s silence had nothing 
to do with saving others from trauma as aesthetics might suggest. Aesthetics can 
provide no understanding of Abraham, as his ‘whole task of sacrificing Isaac for his 
own and God’s sake is an outrage aesthetically.’63 Johannes suggests that Abraham’s 
silence is because ‘he cannot speak… For if when I speak I cannot make myself 
understood, I do not speak even if I keep talking without stop day and night.’64 When 
asked by Isaac ‘where is the lamb for a burnt offering?’65 Abraham responds ‘My son, 
God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt offering’.66 Johannes argues that here 
Abraham is not speaking an untruth to his son with his ironic response, ‘for on the 
strength of the absurd it is… possible that God might do something quite different.’67 
By refusing to speak – that is, talk and be understood – Abraham remains the particular 
apart from the universal. Johannes explains that ‘here too it can appear that one can 
understand Abraham, but only as one understands the paradox. For my part I can in a 
way understand Abraham, but I see very well that I lack the courage to speak in this 
way, as much as I lack the courage to act like Abraham.’68 Abraham can never be 
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reached by appeals to reason, but only by faith. This task may be insurmountable to the 
many (if not to all), yet the pure recognition of the task of faith is, for Johannes, a 
major step towards an authentic Being. 
In Fear and Trembling’s epilogue, the commercial metaphor returns with the tale of 
spice merchants dropping some of their cargo at sea to raise spice prices.
69
 Johannes 
playfully suggests that a similar action on behalf of faith might be felicitous, for ‘faith 
is the highest passion in a human being. Many in every generation may not come that 
far, but none comes further.’70 In a world which had – according to Kierkegaard – 
cheapened Christian faith until it had become meaningless, Fear and Trembling was a 
one-man effort at throwing a large quantity of spice into the ocean. Beyond 
Kierkegaard’s explicitly Christian intentions, Fear and Trembling’s main strength is in 
its inherent criticism of the ways in which the contemporary age chooses comfort and 
ease over struggle. Philosophically it is much more comforting to agree that another 
great thinker has explained everything through his struggles to concoct an absolute 
system than it is to entertain doubts and the need for further struggle. Philosophical 
truth, like Kierkegaard’s Christian faith, is a perhaps unreachable goal towards which 
we must continue to strive as individuals. No one, no matter how great, can undertake 
this struggle on our behalf. 
  
Philosophical Crumbs. 
 
Kierkegaard’s next pseudonym was also to be named Johannes, this time Johannes 
Climacus. The name is based on the beatified monk John Climacus, whose own name 
(John of the Ladder) refers to his work The Ladder of Paradise.
71
 Climacus’ work 
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Philosophical Crumbs might be thought to offer a ladder up to a better understanding 
of the human condition. The title of the work has traditionally rendered in English as 
Philosophical Fragments, yet recent publications of this
72
 and the later Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript
73
 have used “crumbs” as being closer to the original Danish 
smuler. The work’s title is a taunt at the perceived arrogance of Hegelian philosophy – 
instead of offering a philosophical banquet in the form of a grand, all-encompassing 
system, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym offers a few crumbs for thought.74 Philosophical 
Crumb’s area of investigation is set out on the title page as the following question – 
‘Can an eternal consciousness have a historical point of departure; could such a thing 
be of more than historical interest; can one build an eternal happiness on historical 
knowledge?’75 In the work’s preface Climacus sets out his position as dancing ‘nimbly 
in the service of thought, as much as possible to the honour of God and for my own 
amusement’.76 He warns that no-one should ‘attribute world-historical significance to 
such a modest piece… a misunderstanding [which] could happen only if the guilty 
party were by nature extraordinarily stupid’.77 
Echoing Socrates, before continuing to the substantive discussion of the work 
Climacus declares his own ignorance, going as far as to claim that he ‘does not even 
know what has led him to ask such a question.’78 This echo is deliberate and apt, for 
Climacus first moves to discuss the extent to which the truth can be taught - ‘a Socratic 
question, or [one that] became so with the Socratic question of whether virtue could be 
taught’.79 Socrates’ response to the problem is his theory of recollection – ‘that the 
ignorant person only needs to be reminded, in order by himself to recollect what he 
knows.’80 Recollection had already been rejected by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym 
Constantius in Repetition in favour of a theory of repetition, but here Climacus engages 
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with recollection in more depth. Recollection necessarily regards the temporal point of 
departure as contingent.
81
 No matter who is the teacher (‘Socrates, or Prodicus, or a 
parlour-maid’82), the individual is recollecting knowledge they were already in 
possession of without being aware of it. If recollection is to be rejected then, Climacus 
insists, ‘the moment in time must have decisive significance… because the eternal [the 
truth], which did not exist before, came to be in this moment.’83 The individual lacking 
in the truth must be considered to be ‘outside the truth… as being in error.’84 Instead of 
the Socratic teacher reminding the person he is in possession of the truth, the role of the 
teacher is to both bring the truth to the individual and to create the condition for 
understanding the truth. Climacus argues this latter role is equally important ‘because if 
the learner had himself the condition for understanding the truth, then he would need 
only to recollect it’.85 This role of creating the condition for understanding is 
impossible for a mortal teacher to undertake and must be god-given, leading Climacus 
to the conclusion that ‘the teacher is thus the god himself’.86 The term “teacher” is 
deemed to be insufficient to wholly explain the role of a god who not only creates the 
condition for receiving the truth and imparts the truth, but also judges his pupil’s 
grasping of the truth. As such, Climacus asserts that ‘this teacher is thus not really a 
teacher, but a judge.’87 The moment of transition from error to the truth is described as 
a being born again. ‘A person becomes conscious in the moment, that he was born, 
because his prior state, to which he must not cling, was precisely one of non-being. He 
becomes conscious in the moment of being born again, because his prior state was one 
of non-Being.’88 The movement from non-Being to Being in the moment is what 
heralds the importance of both transitions. Climacus admits the preposterousness of 
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demanding ‘of a person that he should by himself discover that he did not exist’,89 but 
argues that its retrospective nature does not diminish its truth. 
 Climacus uses the story of a king in love with a peasant girl to illustrate the 
relationship between the god (in the Crumbs, not specifically the Judeo-Christian God) 
and the disciple. The difference in stature between the king and his potential lover 
might lead the peasant girl to feel always to be in a debt of gratitude to the king for 
choosing to marry such a lowly person, when this difference between the two is 
precisely what the king wishes to eradicate from memory.
90
 It is for such a reason that 
the union between a god and a disciple cannot be brought about by an elevation. 
Alternatively the king might take upon the guise of a lowly servant, to enact the union 
by an act of descent so as to avoid any feeling of debt which would make for an 
unhappy love. The relationship between the disciple and the god can be enacted in the 
same way, but for the god ‘the servant form was not a costume. The god must, 
therefore, suffer everything, endure everything, hunger in the desert, thirst in anguish, 
be forsaken in death, absolutely equal to the lowest’.91 
 Before returning to the theme central to the book, Climacus discusses the 
interrelated paradoxes necessarily present in trying to prove the existence of a god and 
in understanding a god. A god is the ‘unknown thing against which the 
understanding… collides, and which… disturbs even a person’s self-knowledge’.92 As 
this unknown thing we call a god is unknown, it is foolish and impossible to even think 
we can prove or disprove its existence. Therefore, we can only assume a god’s 
existence.
93
 The god as the unknown is the absolutely different, yet this still gets us no 
closer to understanding the god, for ‘the understanding cannot negate itself, but uses its 
own terms in order to do this and thus thinks difference in its own terms… thus 
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conceives this thing which transcends itself by means of itself.
94
 It is with this kept in 
mind that Climacus turns to the lot of the contemporary disciple. 
 Climacus insists ‘that the question of a historical point of departure exists… for 
the contemporary disciple’95 as he is contemporary with the historical. As 
contemporary, the learner can acquire knowledge of the historical minutiae – where the 
god went, what the god ate, where the god slept – much more easily and accurately 
than a non-contemporary learner, but this brings him no closer to being a disciple.
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The contemporary has the advantage of being able to go and see the god, ‘but does he 
dare believe his eyes?’97 If he does, and if he therefore believes he is a disciple, ‘he is 
precisely deceived, because the god cannot be known immediately.’98 If he closes his 
eyes to avoid such a deception, he no longer has any advantage over the non-
contemporary. Climacus explains that the contemporaneous can be the occasion to 
acquire historical knowledge (which is of no consequence for faith), to focus upon 
oneself Socratically (which leads one to the eternal, where contemporaneousness has 
no value), or to ‘receive the condition for understanding the truth from the god, and 
thus to see his magnificence with the eyes of faith.’99 The latter is no longer 
contemporary in the immediate sense, but a contemporary with the god through the 
paradox of faith. Climacus suggests that the only advantage the immediate 
contemporary may have of achieving contemporaneousness through faith is that they 
have not had to endure the ‘echo of the centuries’100 which have conspired to gossip 
about faith and to transform faith into gossip. 
 Here Climacus introduces a chapter as an interlude to mark the passage of time 
between the contemporary learner and the non-contemporary learner. The interlude is 
used as a chance to enquire whether ‘the possible, by having become actual, [has] 
101 
 
become more necessary than it was.’101 Climacus explains that ‘necessity stands 
completely alone; nothing at all comes to be with necessity, just as little as necessity 
comes to be, or that something by coming to be becomes necessary. Nothing is because 
it is necessary, but the necessary is because it is necessary, or because the necessary is. 
The actual is no more necessary than the possible, because that which is necessary is 
absolutely different from both.’102 That which is necessary is the eternal, and as such is 
neither possible nor actual in a historical sense.  
It is with this interlude in mind that Climacus travels ‘eighteen hundred and 
forty-three years’103 to the non-contemporaneous disciple. The situation of the first 
generation second-hand disciple is compared to the situation of the disciple eighteen-
hundred years later, and found to be equal. The first generation has the advantage of the 
difficulty (‘because it is always an advantage… when it is the difficult’104) of the horror 
of faith being close at hand, whilst the later generation is at greater comfort. Yet once it 
is realised that this comfort and ease is itself a difficulty for faith, ‘the difficulty of the 
horror will grip the latest generation… just as primitively as it did the first’.105 The 
contemporary disciple can relate to the non-contemporary disciple by stating their 
belief that this has happened – that the god took on the form of a human servant. This is 
not the same as stating that this has happened, for then, Climacus explains, ‘I am 
recounting something historical; but when I say “I believe and have believed, that this 
has happened, despite the fact that it is foolishness to the understanding and an offence 
to the human heart”, then I have… done everything possible… to decline any 
companionship, in that each individual must conduct himself in precisely the same 
way.’106 Each individual must travel the road of faith alone, for one person’s historical 
certainty in a matter which is eternal would be an impediment, rather than an aid, for 
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faith. Climacus ends by wholly rejecting the differentiation between contemporary and 
second-hand disciples, arguing that they are essentially equal. That the former have 
their occasion in contemporaneousness and the latter have the reports of the 
contemporaneous for their occasion might be interpreted as an advantage for the 
contemporaries, for they ‘are not beholden to any other generation for anything.’107 
Yet, ‘if he understood himself’,108 the contemporary should wish his 
contemporaneousness to end, for the recourse to the temporal and historical is a barrier 
to the eternity of faith. In an oft-quoted line, Climacus talks of a potential sequel to the 
Crumbs, which ‘will refer to the matter by its proper name and clothe it in its historical 
costume.’109 This sequel was to be his Concluding Scientific Postscript, which would 
clothe the problems discussed by Philosophical Crumbs in the proper name of 
Christianity. This clothing would allow Climacus’ arguments to be developed more 
deeply, and also for a much wider array of philosophical topics to be covered. 
  
The Concept of Anxiety. 
 
Before turning to Climacus’ Postscript, in keeping with the chronological progression 
of Kierkegaard’s works followed thus far, it is important not to overlook the position of 
The Concept of Anxiety. The speedily produced
110
 work appeared under the pseudonym 
Vigilius Haufniensis, though early drafts, and clues remaining in the footnotes and 
dedication to his beloved (latterly) anti-Hegelian peer Poul Martin Møller indicate 
Kierkegaard’s original intention to publish under his own name.111 In a manner pre-
empting early twentieth century advances in psychology, Vigilius explores anxiety with 
an emphasis on the issue of hereditary sin. Echoing the difficult and sometimes 
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traumatic nature of Christianity espoused in previous works, The Concept of Anxiety 
describes the necessarily interrelated nature of anxiety and faith. Anxiety is a self-
created condition brought about by the realisation of ‘freedom’s possibility’.112 Anxiety 
stems from the self and is thus not an external judgement which can be escaped by 
avoiding a certain person or place; it is the inescapable connection between the 
individual and the infinite. For faith, anxiety is ‘absolutely educative, because it 
consumes all finite ends and discovers their deceptiveness.’113 Vigilius argues that 
despite common belief of the contrary, possibility is a much heavier category than 
actuality, as possibility is not only the joyful utopia but also the most terrible dystopia. 
The horrors of possibility are such that a man ‘will praise actuality, and even when it 
rests heavily upon him, he will remember that it is far, far lighter than possibility 
was.’114 Yet in faith the true terror of possibility must be faced, as otherwise both faith 
and possibility have been defrauded and lose their meaning.
115
 He argues that ‘the pupil 
of possibility… in the middle of Jutland heath, where no event takes place… will 
experience everything more perfectly, more accurately, more thoroughly’116 than the 
world-historical hero at the centre of great events, whose recourse is solely to the 
actual. Original sin is directly related to the possible, for it is beyond the finite sin 
whose guilt is judged by the temporal law courts – it is the sin of infinity.117 Vigilius 
asserts that ‘he who in relation to guilt is educated by anxiety will rest only in the 
Atonement.’118 It is a concept of the self which offers no finite comfort, but only 
comfort in the infinite. Though temporally more palatable, any other option would be a 
cheapening of faith and, as such, would not be Christianity at all. Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the role played by anxiety in authentic existence was to later influence 
Heideggerian philosophy. Heidegger advances upon Kierkegaard on this point by his 
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secularising the concept of anxiety to better demonstrate the role it plays in the 
individual’s coming to grips with his own Being. This is a subject we shall return to 
more deeply in later chapters. 
  
Concluding Unscientific Postscript and the return of Climacus. 
 
The return of Johannes Climacus to clothe the problem of Philosophical Crumbs ‘in its 
historical costume’119 was intended to be Kierkegaard’s retirement from writing to take 
up a role in the priesthood.
120
 A somewhat self-inflicted feud with The Corsair, a 
satirical newspaper, was to provide the impetus for a return to writing, yet Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript remains the conclusion of Kierkegaard’s first phase of writing 
and heralds the latter writings.
121
 The work’s title is often cited as an example of 
Kierkegaard’s wit, namely due to the absurdity of a postscript being more than four 
times the length of the work it is a postscript to. In the work’s preface, Climacus 
expresses his profound joy at lack of response to Philosophical Crumbs, leaving the 
author with no literary debt to pay and no obligation to graciously receive a torchlight 
procession of supporters.
122
 He ends the preface hoping that the Postscript will be 
similarly received, avoiding the risk of supporters or detractors fooling others into 
believing the work is something that it is not, which would leave Climacus himself to 
deal with the inevitable consequences.
123
 
In the introduction which follows, Climacus explains that the Postscript is what 
was promised for the sequel of the Crumbs, but also contains a new approach to the 
problem discussed in the original work.
124
 Of particular note within the introduction is 
Climacus’ positioning of himself in relation to Christianity. He is an outsider infinitely 
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interested with the problem and possibility of Christianity as the point of departure for 
the eternal consciousness of the single individual. Climacus claims not to have 
understood Christianity, but claims to have grasped ‘that the only unpardonable lèse-
majesté against Christianity is for the individual to take his relationship to it for 
granted.’125 That a simplified statement of the purpose of the Postscript is to explore 
how to become a Christian, it is perhaps apt that the pseudonymous author is a fellow 
traveller on the road to faith instead of preaching from a pedestal. As such, Climacus is 
neither taking his relationship to Christianity for granted, but is depicted as being 
engaged in a personal spiritual quest. 
 Concluding Unscientific Postscript is split into two parts, the second being 
roughly ten times the length of the first. It is in the shorter first part that Climacus 
produces the promised sequel to the Crumbs, addressing ‘The objective problem of 
Christianity’s proof’.126 Whilst in the Crumbs, the relationship between objectivity and 
the eternal was discussed in vague terms; here Climacus directly addresses the extent to 
which Christian faith can be appropriately reached through an objective approach – 
through the historical and through speculative thought. Historically, recourse can be 
made to Scripture, the Church and the centuries of Christianity’s existence. Whilst 
professing admiration for the philological examination of literature, Climacus denies 
that this can have any effect on his eternal happiness. This is not what the philologist 
publishing the works of Cicero has in mind, yet this is the aim of critical theology.
127
 If 
the critical theologian proves beyond doubt the authenticity of the books of the Bible 
and their authors, proves beyond doubt that no texts have been omitted, this has no 
relevance to faith. The person who gains something from this objectively acquired 
certainty has gained nothing with regard to faith, ‘rather, in this profuse knowledge… 
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lying at the door of faith and coveting it… much fear and trembling will be required if 
he is not to fall into temptation and confuse knowledge with faith.’128 Historical 
knowledge is always at best an approximation, whilst eternal happiness needs a much 
sturdier foundation in faith. If a critical theologian were through his work to prove 
beyond doubt the opposite – that the books of the Bible are forgeries and their authors 
lack authenticity – this would also be of no consequence to faith. Christianity is not 
abolished by such an assertion, and the believer is unharmed and still as free to believe 
in the existence of Christ, for faith has no need of proof.
129
 Indeed, proof might be 
more harmful to faith than not, as a belief based on philological concerns might be 
overturned by later discoveries, whilst belief based solely on the power of faith is 
infinite. If one were to abandon the recourse to the objective comfort of Scripture to the 
objective comfort of the Church, one faces similar shortcomings. Climacus argues that 
to prove the existence of the Church today is as meaningless as to prove the existence 
of a person – ‘its being there is superior to any proof of its being so’.130 Yet to prove 
that the Church today is the same Church as that of Saint Peter is to lose any benefit 
and to rely on historical approximation which can have no bearing on faith.
131
 The 
recourse to millennia of Christianity and Christians may be an invigorating ‘rhetorical 
shower-bath’,132 but fails to bring the sinner into faith. Christianity is only interested in 
the individual alone, ‘it will make no difference whether he has the eighteen centuries 
for him or against him.’133 
 The objective speculative approach to Christianity finds as little favour with 
Climacus as the historical approaches discussed above. The speculative philosopher 
aims to approach his philosophising in an objective manner, ignoring his own 
subjectivity. Citing Socrates,
134
 Climacus argues that ‘when we assume flute-playing, 
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we must also assume a flautist; similarly, if we assume speculative philosophy we must 
also assume a speculative philosopher’.135 He accuses speculative philosophy of 
making the assumption of Christianity that all born in a specific time and place are by 
that merit Christians, and as such Christianity is a historical phenomenon.
136
 As he 
asserted previously, Climacus rejects any historical method of reaching faith. If the 
speculative philosopher is a believer as he claims, and is thus infinitely interested in his 
eternal happiness, he must realise that eternal happiness can never be based on 
philosophical speculation. If the speculative philosopher does not come to this 
conclusion, ‘he is comically contradicting himself, since speculative philosophy in its 
objectivity is wholly indifferent to his and my and your eternal happiness, whereas an 
eternal happiness inheres precisely in the subjective individual’s diminishing self-
conceit, acquired through his utmost exertion. Additionally, when making himself out 
to be a believer, he is lying.’137 If the speculative philosopher does not consider himself 
to be a believer of Christianity, there is no comic element, but then the philosopher is 
not addressing the same problem as that addressed by Climacus, ‘for as a speculative 
philosopher, he becomes exactly too objective to be concerned with his own eternal 
happiness.’138 By adopting an objective position through speculation, the philosopher is 
unable to take the properly subjective position needed to address matters of faith. As 
Climacus concludes the first part of the Postscript, the problem of speculative 
philosophy is that it ‘simply prevents the problem [of faith] from emerging, so its 
whole answer is only a mystification.’139 
 Having fully addressed the problem of the Crumbs, of the possibility of 
building eternal happiness on historical knowledge, in its proper historical clothing of 
Christianity, Climacus turns to ‘the subjective problem. The subject’s relation to the 
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truth of Christianity, or what it is to become a Christian.’140 The enlightenment 
philosopher Gotthold Ephraim Lessing is the subject of the first (and considerably 
shortest) of the two sections which make up the second part of the Postscript. It is 
Lessing’s introverted approach to religion which appeals to Climacus, ‘that he shut 
himself up religiously within the isolation of his own subjectivity [that he 
understood]… the religious concerned Lessing and Lessing alone, just at it concerns 
every other human being in the same manner’.141 Through discussion of Lessing’s 
possible and actual theses, Climacus concludes that there can be a logical system, but 
there cannot be a system for life itself.
142
 By claiming to start with nothing, the 
Hegelian system must involve a reflection back – an abstraction from the individual – 
in order to achieve this beginning with the immediate, as the system itself does not 
begin with the immediate, but only after life itself.
143
 Climacus argues that this act of 
reflection or abstraction from self is infinite, and therefore it is questionable how this 
could be stopped objectively.
144
 Indeed, it can only be stopped subjectively, and hence 
it is not objective speculation itself which has ended the reflection, but the subject 
whom has been abstracted from himself.
145
 For God, Climacus insists that it is right and 
proper to agree that life is a system, ‘but [it] cannot be that for any existing spirit.’146 
God ‘is someone who is outside life and yet inside it, who in his eternity is finalised 
and yet envelops life within himself’,147 as such God has both the finality to grasp the 
system from without and the existence to be able to grasp the system. This paradox 
necessary to understand the system excludes finite human beings, for to be finalised is 
to be dead and to be living means one could never abstract from one’s own place in 
existence. 
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 The task of being subjective is, as we have seen according to Kierkegaard’s 
writings, what Christianity calls for. Climacus argues that the seemingly trivial nature 
of the task of being subjective is exactly what makes it so difficult. The triviality of 
embracing the subjective means that it ‘needs an infinite effort just to discover the task, 
i.e. this is indeed the task’.148 Even if a person is to reject the world-historical and 
devote his life to ethical striving for the truth as the individual subject, he might be 
rewarded by world-historical importance – the precise temptation he has been avoiding 
and must continue to reject.
149
 The ethical exists in the world-historical, yet the 
ostentatious window dressing the world-historical drapes over the ethical can easily 
lead the individual to come into the position of an objective spectator of ethics rather 
than the individual subject striving towards the truth.
150
 The ‘truly ethical grasp of the 
ethical… is a matter of fasting and being sober, a matter of not longing to go world-
historically to the banquet and getting drunk in amazement.’151 The world-historical 
finds little of interest in the striving person in faith becoming the single individual, yet 
this is the highest and only true task for the individual.
152
 If it was not the case that the 
striving of the individual in faith was the highest task, and that instead the progress of 
the world-historical was the highest goal, Climacus wonders why God does not get a 
move on to speed up the process.
153
 He denounces the ‘undramatic tedium… what a 
prosaic and boringly protracted performance… if that is all he wants, how terrible in 
this tyrannical fashion to waste myriads of human lives!’154 In such a system, the 
individual would be nothing but an observer of the ethically meaningless process going 
on around him. The individual ‘stares himself into that world-historical drama, he dies 
and disappears, nothing is left of him; or rather, he remains like a ticket in the hands of 
the usher indicating that the spectator has now gone.’155 Such a view of the relationship 
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between God and man can in no way be conducive to any form of Christianity, even a 
Christianity much less personally rigorous than that of Climacus. He likens the 
comforting nature of the world-historic systematic approach to a Christmas tree which 
is raised to allow everyone to take some time off – if the task of being subjective is the 
most simplistic, yet the most difficult and highest task for a person, it is perhaps natural 
that individuals might adopt a position which avoids recognising, let alone addressing 
the task.
156
  
 In the Postscript, Climacus famously asserts that ‘truth is subjectivity.’157 He 
addresses the ‘empirical definition of truth as the agreement of thought with Being [and 
the]… idealist definition as the agreement of Being with thought’.158 In both 
definitions, Being is an empirical Being which must necessarily be understood as being 
in abstraction, ‘or the abstract prototype’159 of what is concrete empirical Being. 
Climacus accuses both the idealist and empirical positions as being tautological, for 
‘thought and Being mean one and the same, and the agreement in question is merely an 
abstract self-identity.’160 The thought of empirical Being is derived from the experience 
of empirical Being, whilst the experience of empirical Being is derived from our 
thought of what empirical Being is. Subjective reflection on existence however avoids 
this issue by the inclusion of the existence of the subjective questioner, upon which the 
result is a deepening of the questioner’s subjectivity – it is no longer a question of 
“what is existence”, but “what is my existence”.161 The subject-object relationship of 
mediation is rejected, for this would lead the question of Being back to the abstraction 
which merely asserts ‘that the truth is’.162 The questioner has the possibility of making 
both an objective and a subjective reflection on existence – he must choose which of 
these paths to take, for it is not possible to address both at once.
163
 The objective path 
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offers a security the subjective path is unable to offer, yet objectivity makes the subject 
accidental and thus existence is an indifference, for the accidental subject vanishes in 
objectivity – the same is true of truth, it becomes indifferent.164 By making the 
objective vanish and leaving the subject as it stands, the subjective path of reflection 
makes ‘inner absorption truth’s reflection’.165 If a person were able to come out of 
himself, truth would be the empirical truth of empiricism and idealism, but being as the 
person is always himself an existing subject, this can only ever be a theoretical 
abstraction with scant relevance to the existing subject.
166
 Climacus argues that 
existence is necessarily a constraint in this way, ‘and if philosophers nowadays were 
not pen-pushers in the service of an endless trifling with fantastical thinking, it would 
have been seen long ago that the only… practical interpretation of its efforts was 
suicide.’167 Whilst Climacus is correct to highlight these flaws in previous 
understandings of truth, it is more difficult to agree with the conclusion he draws from 
these failings. Our apprehension of the truth may be limited by our not being able to 
transcend our individual Being, but this does not necessarily mean that truth is 
subjectivity. Instead, a more nuanced understanding of truth is needed, such as 
Heidegger’s explanation of truth as uncovering which we shall turn to in a later 
chapter. Despite these misgivings, it is important to continue to follow Climacus’ 
arguments in this area in order to understand his criticisms, even if we are not to agree 
with the positive elements of this part of his doctrine. 
 Having asserted the necessity of existence in essential knowing, Climacus 
insists that Hegelian mediation is an illusion. It rests on abstraction, and in abstraction 
there is no movement, yet it holds ‘movement as its presupposition.’168 Mediation is an 
impersonal process which discounts the existence of the mediator. Climacus insists he 
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will have no place in, and sees no point in having, a debate based on the abstract 
fantastic of whether there is or is not mediation, for there is much more of interest to 
the philosopher in ‘what it is to be a human being.’169 Climacus defines subjective truth 
as ‘the objective uncertainty maintained through approximation in the most passionate 
inwardness is truth, the highest truth there is for someone existing.’170 It may seem 
strange to posit uncertainty at the centre of a possible definition of truth which in its 
empirical form is precisely reliant on certainty, but Climacus explains that in observing 
the world the single individual sees things which both reflect ‘omnipotence and 
wisdom, but [also, much]… that troubles and disturbs.’171 His definition of subjective 
truth eschews the presumptuousness of the Hegelian system for the much more humble 
Socratic maxim of proclaiming one’s ignorance. This uncertainty is a necessary 
requirement for faith, for if God could be grasped objectively there would be no faith, 
just the recognition of empirically measurable truth – there would be no need for 
striving, fear and trembling, for there would no longer exist any form of paradox to test 
and tax the believer.
172
 The paradox of Christian faith is the co-existence of individual 
existence and eternal truth.
173
 Absurdity arises when the eternal truth which is timeless 
‘has come about in time, that God has come about, been born, has grown up… has 
come about just as the single human being’.174 Objectively such an occurrence is 
ridiculous and repulsive, yet Climacus argues it is exactly this which makes the absurd 
the true test of faith. To attempt to acquire faith in an objective fashion is hence to 
introduce the comical.
175
 The speculative approach to Christianity accepts the existence 
of the paradox, but asserts that it can be explained away – it accepts that Christianity is 
truth and says that though speculation this truth can be grasped.
176
 However if 
speculation can suspend and overcome the paradox, ‘the paradox is not the eternal 
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essential truth’s essential relation to one who exists at the extremity of existence, but 
only a contingent and relative relation to weaker intellects’.177 This would be an 
offence to both humankind and to God, for it asserts that some persons (the 
speculators) have a more equal relationship with God than others, and that God needs 
lackeys and interpreters to communicate with humankind. The wise man might be more 
aware of the paradox than the simpleminded, but he comes no nearer to understanding 
it.
178
 
 An appendix follows the chapter on truth as subjectivity in which Climacus 
addresses contemporary Danish literature. This turns out to be a casually worded 
section in which pseudonymity is maintained whilst Climacus articulates his thoughts 
after reading the other pseudonymous works published by Kierkegaard and the 
discourses the philosopher published under his own name. The section is of great 
interest for showing the way in which Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms intertwine – 
particularly the suggestions Climacus makes to the other authors regarding how he 
would have improved their works – but offers little of interest to our discussion here 
which has not already been covered when discussing the works themselves above. 
Above all the section demonstrates the way in which Kierkegaard has used literary 
devices to build an on-going picture of an appropriate way to approach Christianity and 
Christian philosophy. 
 Climacus returns to the problem of abstractly enquiring about existence. In a 
footnote he quotes and questions a passage from Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic in which 
the philosopher claims that ‘Existence is the immediate unity of inward reflection and 
reflection-into-another. Therefore (?), it is the indeterminate multitude of existents’.179 
Climacus argues that Hegel, here and elsewhere in his Logic, relies on ideas informed 
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by the concrete despite the system’s pretensions of starting from nothing.180 Climacus 
argues that the ‘suspect nature of abstract thought’181 comes to light whenever it 
addresses questions of existence, as it drops the question of personal existence, a move 
which removes all difficulty, considering everything to thus have been explained. 
Climacus decries the absence of the ethical in the Hegelian system as the ‘individual’s 
own ethical actuality is the only actuality’.182 The actuality of other individuals is only 
able to be grasped in thought, hence in possibility alone.
183
 Climacus argues that the 
individual’s ethical actuality should mean more to him than all of world history, more 
than all of the sciences combined, for if not, the individual ‘has absolutely nothing, no 
actuality at all, since to everything else he has only, at most, a relation of possibility.’184 
The systematic attempt to scientifically view the multiplicities of human existence as 
stages of development of the abstract pure human spirit instead of recognising 
‘existential simultaneity’185 is to enter into a confusion. Each individual is born a child 
and must undergo their own personal development, they are not automatically a 
Christian having been born to Christian parents any more than being born during a 
particular stage of the world-historical development of the human spirit can 
automatically bestow a status of development to the child.
186
 Whilst one-sided 
approaches of other kinds (faith, action) are aware of their omissions, the Hegelian’s 
one-sided focus on thinking ‘produces an appearance of having everything [he]… has 
faith, has passion as transcended moments of his life, so he says – and nothing is easier 
to say.’187 To such philosophers of pure thought, the subjective thinker is an aberration, 
yet for Climacus a subjective thinker is what we should become. The subjective thinker 
requires ‘imagination, feeling and dialectics with passion in the inwardness of 
thinking’.188 Most important to Climacus is passion, for to think about existence as an 
115 
 
existing being must arouse the passions. The efforts of the subjective thinker may enjoy 
‘but a meagre reward’,189 gaining none of the acclaim enjoyed by the objective system-
builder, but this does not denigrate the almost Sisyphean Christian task each individual 
faces to ‘understand oneself in existence’.190 
 With the importance of subjective thinking emphasised, Climacus returns to the 
problem discussed in Philosophical Crumbs. The reader is reminded that whilst the 
proper historical costume of the problem of the Crumbs is Christianity, this is never 
mentioned in the work so as ‘to gain breathing-space and not to be swept immediately 
off into historical, historical-dogmatic, prefatory, ecclesiastical questions about what 
Christianity actually is and is not.’191 The problem of the Crumbs relates not to what 
Christianity is, but how one becomes a Christian. Climacus describes his role as 
‘making it difficult for people to become a Christian by putting them off’.192 At first 
glance, such a task might appear deeply unchristian, yet in reaction to a worldview 
which equates Christianity with being born within a certain state’s borders Climacus is 
reaffirming the true difficulties associated with Christian faith. Indeed, he asserts that it 
is wrong to think that by making Christianity an easy endeavour devoid of personal 
exertion one would be doing others a favour, when he would instead be doing the 
opposite.
193
 The problem of the Crumbs is restated in the Postscript as follows: ‘The 
individual’s eternal happiness is decided in time through the relation to something 
historical, which is moreover historical in such a way that it includes in its composition 
that which according to its nature cannot become historical and must consequently 
become so on the strength of the absurd.’194 Climacus addresses the problem first with 
regard to pathos, and then with regard to the dialectic. Before setting out on this 
method, he reminds the reader that ‘the difficulty lies in putting them together, that an 
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existing person who… expresses his pathos-filled relation to the eternal happiness in 
absolute passion, is to relate now to the dialectical decision.’195 
 Differentiating between existential and aesthetic pathos, Climacus highlights 
the failings in hymning the praises of religious figures when religiously, pathos consists 
in ‘one’s own existing; … the poetic product… is something he considers accidental… 
for aesthetically speaking, it is the poetic productivity that is essential, and the poet 
accidental.’196 Whilst the subjectivity called for by Climacus insists on religious 
individuality, in a footnote he explains that this does not necessarily conclude that all 
religious individuality is an expression of existential pathos. He attacks the 
presumptuousness in many of these individualists’ confidence in their God-
relationship, and the way in they are ‘breezily assured of… [their] own salvation, but 
busily occupied, and with great self-importance, in doubting that of others and offering 
them help’.197 Climacus suggests the appropriate approach for the religious individual 
‘would be for him to say: “I do not doubt anyone’s salvation, the only one I have fears 
for is myself.”’198 The relationship between the absolute telos of Christianity and 
relative ends is discussed at length, with particular reference to the perils of attempting 
to mediate (in a Hegelian fashion) between the two. Climacus concludes that the task 
for the individual is to maintain a relation to both at the same time, ‘relating absolutely 
to his absolute telos and relatively to the relative. The latter relation belongs to the 
world, the former to the individual himself’.199 Whilst simple to state, to actually ensure 
one is relating absolutely to the absolute telos at all times (so as to avoid being in a 
relative relation with it) whilst ‘staying within the relative goals of existence’200 is 
incredibly difficult, ‘existence becomes exceedingly strenuous, for a double movement 
has constantly to be made.’201 The individual who has made this double movement 
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continues to live ‘in the finite, but he does not have his life in it. His life… has the 
diverse predicates of a human life, but he inhabits them as one who goes around in 
clothes borrowed from a stranger.’202 Existential pathos finds its expression in suffering 
which is the mark of religious action.
203
 This suffering emerges as ‘essential existential 
pathos relates to existing essentially; and to exist essentially is inwardness… 
inwardness is suffering, because changing himself is something the individual cannot 
do, it becomes a kind of putting on airs’.204 Unlike the individual living in immediacy, 
the religious individual living inwardly ‘has suffering constantly with him, demands 
suffering… even when misfortune is externally absent’.205 Indeed, suffering caused by 
accidental external events is in itself only accidental, whilst essential suffering must 
persist at all times – even where there is accidental external good fortune.206 Climacus 
cites the humourist as he who is the closest to the religious in terms of suffering, for he 
also grasps that suffering essentially belongs to existence, even if he does not 
understand why. The realisation of belonging relates to the pain in humour, whilst the 
unknowing of the reason relates to the jest, ‘this is why one both weeps and laughs 
when he speaks. In the pain, he touches the secret of existence, but then he goes back 
home.’207 That the boundary of the religious is the humorous is, according to Climacus, 
the reason why ‘in our day people have been quite frequently inclined to mistake the 
humorous for the religious’.208 The inward essential suffering of the religious is a 
temptation – there to test faith and frighten the individual away from the religious.209 
The true expression of the religious is hidden inwardness, for any direct expression 
would be presumptuousness which would be comical (due to the contradiction of the 
essentially inward being expressed outwardly) – even direct expression between two 
religious individuals.
210
 Hidden inwardness necessarily involves the eternal recollection 
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of guilt as the highest possible expression of the relationship between eternal happiness 
and consciousness of guilt.
211
 This guilt cannot be atoned or forgotten by the individual 
himself – this would also cancel out eternal happiness – but must be continually 
recollected as an eternal suffering. 
 The movement to the dialectical decision having discussed existential pathos 
necessarily involves the emergence of the paradox discussed in the Crumbs.
212
 Without 
the paradox, there is a religiousness which involves the individual’s own 
transformation of existence instead of ‘the paradoxical transformation of existence by 
faith through the relation to the historical’213 – this former form of religiousness would 
be the purely human, as each human being ‘viewed essentially, must be assumed to 
have a share in this blessedness and finally become blessed.’214 The difficulty of 
Christianity and the paradox has the power to cause offence in individuals who engage 
in busying themselves ‘with complaints about the whole world, instead of’215 focussing 
inwardly on themselves. This possibility of offence is at the root of the fear and 
trembling the believer finds in his existence.
216
 Climacus echoes the familiar 
Kierkegaardian theme of the cheapening of Christianity when he ponders what ‘have 
we all become, and what has Christianity become, by our… becoming Christians 
without further ado?’217 Without the paradox, the offence, the fear and trembling, 
Climacus fears that what is now called Christian faith is something else (and something 
less) entirely. 
 Having examined what is entailed in becoming a Christian, Climacus accepts 
that his work has made the task ‘so difficult that the number of Christians amongst 
cultivated Christendom may not be very large’,218 whilst also accepting that he is in no 
place to judge or know whether this is the case. By understanding the task involved in 
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becoming a Christian, one is free to strive to become one or to decide that one would be 
best not setting foot on such a route – ‘better candour than indecision.’219 Climacus 
warns against a too strict Christian upbringing for a child (perhaps echoing 
Kierkegaard’s own upbringing220), for this may be counterproductive.221 The opposite 
of this, the preaching of a childlike Christianity to adults in which everyone is ‘made 
happy in the realm of fantasy’,222 is condemned for divesting Christianity of its 
meaning. 
After his conclusion in which Climacus retraces much of the argument of the 
Postscript, an appendix addresses an ‘understanding with the reader.’223 In it Climacus 
denies that he himself is a Christian, ‘for he is completely preoccupied with how 
difficult it must be to become one’,224 and further denies that he has already become a 
Christian and has now gone further in a speculative fashion. He declares the work to be 
his own private experiment regarding how he can become a Christian, and hence the 
book itself is superfluous. With this in mind he begs that ‘no-one take the trouble to 
appeal to it [the Postscript]; for anyone who thus appeals to it has eo ipso 
misunderstood it.’225 The Postscript has sung the praises of subjectivity throughout, 
and any pretensions of it being an objective text on subjectivity would be to descend 
into farce. Hannay suggests that in keeping with Climacus’ name (meaning ladder), the 
work can be thought of as a ladder to reach a better understanding of what it takes to 
become a Christian which, once used, can be set aside.
226
 Either way, without this 
renunciation, Climacus would find himself sitting uncomfortably close to the 
speculative philosophers he had castigated throughout his writings. 
 In keeping with Kierkegaard’s intention that the Postscript mark his withdrawal 
from the literary stage, ‘a first and last declaration’ is placed at the end of the work in 
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which he acknowledges authorship of all the pseudonymous works.
227
 He declares that 
the use of pseudonymity was deliberate and under no intention to avoid prosecution for 
the content of his works (indeed, he had broken no laws). The pseudonymity was  
 
an essential basis in the production itself, which, for the sake of the lines and of the 
variety in the psychological distinctions in the individual characters, for poetic 
reasons required the lack of scruple in respect of good and evil, of broken hearts 
and high spirits, of despair and arrogance, of suffering and exultation, etc, the limits 
to which are set ideally, in terms of psychological consistency, and which no 
factual person would, or can, dare to permit themselves within the bounds of moral 
conduct in actuality.
228
 
 
He claims to have created the authors, who have then in turn created the works.
229
 As 
such Kierkegaard issues a heartfelt plea that if anyone is to quote a passage of one of 
these works, they should cite ‘the name of the respective pseudonym, not my own… 
separating us’230 – a convention adhered to within this study. He concludes by praying 
that ‘no unseasoned hand meddles dialectically with this work but lets it stand as it now 
stands.’231 With this, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous literary project was intended to 
have been closed. 
  
A Literary Review: The passionate against the passionless. 
 
A Literary Review, which appeared under Kierkegaard’s own name, was written whilst 
Kierkegaard was waiting for the publication of the Postscript with the retirement from 
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writing still in mind.
232
 A review of the novel Two Ages by Thomasine Christine 
Gyllembourg-Ehrensvärd is used as a platform for Kierkegaard to launch a critique of 
contemporary Danish society which has a directness not to be found again in his works 
until his feud with the state Church towards the end of his life. Madame Gyllembourg’s 
novel, which was at the time published anonymously, charts the story of a family in 
post-revolutionary Denmark and in the present age. Kierkegaard uses this juxtaposition 
as an opportunity to contrast the passionate post-revolutionary age with the rational 
contemporary age. In comparing the two ages, Kierkegaard sets his task as not being ‘a 
question of an ethico-philosophical assessment of validity, but of the consequences of 
its special character… at the level of generality’.233 The revolutionary age’s essential 
passionateness, and hence inwardness (for, as we have seen, all passion is essentially an 
inwardness), is credited with creating form and culture.
234
 Passion may also create the 
possibility for violence and unruliness in service of the ideal, but this betrays a lack of 
inwardness. If there is a unity of the many in relation to an idea which is a relation 
which singles each out individually, this union ‘unites ideally… the unanimity of the 
singled-out is the band playing well orchestrated music.’235 When the idea unites ‘en 
masse… without the individual, inward-directed singling out’,236 there is violence and 
licentiousness in service of the idea. The essential passion of the revolutionary age 
means it has a sense of decorum –even if it is a false sense, it still has the concept – and 
immediacy.
237
 This immediacy is a reactionary immediacy, which is thus provisional 
and not final, yet this ‘is a restoring of natural conditions, as opposed to a fossilised 
formalism which by losing the originary character of the ethical has become… a petty-
minded custom and practice.’238 The passionateness of the age of revolution means that 
it is a revelation, ‘a definite something which does not change perfidiously with the aid 
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of a conjectural criticism concerning what it is the age really wants.’239 The 
passionateness of the age means it ‘has not annulled the principle of contradiction and 
can become either good or evil’.240 Whichever path the age follows, a choice must be 
made, and in this either/or passion must be discerned. 
 The present age, in contrast to the passionate revolutionary age, is characterised 
by Kierkegaard as being ‘essentially sensible, reflective, dispassionate, eruptive in its 
fleeting enthusiasms and prudently indolent in its relaxation.’241 The philosopher 
bemoans how in the present age, every tiny detail is dispassionately reflected upon 
again and again, with the individual eventually concluding that he would be better not 
acting – giving an illusion of strength through evading taking any decision.242 The 
desire for money – itself an abstraction of value – replaces the envy of a person’s 
capacities and skills which might then bring the reward of money.
243
 The young man 
thinking thus ‘will die under the illusion that had he possessed money he would have 
lived, maybe even done something great.’244 To reflect instead of to act troubles 
Kierkegaard with respect to the impact to good and evil – the ‘hazard… is not being 
able to tell whether it is a conclusion reached by deliberation that saves a person from 
evil deeds, or whether it is exhaustion brought on by the deliberation that saves him, by 
sapping his strength.’245 Whilst a passionate age aims to tear down the institutions it 
disagrees with, the dispassionate present merely divests these things of their meaning 
and turns them into an illusion whilst publicly maintaining that the established order 
still stands. One such example of this being letting ‘the entire Christian terminology 
stand, but in the private knowledge that it is not supposed to mean anything 
decisive.’246  
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 Kierkegaard argues that the unifying principle of the present age is envy of 
excellence. This is a negative unifying principle in contrast to the positive unifying 
principle of enthusiasm found in the revolutionary age.
247
 The philosopher describes 
the outcome of this envy as a process of levelling. He explains that whilst ‘a passionate 
age accelerates, raises and topples, extols and oppresses, a reflective and passionless 
age does the opposite – it stifles and impedes, it levels. Levelling is a quiet 
mathematically abstract affair that avoids all fuss… If an uprising at its peak is like a 
volcanic explosion in which not a word can be heard, then levelling at its peak is like a 
deathly stillness over which nothing can raise itself but into which everything 
impotently sinks down.’248 Whilst an uprising is an individualistic act, levelling cannot 
be so for it would mean the leveller was above being levelled himself. Instead 
‘levelling is an abstract power and is abstraction’s victory over the individuals.’249 
Kierkegaard admits that the ‘spontaneous combustion of the human race’250 produced 
by levelling might provide the individual with the historical point of departure to 
eternal happiness, prompting him to ‘gain the essentiality of the religious inside 
himself.’251 For levelling, this victory of the abstract, to have occurred, Kierkegaard 
insists that ‘a monstrous abstraction, an all-encompassing something that is nothing, a 
mirage’252 was needed. This monstrous abstraction is the public. Kierkegaard blames 
the passionless nature of the age and the press for the emergence of the public. He 
argues that ‘the less idea there is in an age, and the more it relaxes… – if we also 
imagined the press becoming weaker and weaker because no big event or idea gripped 
the age – the more readily levelling becomes a decadent urge’.253 Far from rescuing the 
passionless age from its doldrums, levelling merely hastens the decline – individuality 
is submerged and the excellent brought down to a more acceptable common level. 
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Using starkly apocalyptic imagery, Kierkegaard describes the scythes of levelling 
swooping down to cut each individual down to size, with the only escape being ‘to leap 
over the blade… into the embrace of God.’254 He warns that ‘the desolating abstraction 
of levelling will be continually kept going by its servants’,255 and that the escape into 
inwardness towards God can only be undergone by the individual’s free choice, not by 
any form of compulsion by man or deity. As such, it is not unduly pessimistic to 
assume levelling will consume many more victims. At this point Kierkegaard breaks 
off from his previously ominous tone stating that ‘naturally the only interest this can 
have is as a prank, for if it is true that every person is to work out his own salvation, 
then making prophecies about the world’s future is tolerable and admissible at best as a 
form of recreation, a joke.’256 Not that the philosopher’s doom-laden vision of 
contemporary society reads anything close to a joke or any form of light-hearted 
recreation. Perhaps this recantation of the prophecies to be found in A Literary Review 
is an example of Kierkegaard reasserting the positive and optimistic thought that each 
single individual might gain the inwardness of Christianity (or at the very least, engage 
in passionate renunciation) over the pessimism that this is unlikely to happen. It may 
have been due to awareness he was close to becoming the presumptuous religious 
individualist he condemned in the Postscript – too occupied on judging and advising 
others about their salvation to focus inwardly on his own. Above all, what shines 
brightest in the work is Kierkegaard’s romanticism. It is perhaps this romanticism 
which places him so squarely at odds with the comparatively clinical nature of 
Hegelian philosophy. Kierkegaard appears to be arguing that both life and the 
philosophy which aids in our understanding of this life are worthless if divested of 
passion. Through Kierkegaard’s writings runs the hot and cold flow of life’s course. In 
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a well-known early entry in his journal, Kierkegaard proclaimed his need ‘to find the 
idea for which I am willing to live and die.’257 It is precisely this romantic passion 
which seems to be necessary if the perils of levelling and dissolution into the “public” 
is to be avoided. 
  
The Sickness Unto Death. 
 
Kierkegaard’s return to writing after the Corsair affair produced works much more 
explicitly religious than those before. Works of Love, for instance, extols the Christian 
conception of agape. The Sickness unto Death marked Kierkegaard’s return to 
pseudonymity, being published under the name Anti-Climacus. The pseudonym 
suggests an antagonism between Anti-Climacus and Johannes Climacus, the author of 
Philosophical Crumbs and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Whilst Climacus was 
writing about Christianity from the outside, Anti-Climacus writes from the inside – he 
is a committed Christian. The Christian ideality of The Sickness unto Death is such that 
Kierkegaard felt unable to have it published under his own name. In a journal entry he 
explains, ‘when the claims of ideality are set at the maximum one should above all take 
care not to be mistaken for them, as though one were one self the ideality.’258 In an 
earlier journal entry he had described his position with regard to the two pseudonyms: 
‘I placed myself higher than [Johannes] Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus.’259 
 Anti-Climacus’ work begins with a preface in which he addresses concerns that 
his form of exposition might ‘seem too rigorous to be edifying and too edifying to have 
the rigour of scholarship.’260 Whilst admitting that not every reader will automatically 
find The Sickness Unto Death edifying, this does not necessarily mean it is unedifying, 
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and particularly not because it is rigorous – indeed, ‘what edifies is seriousness.’261 
After an introduction referencing the resurrection of Lazarus, Anti-Climacus turns to 
explain his conception of the self. The self is described as a ‘relation that relates to 
itself, or that in the relation which is in its relating to itself.’262 This relation is the 
synthesis between ‘the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of 
freedom and necessity.’263 This relation between the diametrically opposing terms is 
not one established by the individual person himself, thus the relation which relates to 
itself ‘relates in turn to that which has established the whole relation.’264 This 
conception of the self admits that there are two forms of authentic despair in which the 
self can find itself – ‘not wanting in despair to be oneself, and wanting in despair to be 
onself.’265 This despair is what constitutes The Sickness Unto Death. Anti-Climacus 
explains that such a sickness is typically a sickness which leads to the sufferer’s death, 
yet ‘in Christian understanding death is itself a passing into life… death is no doubt the 
end of sickness, but death is not the end.’266 The sickness Anti-Climacus is referring to 
in the work is ‘to be unable to die, yet not as though there were hope of life… this 
tormenting contradiction’.267 At the bottom, both authentic forms of despair are the 
same – the individual wants to be rid of himself. Even the self wanting in despair to be 
itself wants to be a self which it is not (if the self the self despairingly wanted to be was 
truly itself, this would no longer be despair). In both forms of despair, the self ‘wants to 
tear… away from the power which established it… this he is incapable of doing… that 
power is the stronger, and it compels him to be the self he does not want to be.’268 The 
individual self may not even be aware that he is in despair, but ‘eternity will… make it 
evident… that he cannot be rid of his self… And this eternity must do, because having 
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a self, being a self, is the greatest, the infinite, concession that has been made to man, 
but also eternity’s claim on him.’269 
 Anti-Climacus explains that despair is more widespread than might commonly 
be thought, for unlike physical sickness, the spiritually sick may have no idea that this 
is their condition. Indeed, the self that knows itself to be in despair is dialectically 
closer to not being in despair than the self completely unaware that this is their 
condition – it is very rare to find any self who is not in some way in despair.270 Anti-
Climacus sets out the forms of despair based on the nature of the synthesis which 
makes up the self, first setting aside concerns of whether the self is aware or unaware 
that it is in despair. The finite and infinite, and the possible and necessary aspects of the 
self are in despair if they lack the quality of their opposite. To have infinitude without 
finitude, or possibility without necessity, or vice versa in any combination, means that 
the self is despairing to be a self which it is not – the true self rests in the synthesis of 
these opposites, without the synthesis there is no true self.
271
 If one is conscious of 
being in despair, one might want in despair not to be oneself or want in despair to be 
oneself. The former of these forms of despair is characterised by Anti-Climacus as 
being ‘the despair of weakness.’272 It may be despair over something earthly or despair 
over the eternal, the latter of these being a higher form of despair as it is despair over 
the weakness rather than despair itself being the weakness – the self in despair over the 
weakness is at least aware of the weakness.
273
 Yet this is still despair, for instead of 
‘definitely turning away from despair in the direction of faith, humbling himself before 
God under his weakness, he engrosses himself further in despair… over his 
weakness.’274 Wanting to be oneself in despair is the despair of defiance. Whilst the 
former form necessarily contains a certain degree of defiance
275
 this form involves ‘a 
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raising of the level of consciousness of the self… and of one’s state being one of 
despair.’276 This defiant despair wants to sever the link with the higher power which 
established the self, or even denies that such a power exists.
277
 Yet, according to Anti-
Climacus, all this defiance amounts to is ‘forever building… castles in the air, and… 
fencing with an imaginary opponent… and beneath it all there is nothing.’278 
 Having explained in the first part of The Sickness unto Death the way in which 
despair constitutes this sickness, in the second part of the work Anti-Climacus asserts 
that this despair is sin. The self described before is not a separate unit with God as an 
external figure, but is rather ‘the theological self, the self directly before God.’279 God, 
as the external power which established the synthesis of the self is necessarily entwined 
with each individual self. Anti-Climacus explains that ‘since sin is not the unruliness of 
the flesh and blood itself, but the spirit’s consent to it’,280 the inwardness of despair 
does not make it any less sinful than an externally enacted sin – both are committed by 
the self directly before God. To support his conception that whatever is not Christian 
faith – as despair is not – is necessarily sin, Anti-Climacus cites the biblical passage 
that ‘whatsoever is not faith is sin.’281 The writer accepts the orthodox position that sin 
is affirmative rather than negative even though this position is paradoxical.
282
 He 
explains that ‘Christianity proceeds to set up sin so firmly as an affirmative position 
that human understanding can never comprehend it; and then the same doctrine 
removes this affirmative position in a way that human understanding can never 
comprehend’283 through atonement. As with previous Kierkegaardian pseudonyms, 
Anti-Climacus derides speculative philosophy’s ability to grasp this paradox by 
diluting it until it is understandable, when it can only truly be grasped authentically by 
faith.
284
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 To end The Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus finally turns towards the ways 
in which the sin he had discussed is continued by being in the state of sin, for ‘being in 
a state of sin is the new sin, it is the sin.’285 Sin is continued when the individual self 
despairs over their sin, it intensifies it.
286
 Anti-Climacus rejects the common conception 
that for an individual to despair over their sin is a good, arguing that this passionate self 
who declares he will never forgive himself for his sins ‘is close to being the opposite of 
a contrite heart that prays to God for forgiveness’.287 That God forgives sins may also 
lead to despair in the sinner offended by such a concept. Like the former self, this 
sinner feels despairingly over sin and finds it offensive that God can take their sin 
away. Offence in this way is the opposite of faith (one can believe or be offended by 
Christianity), and as such is sin.
288
 The final way in which sin is dealt with by Anti-
Climacus is the throwing aside of Christianity and declaring it to be a lie. Such despair 
is an aggressive act against God, and ‘is sin against the Holy Ghost. As the Jews said of 
Christ, that he cast out devils with the help of the devil, so this offence makes Christ 
into an invention of the devil.’289 Anti-Climacus concludes by returning to the 
beginning, highlighting that the way to avoid despair was present at the start of the 
work in the self ‘relating itself to itself and in wanting to be itself… grounded 
transparently in the power which established it.’290 Despite Anti-Climacus’ profound 
Christianity, a more non-religious lesson can be taken from The Sickness Unto Death, 
namely that the authentic self must Be itself. A self may despair about this, but this 
despair is a barrier to authentic Being. 
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Practice in Christianity and the return of Anti-Climacus. 
 
Anti-Climacus returns as the author of Kierkegaard’s final pseudonymous work, 
Practice in Christianity, published shortly before he engaged in battle with the state 
Church, a battle which would consume him for the remainder of his life. Much of the 
grounds for this battle were, as we shall see, laid out in this work. In The Sickness Unto 
Death, Anti-Climacus had already launched a minor attack on Christendom, declaring 
it ‘a miserable edition of Christianity, full of misprints that distort the meaning and of 
thoughtless omissions… an abuse of it in having taken Christianity’s name in vain.’291 
Practice in Christianity has Anti-Climacus expounding the ‘supreme ideality’292 of the 
requirement for being a Christian without any scaling down in order to make 
everything seem more palatable to modern tastes. Anti-Climacus takes the biblical 
proclamation by Jesus ‘Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will 
give you rest’293 as the starting point for his discussion. He builds up the passage, 
commenting on the amazing nature of each part and on how with each addition the 
amount of amazement increases. It is amazing that instead of someone having to search 
for help, the one who is able to help calls the needy to him.
294
 It is amazing that the call 
is to all and not to a select few.
295
 It is amazing that the needy are called to the helper, 
instead of the helper coming to see the needy, being able then to retreat away when all 
becomes too much.
296
 It is amazing that all who labour and are burdened are called, 
with the concern that there might be a single individual might not hear the call.
297
 It is 
amazing that the helper offers to give the needy rest for by being the help himself, the 
helper must stay with the needy at all times, and yet it is the helper himself who calls 
the people to him.
298
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 At this point of the work, Anti-Climacus declares a halt. The result of the 
invitation is not what might have been expected, instead of there being a surge of 
people coming to accept the invitation ‘you eventually will see the opposite, a vast 
crowd of people who shudder and recoil until they storm ahead and trample down’.299 
He examines why this may have been the case, first asking just who the inviter was. 
The inviter was Jesus, but not the Jesus commonly held in mind now – ‘the Jesus Christ 
who sits in glory at the Father’s right hand’300 – but the abased Jesus. To think of Jesus 
as having spoken these words in glory when in fact they were spoken in abasement is to 
make the words untrue.
301
 As in the works of Climacus, Anti-Climacus rejects the 
possibility of using historical methods to prove that Jesus was God or to know anything 
about him – ‘one cannot know anything at all about Christ; he is the paradox [and]… 
exists only for faith.’302 Yet despite this rejection of historical knowledge, Anti-
Climacus also rejects the notion that the result of Christ’s life is of more importance 
that the life itself. Even if there were no results, that God became an individual human 
man would still be extraordinary.
303
 If a wise person whose life results in great things 
for mankind but was abased by his own age were to have been born in a different time, 
it is likely that he would not have been abased – this is not the case for Christ, for he 
would have been abased in any age.
304
 A great literary depiction of this is Dostoevsky’s 
Grand Inquisitor who turns away the returning Christ for interfering with the mission of 
the Church.
305
 In this lies what Anti-Climacus refers to as the calamity of contemporary 
Christendom, ‘namely, that Christ is… neither the person he was when he lived on 
earth nor the one he will be at his second coming… but is someone about whom we 
have learned in an inadmissible way from history… that he was some kind of great 
somebody.’306 By loosening the paradox of Christ, ‘Christendom has abolished 
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Christianity without really knowing it itself.’307 Practice in Christianity is Anti-
Climacus’ protest in order to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom. 
 Anti-Climacus attacks what he believes is the deification of the established 
order, perhaps not entirely fairly singling out Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of 
Right as being part of this trend.
308
 He equates this phenomenon with the established 
order ‘ignoring its own origin [that it]… also began with that collision between the 
single individual and the established order’.309 The deification of the established order 
is blamed for abolishing all religious fear and trembling, for the security afforded to the 
individual is ‘to such a degree that one can calculate the probability and spinelessly 
exempt oneself from the least little decision of the kind in which “the single individual” 
has pain, for one is not a single individual.’310 Deification of the established order is 
identified by Anti-Climacus as being secularisation. He agrees that in secular matters, 
the established order may well be the authority (though it may also be wrong in these 
matters also), but in deifying the established order the individual’s ‘relationship with 
God is also secularised; we want it to coincide with a certain relativity’.311 If the single 
individual ‘appeals to his relationship with God over against the established order that 
has deified itself, it does indeed seem as if he were making himself more than 
human.’312 This however is not the case, as this single individual admits that each and 
every single individual has this relationship with God – ‘he really is only making God 
God and himself a human being’,313 yet others not understanding this will take offence 
in the individual’s placing his relationship over and above the totalising whole. 
 Practice in Christianity’s third and final part draws on the biblical passage ‘And 
I, if I be lifted from the earth, will draw all men unto me’314 for discussion. That this 
drawing of men occurs from on high should not fool one into thinking that this means 
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all talk of abasement is superfluous. He explains that the ‘Christian’s abasement is not 
sheer abasement; it is only a depiction of loftiness, but a depiction in this world, where 
loftiness must appear inversely as lowliness and abasement.’315 Anti-Climacus argues 
that it is mistaken understanding in this area which has led to the illusion of the Church 
triumphant which ‘has taken the Church of Christ in vain… a Church that wants to be 
the Church triumphant here in this world’316 instead of in eternity. Christendom is the 
result of this fallacious Church triumphant, where instead of a becoming all is assumed 
to have already been established. Christendom ‘assumes that the time of struggling is 
over, that the Church, although it is still in this world, has nothing more about or for 
which to struggle.’317 Anti-Climacus opposes the Church triumphant with the Church 
militant, where to be a Christian ‘means to express being a Christian within an 
environment that is the opposite of being a Christian.’318 The Church triumphant 
involves the opposite – there is no difference between the Christian and his 
environment, hence there is no struggle. As there is no struggle, it did not take a logical 
leap to assume that under Christendom ‘we are all Christians in exactly the same was 
that it is a given that we are all human beings’.319 By forgetting the abasement of Christ 
and only thinking of the loftiness, the laxness of Christendom has replaced the task of 
being an imitator of Christ with being an admirer, which is exactly the opposite 
‘correlative of abasement and lowliness’.320 To be an admirer involves a personal 
detachment which lacks the requirement of the personal striving an imitator needs to 
become more like the prototype (Christ in abasement) he endeavours to imitate.
321
 In 
Christendom, gone is the danger involved in being a Christian, yet without the danger 
one cannot be a Christian.
322
 In Christendom, all that will be left is the lukewarm.
323
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The final battle against Christendom and the state Church. 
 
Kierkegaard’s plea through Anti-Climacus that the state Church should become the 
Church militant in place of the Church triumphant fell on deaf ears. In particular he was 
disappointed that Bishop Mynster (then leader of the state Church with whom 
Kierkegaard had conversed often) had failed to acknowledge this attempt to save the 
established order.
324
 That the Bishop had still failed to act upon his death convinced 
Kierkegaard the established order was beyond saving and beyond defence.
325
 Mynster’s 
soon to be successor Martensen delivered a sermon in which he paid tribute to the late 
Bishop in terms which were to spark Kierkegaard into embarking on his most direct 
and vociferous literary campaign to date – a campaign which was to continue until his 
death. The first newspaper article to appear in the campaign was written before 
Martensen became bishop (Mynster died 30
th
 January 1854, the service in question was 
on 5
th
 February and Martensen was appointed bishop on 15
th
 April
326
) but publication 
was delayed until December 1854 as Kierkegaard did not wish to add to the slapdash 
onslaught of articles written about the Bishops old and new which emerged at the time 
of the transition. 
 The article entitled ‘Was Bishop Mynster a “Truth-Witness”, One of “the 
Authentic Truth-Witnesses” – Is This the Truth?’ attacked Martensen’s characterisation 
of Mynster during his memorial service as being ‘one of the authentic truth-
witnesses’.327 The phrase so irked Kierkegaard because not only did he feel Mynster’s 
proclamation of Christianity to be lacklustre, but that Mynster’s proclamations ‘over 
many years’328 had themselves already done so much to undo the understanding of 
what it truly meant to be a truth-witness. Kierkegaard argues that to be a witness of 
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Christianity necessarily involves danger, yet this was never something comprehended 
by the late bishop, accusing him of ‘playing at Christianity [removing]… all the 
dangers… to replace them with power (to be a danger to others), goods, advantages, 
abundant enjoyment of even the most select refinements’.329 In a late addition to the 
piece, Kierkegaard explains the position of Mynster’s sermons in the upbringing he 
received from his father, and his unease with the bishop’s brand of Christianity. He 
exclaims ‘now he is dead – God be praised that it could be put off as long as he was 
living!’330 seemingly worried that his internal disdain might have overflowed whilst 
Mynster was still alive resulting in an undignified spectacle. After such a wait, there 
was no way the assault on Christendom was going to stop here. 
 A flurry of newspaper articles followed. ‘There the Matter Rests!’ repeated 
much of the content of the original article, accusing those who felt he had taken to 
attacking the dead because they cannot reply as misunderstanding his position – that he 
had kept publicly silent out of respect to Mynster. Kierkegaard accepts that Mynster 
should have lived ‘out his life undiminished [and have been]… buried with full 
honours… but then no further… he must least of all go down in history as a truth-
witness… one of the holy chain’.331 Kierkegaard published articles addressing attacks 
on his position from pastors,
332
 the task of putting an end to “official” Christianity,333 
the religious situation in Denmark,
334
 and myriad other topics relating to his vision of 
Christianity as related to the state Church. One article addresses the suggestion 
Kierkegaard received that he now ought to “stop ringing the alarm” – the request seems 
to have had little impact on the philosopher’s literary outpourings.335 Kierkegaard 
attacked what he saw as Bishop Martensen’s silence regarding his assault on the state 
Church. Martensen had made one reply to Kierkegaard’s indignation, but had since 
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made no further response.
336
 Martensen ‘threw a garbage can of insults and abusive 
remarks over me – and then took off’337 was how Kierkegaard interpreted the act. In a 
postscript to the same article, he asserted regarding his campaign that ‘this is, 
religiously, the matter I must pursue; therefore I must do what I am doing, whether it 
personally goes against the grain or not.’338 
 Not wanting to outstay his welcome with the Fædrelandet in which he had now 
published more than twenty articles as part of his campaign, Kierkegaard began 
producing his own newsletter – The Moment – as a vehicle for his writings.339 The 
philosopher was to publish nine issues of The Moment (with a tenth ready for 
publication) before his death. The newsletter addressed the themes already found in the 
previous Fædrelandet articles and in Anti-Climacus’ Practice in Christianity in an 
increasingly direct fashion seemingly designed to appeal to the masses. This new direct 
style of delivering the same message is demonstrated in the following aphorisms from 
the sixth issue of The Moment: 
 
Is this the same teaching, when Christ says to the rich young man: Sell all that you 
have and give it to the poor, and when the pastor says: Sell all that you have and 
give it to me?
340 
 
One cannot live on nothing. One hears this so often, especially from pastors. And 
the pastors are the very ones who perform this feat: Christianity does not exist at all 
[in Christendom] – yet they live on it.341 
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In a piece in the same issue of The Moment, the Kierkegaard explains this change to a 
more direct approach through the example of a fire chief. He explains that ‘usually the 
fire chief is a very affable and cultured man; but at a fire he is what one calls coarse-
mouthed – he says, or rather he bellows, “Hey! Get the hell out of here…”… And this 
is quite as it should be. A fire is a serious matter’.342 Even though people might be 
offended, and feel they ought to be handled with a great deal more respect, the 
magnitude of the situation demands a direct approach. The same is the case for the 
crisis of the spirit and the individual’s relationship to their eternal happiness under 
Christendom. 
 By the time of the publication of the ninth issue of The Moment, Kierkegaard 
was not just bellowing “Get the hell out of here”, but going as far as to refer to pastors 
as cannibals. He describes how pastors and their wives and children live off eating 
others, ‘making the most brilliant career, rolling in money’343 instead of actually 
following what Christianity requires. In a three-stage argument, Kierkegaard tries to 
show how pastors are a more abominable form of cannibals than cannibals themselves. 
Unlike the savage cannibal, the pastor is cultured and university educated which makes 
the crime more shocking.
344
 Unlike the cannibal who eats his enemies, the pastor ‘gives 
the impression of being exceptionally devoted to those he eats’.345 Unlike the cannibal 
whose act is a ferocious instant in killing his victim, the pastor’s ‘cannibalism is well 
considered, ingeniously arranged, based on the assumption of not having anything else 
to live on for a whole lifetime and that what one has to live on will be able to support a 
man with a family and will increase year after year.’346 Kierkegaard asserts that at first 
the pastor may feel ‘a certain embarrassment that he hears himself called a true disciple 
of Christ [but] as the years pass, he becomes so accustomed to hearing it that he 
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himself believes he is that. As such he dies, as basically corrupted as it is possible for a 
human being to become, and then he is buried as a “truth-witness”’.347 Within two 
weeks Kierkegaard was taken sick and confined to hospital his legs having failed him, 
little over a month later he died on 11
th
 November 1855, his condition having 
deteriorated during this period.
348
 
 The tenth issue of The Moment, which was eventually published posthumously 
contained a piece, entitled ‘My Task’, in which Kierkegaard sets out for one last time 
the reason behind his writing. He reasserts that he does not call himself a Christian, and 
expresses that it is unfortunate that he is ‘able to make it manifest the others [in 
Christendom] are not either’349 even though many fool themselves and others that this 
is the case. Again Kierkegaard has the pastors in his crosshairs with this remark. He 
assigns himself the Socratic task of auditing the definition of what it is to be a 
Christian, arguing that if he had made the mistaken assumption of himself having been 
the only true Christian, he would have immediately fallen prey to the sophists and 
pastors, just as Socrates would have been undone if he had mistakenly asserted himself 
to be the individual who knew the most.
350
 Kierkegaard explains that he is the only 
person correctly positioned to give a true critique of his body of work as he has spent 
the whole of his life living and breathing it.
351
 As such he ridicules the idea that ‘some 
pastor, at most a professor, would not need more than a superficial glance at it in order 
to evaluate it’352 – thankfully this view has not abated more than a century’s worth of 
Kierkegaard scholarship, which hopefully the philosopher might accept is based on 
more than a superficial glance, even if he might still assert this is still not the true 
critique only he can deliver. Whilst rejecting the idea of himself being the sole true 
Christian, he argues that his task has no analogy – ‘in Christendom’s eighteen hundred 
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years there is absolutely nothing comparable’,353 no one has previously expressed that 
they are not a Christian and then audited what it means to be a Christian – a task from 
which he has not personally profited.
354
 He ends the piece with a paean to the common 
man, to whom he claims to belong and to have lived alongside, as opposed to the elite 
explaining, ‘I definitely have not joined them but have kept only a loose relationship to 
them.’355 In relationship with the elite, Kierkegaard recommends the common man 
‘must at no price have money differences with [them]… lest it be said that one was 
avoiding them to get out of paying. No, pay them double so that your disagreement 
with them can become obvious: that what concerns them does not concern you at all, 
money, and that on the contrary, what does not concern them concerns you infinitely, 
Christianity.’356 As such, Kierkegaard’s campaign against “official” Christianity 
continues even after the philosopher himself is dead. 
  
Conclusion. 
 
Whether Kierkegaard had always intended his authorship to form the continuing 
project asserted above and elsewhere in The Point of View…, or whether like MacIntyre 
focussing on Either/Or,
357
 one assumes that this was a later affectation is of little 
interest to the purpose of this study. Whether originally intended or not, Kierkegaard’s 
authorship does follow the continuing theme of what it means to be a Christian. In his 
initial overt attacks on Hegelianism and his later overt attacks on Christendom, 
Kierkegaard is attacking the same tendency – the positioning of men in the place of 
God and the assumptions of grandeur of the elite. Despite his comparatively more 
playful and aesthetically pleasing literary style, Kierkegaard demands more of his 
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reader than did Hegel. He offers no comforting all-encompassing system for the reader 
to nod his head in admiration of, but instead insists on personal striving from each 
unique individual. The same is true with his relations with Christendom, with Hegel 
offering the comforting position that all are Christians and Kierkegaard suggesting that 
perhaps very few are truly Christians – none of whom will have reached this position 
without personal striving, anguish, fear and trembling. Kierkegaard’s philosophy is a 
Christian philosophy, necessarily meaning that his conception of the Being of 
individuals must be either accepted or denied through faith instead of through logical 
reasoning, though this does not make it any weaker – Kierkegaard would warn us to be 
wary of any philosophy which claims to have proved Christianity. He asserts that each 
of us is a unique individual with our own personal relationship with God. On political 
matters, Kierkegaard occasionally betrays a hint of conservatism, but reminds his 
reader that politics belongs to the transitory finite temporal world, when one should 
instead be focussing on the infinite. One can easily conjecture whether Kierkegaard 
would have focussed more on more temporal difficulties if he had been born in a 
different time, place or class – but this would be to ignore the centrality of this largely 
apolitical stance to his life’s project. If and when the established order proved to be a 
barrier to the understanding of what it means to be a Christian, Kierkegaard had no 
qualms in engaging in battle – namely against the state Church and established 
Christendom – but when this is not the case, Kierkegaard Christianly maintains the 
biblical instruction to ‘Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and 
unto God the things that are God’s.’358 This is perhaps best echoed in the posthumous 
issue of The Moment when he recommended the common man pay twice what is 
demanded of him as an act of protest. Kierkegaard’s existential understanding of 
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subjective Being and the responsibility of each person for the choices he makes – for he 
must choose – foreshadowed the twentieth century existential movement in philosophy. 
Unlike Stirner whose reaction against Hegelian totalising was to reject all values, 
Kierkegaard offers an alternative which asserts the primacy of the single individual, 
whilst maintaining a system of values. Christianity is clearly the foundation for the 
system of values to be found within Kierkegaardian philosophy, but this should not 
imply that it is not possible to draw from it non-theistic lessons, as Heidegger was to do 
both in Being and Time and beyond. 
 In his criticisms of Hegel and the Hegelianism of his contemporaries, 
Kierkegaard was not always entirely fair. Yet it is arguable that such a position is 
excusable. Returning to Kierkegaard’s story of the fire chief, it is clear that he felt 
himself to be writing at a time of philosophical, spiritual and social emergency. The 
sheer dominance of Hegelian philosophy amongst his contemporaries meant that there 
would have been no lack of other writers highlighting the strengths of Hegel’s thought. 
Just as the fire chief dispenses with social graces when attempting to evacuate a 
burning theatre, Kierkegaard seems to have dispensed with a more sober nuanced 
approach to Hegelianism in his attempt to encourage evacuation from this 
philosophical realm. The urgency of the situation means that the fire chief cannot 
afford to calmly inform the crowd of the safer and more dangerous areas of the burning 
room, similarly the urgency of Kierkegaard’s writings is such that there seems to have 
been little time to discuss the more and less innocuous elements of Hegel’s legacy. 
What we should take from Kierkegaard’s philosophising in this context is his attempt 
to return the individual existing person to the centre of philosophy, and his insistence of 
the central importance of the passionate choices that each person makes to authentic 
142 
 
Being. The individual alone is responsible for the act of self-creation undergone over a 
lifetime, and in one way or another they will be held accountable for the choices they 
have made. 
 Finally we must consider the extent to which Kierkegaard’s existential Christian 
subjectivism can be thought of as overcoming the metaphysical approach to 
philosophy. Kierkegaard’s almost single-minded focus upon the individual’s 
relationship with God means that whilst he ably explores each unique individual’s 
subjectivity, he fails to entirely account for the individual’s Being alongside other 
beings. Kierkegaard’s most explicit foray into the relationships between beings was, as 
we saw, in his Literary Review. In it Kierkegaard reveals his romantic preference for 
passionate revolutionary ages over the passionless present in which he lived. Can such 
a preference be understood as being a rejection of metaphysically derived politics? 
Perhaps so, if by metaphysically derived politics we mean that trend towards cool, calm 
governance resting upon utilitarian calculations. If Kierkegaard were around to see the 
age of the opinion poll, focus groups and carefully targeted political advertising, he 
might not have thought of his own age as being so dispassionate. It is perhaps 
inevitable that times of peace will appear much more sober and less exciting than the 
tumult of war or revolution. Such a preference for quality of human life (here taking a 
more exciting passionate life as having greater quality) over quantity (war and 
revolution inevitably leads to increases in loss of life, whilst duller times tend to be 
safer) might imply a partiality for militarism. Yet it would be difficult to draw such a 
position from Kierkegaard’s writings, leading to the question of where, if not from 
militarism, this passion is to be derived from. Kierkegaard would immediately respond 
that it is from the single individual’s relationship with Christianity, but this leads us 
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back into the isolation of subjectivity away from the wider political issues Kierkegaard 
himself raises in his Literary Review. Heidegger was to pick up many of these strands 
of Kierkegaard’s work, both in Being and Time and beyond. As we shall see later, by 
not falling back upon the theological when it comes to questions of beings Being 
alongside one another, Heidegger is able to come to grips much better with the social 
aspects of a post-metaphysical position, even if he was for a period to mistake the need 
for passion with a need for militarism. 
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Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison: Personalist Reform of Hegelianism 
 
The personal idealism of Scottish philosopher Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison
1
 has been 
receiving renewed interest in recent years. Articles by Bill Mander and James Thomas 
appeared in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy analysing Pringle-
Pattison’s debate with Bernard Bosanquet at a 1918 Aristotelian Society symposium, 
whilst Jan Olof Bengtsson’s Worldview of Personalism charted the origins and 
development of British personal idealism alongside various other strands in the 
development of personalist thought. Pringle-Pattison’s importance to this study is due 
to his attempt to reform what he felt to be the impersonal elements of Hegelian idealist 
philosophy from the inside, instead of adopting the position of outright rejection taken 
by the likes of Stirner and Kierkegaard. In particular on this point, the Aristotelian 
Society debate and the distinction it draws between the personalist and absolutist 
strands of idealism will be of key interest to the study, and as such will be discussed at 
length later within the chapter. First we will discuss Pringle-Pattison’s early criticism 
of orthodox Hegelianism in his Hegelianism and Personality, followed by his later 
positions in The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy, particularly as 
demonstrated in the aforementioned debate. The final focus shall be the philosopher’s 
political meditations in The Philosophical Radicals. Pringle-Pattison’s philosophical 
method is one of constructive criticism. As such, we shall see his philosophical 
positions emerge in opposition to the works of other (largely Hegelian) philosophers. 
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The Balfour Lectures: Scottish Philosophy and Hegelianism and Personality. 
 
Hegelianism and Personality was the publication of Pringle-Pattison’s second series of 
Balfour Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh, the first series being 
published as Scottish Philosophy two years previously. Scottish Philosophy’s final 
lecture ‘The Possibility of Philosophy as a System: Scottish Philosophy and Hegel’ 
offered a clear suggestion that the philosopher often assumed to be an orthodox 
Hegelian idealist was not all he seemed.
2
 The lecture defends Hegel’s Absolute against 
Hamilton’s depiction of it as ‘“not under relation” – “the absolute negation of all 
relation.”… the very abstraction against which we find Hegel inveighing at every 
turn.’3 Despite this spirited defence, the lecture concludes by questioning the ‘vague 
answers of Hegelianism’4 regarding immortality and, most importantly for our purpose 
here, ‘what we may call the individual in the individual – those subjective memories, 
thoughts and plans which make each of us a separate soul.’5 Pringle-Pattison suggests 
that such deficiencies require not the total rejection of Hegel’s thought, but ‘to repair 
the omissions… in respect of the individual and the nature of the existence that belongs 
to it.’6 The ground was thus cleared for Pringle-Pattison’s extended thoughts on these 
matters in Hegelianism and Personality. 
 After two lectures on neo-Kantianism and Fichte respectively, Hegelianism and 
Personality’s remaining lectures deal directly with the flaws and merits of Hegel’s 
philosophy (with a particular focus on the former). Several times during the lectures, 
Pringle-Pattison commends Hegel for not shrinking from anthropomorphism in 
utilising self-consciousness as the ‘key to the ultimate nature of existence as a whole.’7 
Pringle-Pattison’s insistence that this is the appropriate entry point to understand 
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existence is explained by the assertion that philosophy must necessarily involve the 
explanation of the lower by the higher, and it is arguable that ‘self-consciousness is the 
highest fact we know’.8 Pringle-Pattison explains however that Hegel tends to suppress 
the importance of experience within his philosophy. ‘He presents everything 
synthetically, though it must have been got to analytically by an ordinary process of 
reflection upon the facts which are common to every thinker.’9 This point is expanded 
later to explain that although Pringle-Pattison is in absolute agreement with Hegel’s 
positioning of self-consciousness as ‘the ultimate category of thought... through which 
alone the universe is intelligible to us’,10 Hegel’s journey to this conclusion is 
unnecessary. It is through Hegel’s own experience of his own existence that this 
conclusion becomes clear, it ‘is not really reached by any “high priori road”’.11 It is 
this Pringle-Pattison is referring to when he accuses Hegel of suppression, for in this 
instance Hegel has entered the realms of logic to expound a position which is much 
more easily accessible through direct human experience. Hegel’s Absolute Idea, 
Pringle-Pattison insists ‘is simply the notion of knowledge as such’.12 It ‘is no more 
than an ideal drawn by Hegel from his sole datum, the human self-consciousness, and 
does not lift us beyond our starting point.’13 Despite the attempts to stand above human 
self-consciousness in the form of the Absolute self-consciousness, Pringle-Pattison 
argues that such an achievement is beyond the scope of any philosophical system – 
Hegel’s or any other. The realisation of Absolute self-consciousness in God ‘remains a 
belief or faith, not something which is attained in actual knowledge’ 14 by human 
persons. 
 Beyond the Absolute Idea – the self-consciousness of the Absolute – is the 
Absolute Spirit, described by Pringle-Pattison as ‘the one ultimately real existence’15 in 
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Hegel’s philosophical system. Pringle-Pattison cites the supreme category in Hegel’s 
Logic as a description of this Absolute Spirit. The transition from Hegel’s Logic – in 
what are commonly referred to as the Greater Logic (Science of Logic) and Lesser 
Logic (volume one of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences) – to the second 
and third volumes of the Encyclopaedia (Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Mind 
respectively) troubles Pringle-Pattison deeply. The Logic, he explains, is ‘is ostensibly 
a logic and nothing more; but in the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of 
[Mind] we are offered a metaphysic or ontology’.16 The philosopher’s trouble with 
Hegel on this point is due to the blurring of the distinction between logic and 
metaphysics, which he argues results in Hegel ‘offering us a logic as a metaphysic 
[which is not]… merely an implication of his views [but]… is often presented by 
Hegelians as the gist and outcome of the system.’17 Pringle-Pattison argues that Hegel’s 
presentation of an absolute Logic necessarily results in this identification. Pringle-
Pattison accepts that Hegel meant his philosophy to be understood by being read 
backwards, thus meaning the Absolute Idea never existed separately from Absolute 
Spirit.
18
 There is no actual leap from the logic of Logic to the metaphysic of Nature and 
Mind, as ‘it might be said we are merely undoing the work of abstraction and retracing 
our steps towards concrete fact.’19 Yet this, Pringle-Pattison explains, ‘implies the 
admission that it is our experiential knowledge of actual fact’20 which drives the move 
from the wholly abstract Logic to the semi-abstract Nature, and finally to the absolute 
reality of Mind, the Absolute Spirit. Pringle-Pattison suggests that the ‘clumsy stride 
from Logic to Nature’21 is in part due to Hegel’s ambition to produce an absolute 
philosophy which must strive to overcome reliance on facts derived from self-
conscious existence.
22
 Hegel’s insistence that Being is the least we can say about a 
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thing – that we must then proceed to discuss the mode of this existence – is accepted by 
Pringle-Pattison.
23
 Yet in Hegel’s identification of Logic with metaphysic, he has failed 
to account for the experiential assurance we first gain of a thing’s existence. Only once 
we have datum from our experience that a thing exists, Pringle-Pattison claims, can we 
move beyond this basic level of Being.
24
 
 Pringle-Pattison hypothetically allows Hegel to take what he describes as ‘this 
impossible leap from Logic to Nature’25 to discuss Hegel’s conception of Nature itself 
in which he finds great fault in the downgrading of existence and existents into logical 
categories. He accepts the use of categories to speak of ‘the realisation or manifestation 
of reason’26 in the world, but such an approach, Pringle-Pattison insists, must 
‘recognise the quasi-metaphorical nature of the language used’.27 We must recognise 
that whilst we can use the information from our experience to categorise existents in 
Nature, even the most minor of these existents ‘has a life of its own, unique and 
individual’28 which can only be partly understood by such categorisation. Here Pringle-
Pattison is not asserting an abstract individuality against the whole of which it is a part, 
but urging that the myriad finite existents within the whole have their dignity as 
individual existents respected.
29
 Hegel is forced to recognise this plethora of differing 
existents, none of which are exactly identical to their notional type, but this is 
contingency as opposed to the necessity of the Notion.
30
 Pringle-Pattison shows that to 
counter the problem of contingency, Hegel ‘endeavours to turn the tables upon 
reality.’31 Nature is effectively blamed for running riot, with contingency being caused 
not by reason but by accident.
32
 Pringle-Pattison discusses two solutions Hegel 
seemingly offers for the problem of contingency, the first being to include contingency 
as a category. This is dismissed as ‘the most transparent fallacy’,33 for the very nature 
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of contingency is that no rational reason can be given for what is the product of 
accident – if reason could be given, it would not be contingency. The second solution, 
to blame nature and the way its impotence gives a limit to the realm of philosophy is an 
acceptable position, but as Pringle-Pattison argues, this recourse is not available to 
Hegel whilst attempting to offer an absolute system of philosophy.
34
 
 The Absolute Idea as the sole concrete existent in Hegel’s philosophy is 
criticised by Pringle-Pattison for denying both God and man’s true natures of existence. 
This is highlighted by the suggestion that throughout his philosophy Hegel never refers 
to human self-consciousness or divine self-consciousness, just self-consciousness.
35
 
Pringle-Pattison argues that the uniting of God and man within the concrete Absolute is 
at the price of ‘eviscerating the real content of both.’36 When the Absolute is being used 
by Hegel to depict man we lose hold of God, and vice versa when used to depict God, 
‘we never have the two together [though]… the alternation is so skilfully managed by 
Hegel himself that it appears to be not alteration but union.’37 Hegel’s logical step from 
the position that each Ego contains within itself a Non-Ego (which Pringle-Pattison 
supports) to the identification of God’s Non-Ego with Nature is contested by Pringle-
Pattison.
38
 Such a step would necessarily do away with the self-consciousnesses of 
finite selves, transforming them into ‘the still mirror in which the one Self-
consciousness contemplates itself.’39 The flaws found in this step are but one more 
example of Pringle-Pattison’s criticisms of Hegel’s logic as metaphysics. Hegel’s 
conception in this area leads to the following process of human advancement described 
by Pringle-Pattison. ‘Out of the conflicting passions and interests of men there is built 
up – built up by them, acting as the unconscious instruments of reason – that stable 
system of law and custom which sets bounds to individual lawlessness and caprice.’40 
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This development of the Absolute Idea and its external form the rational state is 
profoundly impersonal when understood in this way, and hence unsurprisingly 
countered at length by the personalist Pringle-Pattison in the final lecture of 
Hegelianism and Personality. 
 Previously Pringle-Pattison had highlighted the flaws inherent in conceiving the 
Absolute as God. Towards the beginning of the final lecture, through criticising the 
work of the Left Hegelians, Pringle-Pattison discusses the polar opposite – conceiving 
the Absolute as man. The profoundly religious philosopher rightly deduces that if the 
Absolute is man, and therefore nothing is higher, man is put in the place of God.
41
 Yet 
this deification of man would still result in the same impersonal consequences seen 
when identifying the Absolute with God. It is not individual persons raised to the 
position of Absolute, but “Man” the impersonal subject of abstract thought. The 
individual human persons ‘are, as it were, the foci in which the impersonal life of 
thought momentarily concentrates itself, in order to take stock of its own contents.’42 
Human existence has no further meaning than to be, effectively, the temporary 
container for the impersonal thought of the Absolute. The Left Hegelian attempt to 
‘construct reality out of the logical Idea [has no other result]… than that both God and 
man, as real beings, would vanish back into their source, leaving us with the logical 
Idea’43 alone. Pringle-Pattison introduces the idea of a thought without a thinker to 
demonstrate the fallacy involved in the Left Hegelian approach, but argues that such an 
approach does have Hegel’s system on its side. He argues that it has been mistaken to 
‘identify the Absolute with our knowledge of the Absolute, and take the process of 
human development as in the very truth of the evolution of God.’44 Instead, Pringle-
Pattison suggests that it would be more correct to understand that it is ‘not the 
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evolution of God [we trace], but of man’s thoughts about God – a development, 
therefore, which does not affect the existence of their object.’45 This religious attitude 
is the prism through which Pringle-Pattison’s criticisms of Hegelian ethics and politics 
should be viewed. 
 The religious approach of continuous striving to be closer to the will of God 
does not mean that man claims to know God in His entirety, for as we saw above, man 
only has an idea of God. As such, the current state of things is – according to Pringle-
Pattison – almost always ‘painted in the darkest colours’.46 This is the motivation of the 
religious attitude to attempt to make the world a better place, both ethically and 
politically – it is man’s responsibility to do so. Pringle-Pattison contrasts this with 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in which ‘the circle is closed… the ideal is real, and we 
see that it is so.’47 The criticism that Hegel’s declaration that ‘what is rational is actual 
and what is actual is rational’48 is little more than the result of the optimistic 
conservatism of a man with a comfortable life is rejected by Pringle-Pattison.
49
 Instead 
of caricaturing Hegel as a political opportunist in hock to the status quo, Pringle-
Pattison sketches out the difference between “the actual” – what is, and “the really 
actual” – that justifiable by reason. With such an understanding Hegel does not argue, 
as it may have appeared, that any particular being or occurrence in existence is by its 
very existing necessarily rational. Instead, Hegel’s position can be understood as being 
‘in short, the real, so far as it is rational, is rational; the rest we leave out of account.’51 
However this, he counters, ‘is to reduce the position to an empty tautology.’52 Again 
Pringle-Pattison argues that what is effectively another retreat to contingency, this time 
in the form of ‘exceptions, misgrowths [and] positive evils’53 is not a position which an 
absolute philosopher like Hegel can occupy. Pringle-Pattison argues that the 
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relationship between existence and reason in Hegel’s thought is flawed in a similar way 
to that of Plato – ‘Nature or existence, says Hegel, is the home of Contingency, and so 
it fails of truth – fails that is, to body forth the notion. Necessity, says Plato, is mingled 
with Reason in the origin of the world, and Reason cannot quite subdue Necessity to 
itself. The very form of words is almost the same, in which the two thinkers record 
their own failure in the attempt to conceal it.’54 Pringle-Pattison takes exception to what 
he perceives as Philosophy of Right’s ‘externalisation of morality.’55 The person is 
expected to meet the standard of their society – ‘do as others do; perform the duties of 
your station; be a good citizen’56 – and no more. This is not due to an inner personal 
responsibility to fulfil this duty, but ‘an automatic adaptation to an external mechanism 
of observance and respectability.’57 This can in no way accommodate the moral 
progression and maintenance Pringle-Pattison argues is needed. On this point Pringle-
Pattison cites T. H. Green’s divergence from Hegel, in which he insists ‘upon “an ideal 
of virtue” as “the spring from which morality perpetually renews its life.”’58 
 Pringle-Pattison’s conclusion to the final lecture perhaps best summarises his 
thoughts on the failings of Hegelianism. He explains the synthesis of the universe to be 
the property of God, though man can get closer through ‘faith in reason and faith in 
goodness.’59 Hegel’s faith in reason is held by Pringle-Pattison to be both his strength 
in creating a new world for those who enter his thought, and his weakness when faith in 
reason is ‘reduced to system, and put forward as demonstration’.60 Absolute 
philosophical systems, Pringle-Pattison suggests, sap ‘the springs both of speculative 
interest’61 by presenting philosophy as closed ‘and of moral endeavour’62 by 
exteriorising morality. Hegel’s system is placed by Pringle-Pattison amongst those of 
Aristotle and Spinoza from which future philosophers will ‘draw inspiration and 
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guidance from its successes [and]… warning by its mistakes.’63 Yet Pringle-Pattison is 
aware that his approach in the lectures may appear to ‘contain only unmitigated 
condemnation of Hegel and his system.’64 His own intellectual debt to Hegel means 
this is looked on as being regrettable. He praises Hegel’s work in phenomenology and 
logic, and his anthropomorphism in insisting on the value of self-consciousness.
65
 Yet, 
he argues that Hegel’s system breaks down and sacrifices itself ‘to a logical abstraction 
styled the Idea, in which both God and man disappear.’66 Hegel’s systematising is thus 
seen by Pringle-Pattison as turning a philosophy which champions humanity into a 
philosophy in which humanity is dissolved and submerged in the Absolute. 
 D. G. Ritchie’s contemporary review of Hegelianism and Personality for Mind 
offers several Hegelian responses to Pringle-Pattison’s criticisms. Ritchie questions 
Pringle-Pattison’s assertion that the ‘individual alone is real’,67 particularly that the 
individual is nowhere distinctly defined in the work.
68
 This point was picked up later in 
a piece titled ‘What is Reality?’ in Philosophical Review, in which Ritchie accuses 
Pringle-Pattison of nominalism. Ritchie suggests that it is mistaken to equate self-
consciousness with self-identity, for this involves an inference.
69
 In the article Ritchie 
also questions the argument advanced by Pringle-Pattison that thought must imply a 
thinker. Though true at this level, Pringle-Pattison is said to imply a thinking substance, 
whilst Ritchie insists this should be a thinking subject
70
 – the need for a thinker does 
not necessarily support the existence of finite individuals. A similar point is made by 
Ritchie in his review in which he asks, ‘does consciousness testify to anything more 
than the existence of the subject?’71 Pringle-Pattison replies in part to the criticisms in 
Ritchie’s Philosophical Review article in a footnote added to the second edition of 
Hegelianism and Personality.  
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Surely Mr Ritchie cannot seriously mean that his own existence, for himself, is no 
more than a cluster of abstractions. As all knowledge consists of universals, it is 
obvious that, however far we may penetrate into the essence of any individual 
thing, our account of it will be a set of universal attributes. But the attributes do not 
meet, as universals in the real thing; no number of abstracts flocking together will 
constitute a fact. In this sense, there is a complete solution of continuity between 
the abstractions of knowledge and the concrete texture of existence.
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As always in Pringle-Pattison’s thought, the mode of being of the finite individual 
person is defended without recourse to philosophical egoism. This shall be clear again 
in the Aristotelian Society debate between the personal idealist Pringle-Pattison and the 
absolute idealist Bernard Bosanquet. 
  
The Bosanquet/Pringle-Pattison debate. 
 
The title of the symposium in July 1918 is accurately described by Mander as being 
‘somewhat obscure’.73 Yet despite this obscurity, the title ‘Do Finite Individuals 
Possess a Substantive or Adjectival Mode of Being?’ refers to a disagreement between 
the philosophers’ thought which, as Mander explains, had recently come to the fore in 
their respective Gifford Lectures.
74
 Bernard Bosanquet’s lectures were delivered in 
Edinburgh University in 1911 and 1912 under the general title ‘Destiny and 
Individuality’, with the first series published as The Principle of Individuality and 
Value and the second as The Value and Destiny of the Individual. In his Gifford 
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Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen between 1912 and 1913 (published as 
The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy), Pringle-Pattison included two 
lectures critiquing the treatment of the finite individual in absolute idealism, 
particularly focussing on Bosanquet’s The Value and Destiny of the Individual. 
Bosanquet, he argued, had crudely mischaracterised alternative views of the individual. 
Pringle-Pattison explained the personal idealist view as being between the self-
transcendence of absolute idealism and the unrelated persons of the extreme egoism 
criticised by Bosanquet. This middle ground insists upon the formal distinctness of 
selves, whilst insisting with equal fervour that these selves are necessarily interrelated 
in society which is organic to the individual.
75
 Bengtsson highlights the integral nature 
of this view of unity-in-diversity to personalist thought, explaining that although both 
absolute and personal idealists have deployed this term, what they mean by it is very 
different. For personalists, ‘both the unity itself, and the diversity within it, were 
ultimately personal.’76 
 Unity-in-diversity is not the only term interpreted differently by the personal 
and absolute idealists, thus it is unsurprising to find parts of the debate between 
Pringle-Pattison and Bosanquet focussing upon the semantics of certain terms and even 
on whether certain terms can be used in certain contexts. This is illustrated by Pringle-
Pattison’s complaint that, 
 
Confusion [is] introduced into the debate by the Spinozistic use of the term 
substance and the description of all “provisional subjects” (things or persons) as 
“predicates” or “adjectives” of “the one true individual Real.” My conviction of the 
forced and misleading nature of such terminology was amply confirmed by the 
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difficulty I had in persuading the compositors and readers of the Clarendon Press 
[who published The Idea of God] to accept the word “adjectival” in this connection 
at all; it evidently to them made nonsense of the sentence in which it occurred.
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In his reply, Bosanquet counters this with a defence of his original word usage. 
 
In grammar any content can be an adjective and any a substantive, especially in 
inflected languages which possess a neuter adjective. A proper name can be an 
adjective – “a Solon.” Still, in becoming an adjective a name indicates a change in 
the status of its object. The object becomes ad hoc only intelligible as attached and 
dependent. An adjective has a meaning without its substantive, but a meaning 
which becomes self-contradictory if we try to conceive it without attachment to 
something more nearly existent in its own right.
78
 
  
The disagreements regarding the use and misuse of the English language seem to be 
grounded less in the words themselves, but instead the symbolic nature of allowing 
certain words to be used in certain contexts. For Bosanquet the term adjectival has a 
metaphorical value for if one accepts, as he explains, that an adjective has a meaning 
without its substantive, but needs to be conceived attached to something more existent, 
his view of the finite individual as possessing an adjectival mode of Being starts to 
appear more acceptable. As such, an individual has meaning, but must be attached to 
something more existent (the Absolute) for this meaning not to become self-
contradictory. Hence, Pringle-Pattison’s complaint that the usage of adjectival in this 
context is forced and misleading ought to be viewed as a result of his concern about the 
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philosophical implications of accepting such a use, as opposed to the grammatical 
implications alone. 
 Mander describes the philosophers’ respective positions on the substantive or 
adjectival nature of the self as being ‘just pegs’.79 Whilst the debate is important for 
showing that there is more than one form of idealism, perhaps its greatest importance 
comes from revealing that the relationship between absolute and personal idealism is 
not as straightforward as some characterisations would imply. In a debate, attention is 
often solely paid to differences between the views of the parties involved. It is therefore 
of great use to those attempting to understand where Pringle-Pattison and Bosanquet 
stand in relation to one another that both philosophers take time to emphasise the 
matters on which they agree. Another effect of stating points of agreement is to 
neutralise the effectiveness of misrepresentation. In order to avoid such a fault here, it 
will be of use to first discuss these similarities in Pringle-Pattison’s and Bosanquet’s 
philosophies.  
  When discussing common ground, Bosanquet cites directly from Pringle-
Pattison’s Gifford Lectures, 
 
Our common ground, as stated by Professor Pringle-Pattison himself, involves a 
negation and an assertion. We both reject “the old doctrine of the soul-substance as 
a kind of metaphysical atom.” We both believe that the mere individual nowhere 
exists; “he is the creature of a theory.” “Both his existence and his nature (his ‘that’ 
and his ‘what’) are derived. It is absurd to talk of him as self-subsistent or existing 
in his own right.” I need not multiply citations. Again, we both assert that if we 
could possess ourselves entirely “we should be... either the Absolute in propria 
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persona, or Browning’s ‘finite clod untroubled by a spark.’” “All this, then, is 
common ground.”80 
 
Bosanquet’s statement is an acceptance that Pringle-Pattison equally rejects the 
extreme individualism which fails to accept that individuals are necessarily interrelated. 
The issue of soul-substance is related to what Bosanquet refers to as the first set of 
arguments resulting from the topic of the symposium which appeal ‘to the fact of 
existence.’81 This argument rests on the premise that by showing that finite individuals 
are things (by proving their thinghood) one can deduce they are substantive. This line 
of argument is weak, as Bosanquet explains, for things can be parts of other things.
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Pringle-Pattison’s refusal to use this argument at any length to prove the substantive 
nature of finite individuals can be taken as an agreement with Bosanquet that an 
argument with such a basis is deeply flawed.
83
 
 Further agreement beyond those cited directly by Bosanquet are confirmed 
when he states that the two are ‘arguing on common ground, a ground much narrower 
than that on which… discussion has so far moved’,84 adding later that his statement for 
the symposium could have been modelled ‘into an almost complete agreement with 
Professor Pringle-Pattison, for the explicit difference… is one of proportion and 
degree.’85 This is not the case, he explains, as he was ‘not asked to open this discussion 
in order to gloss over a radical discrepancy of feeling, but, I suppose, in order to make 
it explicit.’86 Thus, it is likely to have been the limitations of context and space which 
prohibited Bosanquet from expanding greatly on the points of concurrence he 
highlighted. 
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 Pringle-Pattison confirms Bosanquet’s criticism of the first line of arguments, 
stating that ‘the term thing or substance is commonly applied to innumerable objects, 
animate and inanimate, to which we should never dream of attributing the status and 
destiny which have been claimed for the human individual.’87 Another agreement 
emerges on the subject of immortality of the finite individual. Alongside Bosanquet, he 
rejects any notion of ‘inalienable immortality’88 for the finite selves, linking the 
concept back to the previously discussed notion of soul-substance (‘a piece of covert 
materialism’89). The routes to which Pringle-Pattison and Bosanquet reach this similar 
conclusion are, however, certainly different and will be dealt with at a later stage. At 
the end of his paper, Pringle-Pattison explains how the end section of Bosanquet’s 
paper ‘resembled the very doctrine which I have supported. But this runs counter to the 
general tenor of his article elsewhere that I am doubtful as to his precise meaning.’90 He 
hopes Bosanquet will elucidate his statements regarding ‘the eternity of all spirits in 
God.’91 in his reply to the symposium. In the reply, Bosanquet concludes that this 
apparent agreement was not as it seemed (Bosanquet viewed it as ‘not a conception 
which could support a pluralism or individualism.’92). This theme of mistaken 
agreement can found elsewhere in the reply, though less explicitly.
93
 Due to the limited 
space available for his reply, Bosanquet focuses on defending his positions from attack 
instead of finding further commonality. 
 As Bosanquet stated, the main purpose of the debate is to focus on the 
differences in the philosophers’ positions. Returning to his lines of argument arising 
from the topic of the symposium, the second line of argument Bosanquet states is that 
appealing ‘to the intentional character of spiritual finite beings’.94 Unlike the first line 
of argument, the second line is an issue on which he and Pringle-Pattison differ. ‘It 
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deals with such matters as the self in morality and religion, with its pretension to assert 
a unity which it does not find existent, to be free and responsible, to remain itself even 
in the social bond or in oneness with God.’95 Unlike the first line of argument, 
conclusions from which lacked validity, Bosanquet states that ‘a conclusion from such 
considerations would be strictly applicable to the finite spiritual individual.’96 Whilst 
Bosanquet is referring to the points he advances rather than the points Pringle-Pattison 
and others might advance against him, this does at least confirm this territory of 
argument as being a valid philosophical battleground. After discussing the first line of 
argument at length, Bosanquet turns to the second in the same detail. He accuses 
Pringle-Pattison of lowering the meaning of the word substance by the way he uses it 
whilst guarding ‘against applying Spinozistic self substance, or self-subsistence.’97 
Through doing this, Bosanquet explains, Pringle-Pattison moves towards the first line 
of argument by ‘resting upon distinguishable existence or concrete thinghood, taking 
no account of what is special to a finite spiritual being.’98 He believes that whilst 
guarding against the perils of asserting a form of extreme individualism, Pringle-
Pattison has failed to maintain the finite individual’s status. Yet Bosanquet stresses that 
as this ‘amounts to little more than an argument from distinct existence’,99 any 
philosophical conclusion drawn from it in favour of either position has little validity. 
 After dealing with criticisms of his rejection of ‘the notion of the membership 
of finite spirits... in the Absolute’100 (as this would commit to an acceptance of eternal 
substances), Bosanquet states that the other points to be discussed with Pringle-Pattison 
‘amount to the problem of free self-determination on the part of the spiritual finite 
individual, and the conceivability of confluence between such individuals, or their 
transmutation and absorption in the Absolute.’101 He discusses these points through 
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looking at different attitudes to the issues. He describes the first attitude as being 
pluralist, ‘alike in contemplating the natural and the human world, it models itself on 
the apparent self-identity of the movable and self-coherent body... The apparent self-
completeness of our bodies, and their external repetition of a single type, side by side, 
as free figures devoid of material co-adaptation or connection, occupy our vision, 
blinding us to the moral and spiritual structure which lies behind the visible scene.’102 
Bosanquet argues that this flawed approach is mirrored in religious individualism 
(linked to the concept of soul-substance), brought about by ‘natural bias and prolonged 
tradition’.103 He exclaims that such an approach ignores the inescapable fact that 
consideration of the finite individual necessarily involves an abstraction from the 
whole. Such an approach relying only on the numerical identity of the finite individual 
can be used to prove thinghood and little else. As such, according to Bosanquet, it is 
untenable. 
 The second attitude handled by Bosanquet ‘comes to us partly through the 
experience of life, as in morality and religion, partly through science and 
philosophy.’104 Under this attitude, particularly through science and philosophy, we 
become aware of the abstraction involved in discussing the finite individual and it is 
‘completely undone’.105 Despite strong urges to assert one’s individuality (‘We are 
confident of our individual unity... it is in our nature to be a single self. We claim it as a 
right, and accept is as a duty.’106), this is not reflected in our reality (‘Our unity is a 
puzzle and an unrealised aspiration. It is demanded by thought and action, but we 
cannot find it in existence.’107). The closest a finite individual gets to being substantive 
in their own right is through this mistaken interpretation of a false appearance. As 
Bosanquet suggests, ‘I seem to myself, perhaps, to be the King, and I am the fool.’108 
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 Bosanquet questions the extent to which the finite individual has free will. He 
takes a Rousseauean approach in arguing that man’s freedom is through the universal. 
Disparaging the view that ‘freedom is most strongly felt in mere choice’,109 Bosanquet 
instead argues a finite individual experiences freedom ‘in so far as he wills the 
universal object.’110 The explanation for this position, he claims, is very clear. ‘It is 
only what is universal that is free from self-contradiction. It is only what is free from 
self-contradiction that can be willed without obstruction. Every contradiction in my 
world of experience obstructs my action and embarrasses my will; and every pain or 
defeat or confusion of which I am aware, in any subject or object apprehended by me, 
is a contradiction in my world… it is only in a will above my own that I can find my 
own will and my freedom and independence.’111 Bosanquet addresses potential 
uncertainties about where the communal will is derived from. He explains that the 
communal will is ‘revealed in a number of individuals, [but] is a single thing as much 
as external nature, which is revealed in the same way.’112 Such a move, he argues, 
involves recognising the existence of linear and lateral identity. Linear identity is the 
form of identity experienced and possessed by finite individuals, and as such involves 
little in the way of philosophical controversy. An acceptance of lateral identity is linked 
to a confluence of selves. Failure to accept this confluence, Bosanquet argues, leads us 
to ‘unnaturally narrow down the basis of our self.’113 He criticises Pringle-Pattison’s 
misconception of the ego as contributing to his rejection of the confluence of selves. ‘If 
the ego has a prior content, apart from what it unifies, unification becomes impossible. 
If the self is to be free and self-modelling, the ego must be a mere spirit of unity 
working in and throughout experiences. Otherwise, it must bring with it some character 
or nature which would be an antecedent condition biasing and restricting the 
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development of the soul or self.’114 This relates back to Bosanquet’s notion that it is 
only through the communal – the confluence of selves – that the finite individual can 
reach his potential level of freedom. 
 Bosanquet addresses criticisms regarding his perceived level of appreciation of 
the self. He aims to make it clear where he agrees with, as well as where he departs 
from, regular opinion on the issue. He agrees that the self exists (‘as a function which is 
a system of functions… not a mere adjective in the sense in which P is so taken in the 
formula S is P.’115), but adds the caveat that ‘existence of the self is not adequate to its 
implied unity, which is a pretension inherent in a thinking being.’116 Bosanquet 
explains that the self which he agrees exists ‘has no content and can originate 
nothing.’117 He continues to argue that the self ‘is the utterance of his place and time – 
a sub-variant of the content of his age, and a derivative of his family stock like a bud on 
a plant. And, if we abstract from these conditions, he is nothing.’118 He relates this back 
to freedom of will, showing how whilst his love and hate are beyond the control of 
others, they are also beyond his control (‘No one, I think, has said that you can love and 
hate as you wish. How easy life would be, if you could!’119). He uses his philosophy as 
an analogy of how attaining perfection would necessarily involve a confluence of 
selves, explaining that ‘if my philosophy were made complete and self-consistent, I am 
sure my critics would admit, it could no longer be identified with that which I profess 
as mine; but would probably amalgamate with that of someone else, and in the end with 
that of all. I do not know why the same should not be the case with my self.’120 Such an 
argument is consistent with his view of selves as being adjectival or functions.  
 Bosanquet discusses the existence of finite individuals, the reasons for their 
existence and the duration of their existence. He explains that ‘the reality of the finite 
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individual is not confined to his temporal existence as a soul or self… It seems 
impossible to hold that men who have lived in the past are not real so far as their 
thoughts and characters are present and operative today. They are not here in full 
personality, but their reality would be diminished if its activity of today were subtracted 
from it.’121 As previously mentioned, this is in no way an acceptance of everlasting 
soul-substance. The content of the finite individual continues to exist as an adjective of 
the communal, the Absolute, even after the finite individual as an apparent centre of 
experience has long gone. ‘Thus, individuals not merely exist for a brief space in the 
world, but characterise it as permanent qualifications.’122 For this final section of his 
statement, Bosanquet emphasises several times the minute and brief nature of the finite 
individual when compared to the Absolute. 
 The differences in opinion cited by Pringle-Pattison begin with the previously 
mentioned disagreement over word usage. He criticises the Spinozistic nature of 
Bosanquet’s ‘conception of the universe as a continuum of interconnected content 
within, or referred to, the one ultimate subject.’123 Pringle-Pattison argues that just like 
Spinoza, Bosanquet fails to adequately account for the finite individual being a 
‘separate centre of thought and action’124 when he views such experience as merely 
appearance. Such a view ‘ignores entirely the concrete texture of existence as 
distinguished from the abstractions of intellect.’125 He accuses Bosanquet of having an 
‘inorganic view of the physical world’126 due to his failure to interpret this as ‘organic 
to the world of life and consciousness.’127 This appears to have been a particularly 
calculated attack, as Bosanquet was keen to emphasise the organic nature of his 
philosophy. 
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 Pringle-Pattison further accuses Bosanquet of dealing in abstractions when 
dealing with content as apart from finite individuals in suggesting a confluence of 
individuals. ‘Truth, beauty, love – all the great values – what meaning have they apart 
from their conscious realisation in a living individual, finite of infinite?’128 Despite 
Bosanquet’s insistence to the contrary, Pringle-Pattison argues that Bosanquet’s theory 
truly lacks a conception of the self. Instead, ‘the world is dissolved into a collection of 
qualities or adjectives which are ultimately housed in the Absolute.’129 The self cannot, 
Pringle-Pattison explains, mix with others in the way Bosanquet suggests. ‘A self may 
be largely identical in content with other selves, and in that sense we may intelligibly 
talk of “overlapping”, but to speak as if their common content affected in any way their 
existential distinctness is to use words to which I can attach no meaning. So, again, a 
self may cease to be, but it cannot coalesce with another self; for the very meaning of 
its existence is that it is a unique focalisation of the universe.’130 He holds that this 
argument is equally valid when discussing finite individuals being transmuted in the 
Absolute, a suggestion which would necessarily result in the elimination of any 
individuality. Bosanquet’s analogy for the confluence based around the ownership of 
philosophical systems is also contended by Pringle-Pattison. He explains, ‘I could not 
desire any better illustration of the confusion against which I am contending than this 
comparison between the piecing-out of an impersonal system of thought and the life-
course of a moral personality which, however it may bud and blossom and ripen to 
maturity, must grow always from its own root.’131 This particular point is perhaps 
indicative of much of the difference between personalist and absolutist forms of 
idealism, condemning the notion of a single homogenous idealist doctrine. 
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 Pringle-Pattison discusses the immortality of the soul. As previously mentioned, 
like Bosanquet, he rejects any notion of the soul being an eternal substance. For 
Pringle-Pattison, this immortality is something to be achieved by the individual and is 
awarded by God alone. He explains further that ‘it is difficult to conceive of anyone 
claiming immortality as a right for himself on purely personal grounds; indeed the idea 
of a “right” in such a reference is so incongruous that to make such a claim might 
almost be said to disqualify the claimant.’132 Little of this would cause disagreement 
with Bosanquet, but is related to Pringle-Pattison’s criticism of the role of God as a self 
in the former’s theory. Bosanquet’s failure to ‘realise the elementary conditions of 
selfhood [means]… in his theory there is no real self at all, either of God or man, but 
only a logical transparency called the Absolute.’133 Pringle-Pattison suggests that this 
mistaken view is due to a tendency on Bosanquet’s part to view selves from the 
outside, ‘from the point of view of a spectator momentarily concentrating attention 
upon them in abstraction from the social whole which is their setting.’134 As he 
explains, ‘because a mind cannot be extracted and exhibited as a self-contained whole 
apart from the “moral and spiritual structure” in which it is rooted, it does not follow 
that the mind or self is simply a punctual centre in which a system of moral and social 
relations reflects itself into unity as rays of light are concentrated in a focus.’135 This is 
yet another area in which Pringle-Pattison accuses Bosanquet’s theory of being 
weakened through dealing in abstractions. 
 Pringle-Pattison criticises Bosanquet’s handling of free will, which fails to 
account for the importance of this element of the finite individual. He explains, 
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The authorship of our own acts and our responsibility for them – this is the inmost 
meaning of our freedom and independence, and any theory is self-condemned 
which can find no room for this elementary certainty. Professor Bosanquet evades 
this issue when he talks disparagingly of “mere choice” and makes play with the 
familiar equivocation between freedom meaning the capacity of choice between 
good and evil, and freedom in the sense of willing “the universal object,” accepting 
“a will above my own,” in a word, the achieved harmony of the perfect moral 
will.
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Pringle-Pattison further criticises the moral ambiguity of Bosanquet’s theory citing the 
latter’s somewhat glib remark that ‘in error and in sin’137 is the closest he gets to being 
a substantive in his own right. The great flaw in this statement, Pringle-Pattison 
explains, is that if Bosanquet’s theory is followed to its logical conclusion there can be 
no such thing as error or sin. Pringle-Pattison argues the contradiction lies in how 
someone could ‘take up this attitude of opposition’,138 which would be necessary to 
make errors or commit sins, if he had no ‘kind of existence over and against the spirit 
of the whole’,139 of the Absolute or communal. The denying of the individual authoring 
and baring responsibility for their own actions, Pringle-Pattison explains, would cause 
great problems for Christian belief, for ‘the surrender of the selfish will implies the 
power to assert it.’140 He continues to ask Bosanquet, ‘where is the merit or value in the 
self-surrender if the whole process is a make-believe on the part of the Absolute?’141 
 Error and sin are related to the problem of evil, the attainment of perfection and 
the wider issue of God’s relationship with man. In Bosanquet’s theory, Pringle-Pattison 
explains that evil comes to be seen ‘as simply good in the wrong place.’142 As such, he 
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suggests that Bosanquet’s theory will lead to a Nietzschean transcendence of values, 
for as the only agent, the Absolute must necessarily be perfect. In Pringle-Pattison’s 
theory, the only perfect self is God. For all other selves, perfection is an ideal, rather 
than something readily attainable. Pringle-Pattison clarifies his position, explaining 
‘because I desire to be made more and more in the likeliness of God, I do not therefore 
desire to be God.’143 Pringle-Pattison suggests that Bosanquet’s Absolute might share 
characteristics with the Hindu conception of Brahman, but this would still allow the 
view of the finite world as ‘a game of make-believe which the Absolute plays with 
itself.’144 For Pringle-Pattison, ‘the reality of both God and man depends on the reality 
of the difference between them.’145 Such a difference is incompatible with Bosanquet’s 
philosophy which displays indifference to the finite individual. Pringle-Pattison asks: 
 
Are we to attribute to the divine Friend and Lover of men a levity of attitude which 
we find offensively untrue of our ordinary human fidelities? Are we to liken Him to 
a military commander, who is content, if fresh drafts are forthcoming to fill his 
depleted battalions? To the military system, men are only so much human material, 
so many numerable units; but a chance encounter with one of the men in the flesh, a 
touch of human-heartedness, is sufficient to dissolve the abstraction which so 
regards them.
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The omniscient Christian God has a relationship with each finite individual much 
greater than this described encounter. As such the indifferent attitude associated with 
Bosanquet’s theory must be the antithesis to the view of God as all-loving. He ends his 
paper with the previously discussed discussion of the end of Bosanquet’s paper. 
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 Bosanquet’s statement in reply to the symposium’s papers unsurprisingly 
focuses upon addressing points of criticism raised by the other participants, and 
restating points he felt had either been misunderstood or overlooked. He begins with 
his previously mentioned defence against Pringle-Pattison’s attack over word usage. He 
counterattacks by criticising Pringle-Pattison’s attachment to the term “finite 
individual”, claiming that the two words are incompatible. ‘A finite individual then is a 
positive unit, limited by a mere negation. But this is a contradiction. A thing’s limit 
expresses its nature, and a bare negation cannot be the nature of anything. If the 
contradiction is to be removed, the limit must not merely be shifted (for that leaves the 
bare negation as before), but turned into a positive expression of the unit’s nature, by 
becoming a distinction and no longer a bare negation.’147 If we follow this argument 
through, what is individual (meaning ‘indivisible, and indivisible not as atom, as the 
least that can have being, but as a whole, as what loses its essence if divided.’148) must 
be infinite. He argues that ‘finiteness is fatal to individuality… nothing can be 
individual except as infinite, nor infinite except as part of a systematic whole in which 
its contradictions are at least relatively solved and harmonised. It is plain then that the 
finite individual is by definition adjectival. It is attached, included, subordinate, not 
merely interrelated on equal terms.’149 Bosanquet explains that it is not merely due to 
some ‘verbal issue’150 or misunderstanding that Pringle-Pattison disagrees with him, 
but that there is a genuine difference between the two philosophers. In a somewhat 
backhanded compliment, he explains that between writing his original statement and 
this reply he had taken the time to re-read Pringle-Pattison’s Idea of God. As a result of 
this, he asserts a view that Pringle-Pattison ‘does himself less justice in his paper [for 
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the symposium] than in the original work’,151 though he does note that the areas of 
disagreement were present there too. 
 Bosanquet reiterates his theory of the communal mind. He explains that it ‘is 
not a ghost hovering over a nation; it is the minds of individuals in which the common 
stuff gives varied expression to the qualities and functions of the whole.’152 He rejects 
any notion that his theory involves the dissolving of individualities in the Absolute, as 
these abstract individualities have never truly existed. Again he explains how the finite 
individual attains perfection through the Absolute. ‘Each “mind” finds its completion in 
the other, its purposes supported and corrected, its contradictions removed, its 
tendencies and inclinations represented, reinforced, systematised.’153 This is linked into 
Bosanquet’s previously discussed assertion that lateral as well as linear identity should 
be embraced and understood. He contrasts his own view with Pringle-Pattison’s 
‘reflective morality [in which]… good is to be realised, by the successive strivings, in 
time, of the finite individual intent upon self-improvement’,154 though true perfection is 
out of the reach of the finite individual. For Bosanquet, this striving is in vain; these 
finite individuals must accept their state of self-contradiction. Discussing this matter, 
Bosanquet cites the issue at the heart of the Christian Reformation; whether faith or 
deeds are the route to God. He aligns himself with the former (which does not exclude 
the latter) and seems to align his critics with the latter (which does exclude the 
former).
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 Bosanquet addresses Pringle-Pattison’s criticisms of his comments regarding 
error and sin. He rejects the argument that such manifestations would be detrimental to 
the unity of the Absolute. ‘Above all things, it is successful in maintaining that unity. 
No disintegration of the personality could be so hopeless or so final as a doctrine which 
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should recognise in it an evil which has nothing of good, or an error which has nothing 
of truth. The individual would be split up from top to toe, and no possibility of 
improvement or deterioration would remain to him.’156 Bosanquet also disagrees with 
Pringle-Pattison’s criticism that the connection of content in the Absolute disparages 
the connection of content in the finite individual. He likens it to ‘recognising its 
relation to the reality from which it came, and out of which it is continually nourished 
and renewed’,157 failure of which to recognise would involve treating the finite 
individual as an abstraction. 
 Towards the end of his reply, Bosanquet readdresses a point in his paper which 
he feels was either ignored or overlooked by the other participants in the symposium, 
despite the importance and weight Bosanquet felt the assertion had. He argues, 
 
the discussion should not turn exclusively on the soul or self, but it should be 
remembered that the individual has a reality beyond either, first in the more 
immediate not-self – as, for instance, in his possessions and connections, apart from 
which it is clear that he is not fully realised – and, secondly, in all that survives his 
temporal existence on earth. Is it, I am far from being the first to ask, a mere 
metaphor to say that Plato teaches us to-day through a thousand channels and 
influences? And if you say “But we can we take these biased interpretations an 
impure traditions as Plato’s authentic voice?” we should ask you to consider the 
misinterpretations and prejudices to which a great man is exposed in his lifetime, 
and to determine whether if in one sense he speaks less directly to-day, yet in 
another he does not speak to us more authentically and completely than he ever 
spoke to mankind before.
158
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This point opens up many potential areas of discussion between the philosophers on 
what makes up the identity and reality of the finite individual. Bosanquet asserts that 
such considerations are of the utmost importance when asserting the substantive or 
adjectival nature of finite individuals within the Absolute. He also reasserts the nature 
of the Absolute itself, that ‘it is never itself a subject, or a predicate or a logical 
transparency, or a monad or an other or a spectator or a knower. It is always the 
whole… though divisions and conditions have relative being within it.’159 Such relative 
Being is the Being experienced, according to Bosanquet, by the adjectival finite 
individuals. Bosanquet concludes his reply with the previously discussed matter which 
also made up the conclusion of Pringle-Pattison’s paper: Bosanquet’s comments in his 
original paper about ‘the eternity of all spirits in God’.160 
 The polarising nature of the Bosanquet/Pringle-Pattison debate has meant that 
dispassionate judgement over which philosopher “won” is nigh-on impossible. The 
obscurity of the debate, particularly in modern times, has meant that it is encountered 
and studied only by those with a prior interest in idealist philosophy. Those with a prior 
interest in idealist philosophy are very likely to have made prior judgment between 
personal and absolute idealist arguments (arguments which Bosanquet and Pringle-
Pattison’s contributions to the symposium are representative of). A review 
contemporaneous to the symposium by W. H. Sheldon illustrates this point, being 
largely based upon the weaknesses of absolute idealism than in Bosanquet’s arguments 
themselves.
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 It should be noted at this point that the expositions by Mander and 
Thomas to be dealt with here are certainly more balanced than Sheldon’s review. 
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 In his study of the Bosanquet/Pringle-Pattison debate, Mander argues that it was 
Bosanquet with the stronger arguments.
162
 In discussing the philosophers’ accusations 
that the other is dealing in abstractions, he accuses Pringle-Pattison of failing to address 
key points, misunderstanding some of Bosanquet’s positions and philosophical naivety. 
He argues that ‘Pringle-Pattison badly misunderstands Bosanquet’s conception of 
universality… in correcting the faults of the finite self as we experience them, we need 
to move towards a conception which is more universal.’163 For Pringle-Pattison, the 
result of this movement is a movement towards greater abstraction. For Bosanquet, the 
opposite is true; it is a move towards concretisation. The result of this, a concrete 
universal which, Mander explains, ‘is absolutely central to Bosanquet’s thought’164 and 
is left unaddressed by Pringle-Pattison’s paper.165 Mander’s accusation that Pringle-
Pattison is being naive relates to his belief ‘that in experience he has a direct and 
unmediated contact with reality.’166 He argues that this is flawed because: 
 
experience comes to us already screened or filtered through our theories and 
concepts, disregarding a variety of aspects and sides to a thing’s being as 
‘inessential’ or ‘irrelevant’… In view of this, veneration for immediate 
experience… begins to seem like the attitude of a rather over-cautious preservation 
society refusing to countenance any alteration or modernisation whatsoever to an 
ancient building which only came to have its current fine look through a continual 
process over the years of precisely such alteration and modernisation.
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Whilst Mander is correct to suggest that we must be aware of the limitations of 
experience, it is difficult to agree that this necessarily means that experience must be 
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eschewed as philosophy’s primary data. Even the most abstract of abstractions must 
surely be grounded to some degree in our experiences in order to be comprehendible to 
human understanding. Mander continues to cite three further points in the debate in 
which he believes Bosanquet’s arguments are victorious over the arguments of Pringle-
Pattison. These points are Bosanquet’s views regarding the confluence of selves, 
arguments over immortality and the value of the finite individual. 
 James Thomas’s discussion of the debate – focussing largely upon the merits 
and weaknesses of Mander’s previous article – comes to a much more neutral 
conclusion, arguing that truth lies somewhere between the positions of Bosanquet and 
Pringle-Pattison. Bosanquet is seen as being guilty of emphasising the concept 
independent of experience, whilst Pringle-Pattison is found to have done the 
opposite.
168
 Thomas seems to suggest that Mander has been too emphatic in his support 
of Bosanquet in his article. 
  
The Philosophical Radicals: Pringle-Pattison and politics. 
 
Earlier, Pringle-Pattison’s response to the political philosophy of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right was discussed. In his collection of essays The Philosophical Radicals, Pringle-
Pattison’s relationship with other schools of political philosophy is made clearer. The 
eponymous first essay in the collection discusses utilitarianism in wake of the 
publication of Leslie Stephens’ The English Utilitarians. Taking in the works of 
Bentham, and James and John Stuart Mill, Pringle-Pattison argues the movement lacks 
originality, for ‘hedonism is as old as ethical speculation’.169 He traces what he refers to 
as ‘the greatest-happiness principle’170 through the works of Palsey, Hume, Hutcheson 
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and Locke. Not only is the originality of the utilitarian school doubted by Pringle-
Pattison, but also the school’s profundity, accusing Bentham of ‘extending the 
principles which he found sufficient to solve his own practical problem, and [using] 
them as ultimate principles of explanation in psychology, ethics and sociology.’171 
Pringle-Pattison’s personalism, resting on a fundamental belief in the dignity and moral 
responsibility of human persons, could never be fully compatible with the utilitarian 
creed. Utilitarianism effectively downgrades the person into a container for utility, not 
entirely different from the Hegelian tendency to envisage individuals as containers for 
the attributes of the Absolute. Despite Pringle-Pattison’s unflinching criticisms of 
utilitarian principles, he argues that utilitarianism did serve a beneficial purpose in the 
nineteenth century. Utility was a practical test of rationality of ‘laws and customs 
which, useful in their day, have survived their usefulness and become… a harmful 
restriction or a crying injustice.’172 Utilitarianism’s strength as a negative movement of 
reform was not matched by a strong positive nature. Pringle-Pattison argues that the 
school’s ‘strength departed from it just in proportion as its critical attack was 
successful.’173 By failing to recognise the dignity of the person beyond the hedonistic 
measurement of happiness –itself difficult to quantify – its philosophical basis was 
flawed, and hence doomed to fail.
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 The political conclusions of Herbert Spencer’s individualism are similarly 
criticised in an essay discussing his autobiography in Philosophical Radicals. Pringle-
Pattison’s brief comments on this point highlight that despite his metaphysical 
insistence that the individual person’s mode of Being be respected and recognised, this 
does not result in an individualist form of politics. Pringle-Pattison describes the 
individualism found in Man Versus the State as being ‘as unhistorical as it is 
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unphilosophical’.175 Spencer’s ‘pre-social unit with his natural rights never existed’,176 
for such free individuals are the goal of politics rather than its starting position. Pringle-
Pattison describes Spencer’s arguments in favour of such political individualism as 
having the air ‘of one crying in the wilderness.’177 At the time of writing, he insists, all 
but a small number of (largely Nietzschean) anarchists recognise the ‘conception of 
man as essentially social, and of the State as the organ of the general will’.178 As such, 
it is clear to see that Pringle-Pattison’s reaction to Hegel in the area of politics is far 
from mirroring the radicalism to be found in the works of the likes of Max Stirner.  
  
Conclusion. 
 
Pringle-Pattison’s attempts to reassert the importance of personality within the confines 
of Hegelian thought are at least partially successful. In response to the abstract 
tendencies of contemporaries such as Bosanquet, Pringle-Pattison correctly insisted 
upon the role of lived experience in any successful philosophy. That his personal 
idealism ought not to be thought of as a violent attack on Hegel and Hegelianism is 
clear from Pringle-Pattison’s reformist stance. In Hegelianism and Personality, he 
insists that this is the case in his concluding paragraph, stating that if the impression has 
been gained from the lectures that they ‘contain only unmitigated condemnation of 
Hegel and his system’179 it is deeply regrettable. Indeed Pringle-Pattison highlights his 
own ‘great personal obligations to Hegel, which would make such a condemnation 
savour of ingratitude [and]… the great debt which philosophy in general owes to 
Hegel, and the speculative outlook which is got by studying him.’180 Pringle-Pattison’s 
religious attitude with regards to the dignity of the person and the need and 
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responsibility to strive to make the world – and, ethically, individuals themselves – 
closer to the ideal of God undoubtedly forms the backbone of his philosophy. It is the 
conscious and unconscious attempts of Hegelian thought to submerge God within the 
absolute which appear to drive many of his positions. Yet even if we are to take a more 
secular approach, there is still merit in Pringle-Pattison’s personalism. The dignity of 
the person, and the need for this dignity to be respected by any successful philosophy, 
need not necessarily be derived from the person’s relationship with God. To turn the 
focus away from religious argument towards Pringle-Pattison’s insistence on the 
importance of recognising and accounting for lived experience, and the dignity which 
follows from our experiences of ourselves as separate, distinct, yet interrelated units 
would not greatly weaken the structure of his philosophy. Despite this, it would be 
fallacious to insist that Pringle-Pattison’s thought is without flaw. 
  Whilst able to identify and correct many of the flaws in the Hegelian approach, 
Pringle-Pattison’s thought is weakened by his own approach to Hegelian thought. 
Despite recognising and criticising Hegelian impersonalism, Pringle-Pattison’s 
insistence on taking a reformist approach – an insistence that these flaws can be ironed 
out – keeps him from turning further afield for a more satisfactory approach. As he 
remains within the confines of Hegelianism, albeit unorthodoxly, more radical 
solutions to the problems he diagnoses remain outside his grasp. Perhaps the greatest 
weakness of Pringle-Pattison’s personalism, as well as wider personalist thought in 
general, is its failure to satisfactorily define precisely what constitutes a “person”. It 
may be possible to argue that we cannot expect a definition of what is meant by “God” 
because gods are inherently unknowable, but the same cannot be said of persons. 
Pringle-Pattison correctly insists that a person is what we experience ourselves to be, 
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yet never truly attempts to grasp what this means. This is clearly related to Pringle-
Pattison’s failure – a failure of the philosophical tradition since Platonism – to directly 
address the question of Being, of what it means to Be. The only way to distinguish 
what it means to be a person (a particular form of Being), is to explore what it is which 
separates the form of Being experienced by persons from Being in general. Pringle-
Pattison’s adherence to Hegelianism stops such a point drawn from his philosophy 
from being followed to its logical conclusion. 
 Pringle-Pattison’s relationship with metaphysically derived politics is 
complicated by his reformist philosophy. As with his personalist reform of Hegelian 
absolutism, Pringle-Pattison fails to entirely follow through on his political criticisms. 
As we saw, Pringle-Pattison’s political bête noire was the hedonism he felt was 
inherent in both utilitarianism and Spencerite individualism. It is perhaps unsurprising 
that the consistently sober personalist would find any creed which might place base 
pleasure above thoughtful contemplation invalid. Ironically considering the reasoning 
behind his rejection of utilitarianism, Pringle-Pattison’s political outlook gets no further 
than ably highlighting many of the errors of a utilitarian worldview. His taste for 
political radicalism appears to be as limited as his taste for philosophical radicalism. He 
is willing to give both a fair hearing, but inevitably always sides with the moderate 
approach. Just as Pringle-Pattison failed to follow his criticisms of Hegelianism to the 
point that he fully ceased to be a Hegelian, his politics betray a similarly pragmatic 
attachment to the status quo. Pringle-Pattison’s refusal to consider the radical 
conclusions of his criticisms means that neither his philosophy nor his politics can 
provide a satisfactory alternative to the failings of a metaphysical approach. 
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Martin Heidegger: The Reintroduction of the Question of Being 
 
Martin Heidegger is widely accepted to be one of the most insightful and ground 
breaking philosophers of recent times, yet he is also one of the most controversial. 
Thomas Sheehan succinctly summarises that there are ‘two facts about… Heidegger 
[which are]… as incontestable as they are complicated: first, that he remains one of the 
[twentieth] century’s most influential philosophers and, second, that he was a Nazi.’1 
The relationship between these two sides of Heidegger has spawned a vast array of 
literature, particularly after the publication of Victor Farías’ Heidegger and Nazism in 
the late 1980s.
2
 The so-called “Heidegger controversy” regarding the philosopher’s 
engagement with National Socialism is of relevance to this study, but ought not to 
overshadow the discussion of the complex and multi-faceted nature of Heidegger’s 
philosophical thought. So as not to get too swamped in the controversies relating to 
Heidegger’s politics, we will first discuss Heidegger’s handling of the question of 
Being (particularly in Being and Time), before turning to Heidegger’s relationship with 
National Socialism and the wider political implications of Heideggerian philosophy. 
Despite Heidegger’s temporary support for National Socialism, it will be argued that 
this is not the logical conclusion of his philosophy. Instead it will be argued that 
positive political lessons can be taken from it. 
  
The structure of Being and Time. 
 
Being and Time is a work that is famously unfinished. In the work’s introduction, 
Heidegger sets out the two parts of the project: ‘Part One: the Interpretation of Dasein 
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in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for 
the question of Being. Part Two: basic features of a phenomenological destruction of 
the history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue.’3 These two 
parts were then to be divided into three distinct divisions.
4
 What we must now accept is 
the complete (incomplete) version of Being and Time only contains the first two 
divisions of the first part (lacking the third division on time and Being), and none of the 
divisions focussing on Kant, Descartes and Aristotle respectively which were to have 
formed the second part. It is perhaps testament to the work’s strengths that a project 
lacking two-thirds of its projected content could still make such a dramatic 
philosophical impact. The reason for Being and Time’s emergence in such an 
incomplete fashion seems to have been due to the practical rather than the purely 
philosophical – Heidegger needed to publish a major work in order to be accepted by 
the Ministry of Culture for promotion to a full professorship at Marburg University.
5
 In 
the preface inserted in the seventh edition of Being and Time, Heidegger concludes that 
the work will never be completed, as ‘the second half could no longer be added unless 
the first were to be presented anew.’6 We should not take from this the impression that 
Heidegger had by this point entirely rejected the progress made by Being and Time, as 
he argues ‘the road it has taken remains a necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred 
by the question of Being.’7 Of the two divisions that exist, Heideggerian scholars differ 
in their evaluations of which of these truly heralds Heidegger’s brilliance. For instance, 
Hubert Dreyfus considers the first division to be ‘the most original and important 
section of the work’,8 whilst he views the second division as ‘much less carefully 
worked out [having]… some errors so serious as to block any consistent reading.’9 
Dreyfus’s view is supported by Being and Time’s hasty publication against Heidegger’s 
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prior intentions. Piotr Hoffman however finds much more of value in what he believes 
is the more subjectivist Heidegger of the second division against the first division, the 
entirety of which he argues ‘must be considered profoundly incomplete, since it has 
failed to give us the required insight into both the totality and the authenticity of 
Dasein.’10 That Being and Time can open up such divergent pathways in the dense 
forest of philosophy is perhaps the greatest indication of the work’s brilliance and 
reason for its continuing influence on myriad intellectual fields to this day. 
  
The introduction to Being and Time. 
 
We have already briefly touched upon Heidegger’s introduction to Being and Time 
when mentioning the work’s intended structure. To leave the matter here would be to 
do Heidegger a great disservice. David Farrell Krell likens Heidegger’s introduction to 
Hegel’s celebrated preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit ‘which came to serve as an 
introduction to Hegel’s entire philosophy.’11 Krell argues that all of Heidegger’s 
philosophy from Being and Time and beyond is to be found along the paths first opened 
by Being and Time’s introduction. The introduction reintroduces the question of Being 
into philosophy, or at least the question of the question of Being. Heidegger asserts that 
not only are we unable to explain what we mean by the term Being, but we also lack 
any realisation or perplexity regarding this inability. What is needed is thus to 
‘reawaken an understanding of the meaning of the question [of Being].’12 Western 
philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel has trivialised the question of Being, 
allowing it to ‘subside… as a theme for actual investigation.’13 This turn away from the 
question is excused by Being’s universality, indefinability and self-evidence. 
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Heidegger, unsurprisingly, disagrees with this diagnosis arguing that ‘if it is said that 
‘Being’ is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is the one which is 
clearest… It is rather the darkest of all’;14 ‘the indefinability of Being does not 
eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands we look the question in the face’;15 
and ‘within the range of basic philosophical concepts… it is a dubious procedure to 
invoke self-evidence.’16 Heidegger approaches the question of Being through Dasein – 
taken literally, “Being-there” – which is the manner of Being of human individuals. 
Dasein has an awareness of Being which is lacking in other entities. Dasein ‘does not 
just occur among other entities… it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very 
Being, that Being is an issue for it.’17 It is the nature of Dasein’s very Being that it has 
an understanding of Being, meaning it ‘is ontically distinctive in that it is 
ontological.’18 Heidegger does not intend to argue by this that Dasein has an inbuilt 
perfected philosophical ontology innately present awaiting some sort of Socratic 
recollection, but rather that Dasein’s Being has a self-awareness of its Being, which 
means it cannot be thought of as being solely ontical. 
 In approaching the question of Being in general from the specific Being of 
Dasein, Heidegger warns that any analysis of this entity which is overly hasty due to 
relying on ‘dogmatic constructions’,19 even if these are commonly seen as self-evident, 
will be inherently flawed. Instead he insists ‘we must rather choose such a way of 
access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity [Dasein] can show itself in itself 
and for itself.’20 This is to be achieved by viewing Dasein in its everydayness, for ‘in 
this… there are certain structures… essential ones which, in every kind of Being that 
factical Dasein may possess, persist as a determinative for the character of its Being.’21 
At this early stage, Heidegger asserts that his study will point to temporality as the 
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meaning of the Being of Dasein – this will provide a step towards obtaining an answer 
to the meaning of Being in general by providing a ground for further analysis.
22
 
Heidegger’s introduction sets out ‘the task of destroying the history of ontology’23 – a 
reference to those dogmatic constructions mentioned before. The philosophical 
tradition has become so rigid and built up that it has often been seen as ‘material for 
reworking, as it was for Hegel.’24 Heidegger’s task of destruction is one of 
unconcealment of ‘those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of Being’25 which have long since been overlooked. The 
positive nature of this destruction is indicated by Heidegger’s tracing the bringing 
together of the phenomenon of time and an interpretation of Being back from Kant, to 
Descartes, to Aristotle.
26
 Heidegger is not throwing the history of ontology onto the 
fire, but advocating going back to philosophy’s primordial roots to clear away the bad 
in order to maintain the good. 
  
Heideggerian phenomenology and Husserl. 
 
Heidegger ends the introduction of Being and Time by discussing the methodology he 
will use – namely a form of phenomenology. Edmund Husserl, arguably the lead figure 
in the foundation of phenomenology, effectively played the role of Heidegger’s mentor 
at the University of Freiburg early in the latter’s academic career.27 The relationship 
between the two men’s phenomenologies is complex and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
complicated. Much could (and has been) written on the subject, but for our purposes 
here, a brief overview must suffice. Carman explains Husserl’s ‘injunction to 
philosophers to return “To the things themselves!”… Not physical things or empirical 
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facts in contrast to ideal types or essences, but any immediately accessible matters 
susceptible to concrete description, as opposed to hypothesis or explanation.’28 
Passmore suggests Husserl’s phenomenology owes an intellectual debt to the tradition 
of German idealism, arguing it was an attempt to put ‘idealism on a scientific basis for 
the first time.’29 According to Carman, from idealism as well as from rationalism, 
Husserl adopted ‘a conception of philosophy as rigorous discipline or science.’30 It was 
this strict methodological ideal which Heidegger was to blame for distorting ‘Husserl’s 
view of the phenomena from the outset, contrary to his own stated aims.’31 Heidegger’s 
own hermeneutic phenomenology was effectively an attempt to follow Husserl’s battle 
cry towards “the things themselves” without making the same methodological errors. In 
the introduction Heidegger rejects any method of ontology which ‘merely consult[s] 
those ontologies which have come down to us historically.’32 He describes his 
phenomenology as being ‘opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to 
have been demonstrated [and]… opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade 
themselves as ‘problems’ often for generations at a time.’33 In keeping with his stress 
upon the primordial, Heidegger – in a way which will become common throughout his 
career – approaches the term “phenomenology” through analysing the primordial (i.e. 
classical Greek) origins of its constituent parts, namely “phenomenon” and “logos”.34 
Phenomenon is taken as something encountered as ‘showing-itself-in-itself’,35 whilst 
logos is taken as ‘letting-something-be-seen’.36 Together, Heidegger takes the terms to 
mean ‘to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it 
shows itself from itself.’37 He admits that in this explication of the term 
“phenomenology”, what we have arrived at is the Husserlian call for philosophy to 
return to the things themselves.
38
 The phenomenological method allows those things 
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which are hidden, have been covered up, or are disguised be encountered as they are in-
themselves – Heidegger has in mind particularly the Being of entities.39 He argues 
‘phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology… Only as 
phenomenology, is ontology possible.’40 For Heidegger, ontology and phenomenology 
are the same, for ‘these terms characterise philosophy itself with regard to its subject 
and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, 
and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which… has made fast the 
guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it 
returns.’41 
  
The entities to be analysed. 
 
At the beginning of the first part of Being and Time Heidegger reminds the reader that 
‘we are ourselves the entities to be analysed.’42 He takes steps to distance his 
phenomenological ontological inquiry from the sciences usually related to human 
existence – namely, biology, psychology and anthropology.43 Heidegger criticises the 
‘anthropology of Christianity and the ancient world’44 for providing an inadequate 
foundation for any accurate sort of ontology. He highlights two key aspects of this 
anthropology, the first being that man is taken as being a “rational animal” – something 
occurring amongst the other things in the world. This fails to account for the Being of 
Dasein which is, as Heidegger will argue, much more than Being present-at-hand. 
Secondly, the Christian anthropological tradition has the biblical maxim ‘And God said 
let us make man in our image, after our likeness’45 as its point of departure, which ‘in 
modern times [has tended to have]… been deprived of its theological character.’46 This 
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Christian conception of man is clearly more than as a thing which has intelligence, but 
‘the question of his Being has remained forgotten… this Being is rather conceived as 
something obvious or ‘self-evident’ in the sense of the Being-present-at-hand of other 
[God] created Things.’47 Heidegger finds similar flaws in psychology (‘whose 
anthropological tendencies are today unmistakable’48) and biology, which again only 
deals with the present-at-hand. Heidegger is insistent that despite these criticisms, there 
are positive aspects to these scientific ventures. 
 
In suggesting that [they]… all fail to give an unequivocal and ontologically 
accurate answer to the question about the kind of Being which belongs to those 
entities which we ourselves are, we are not passing judgement on the positive work 
of these disciplines. We must always bear in mind, however, that these ontological 
foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from 
empirical material, but that they are always ‘there’ already… If positive research 
fails to see these foundations… this by no means proves that they are not 
problematic in a more radical sense than any thesis of positive science can ever 
be.
49
 
 
Far from being crudely anti-scientific, Heidegger is merely suggesting that there are 
aspects of human existence which cannot be gleaned from the solely present-at-hand. 
Due to these criticisms of the human sciences, Heidegger rejects the idea of using 
information about primitive human societies as a window to the primordial Being of 
Dasein. This information comes from ‘ethnology [which] operates with definite 
preliminary conceptions and interpretations of human Dasein, even in first ‘receiving’ 
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its material, and in sifting it and working it up.’50 Instead, Dasein is to be encountered 
in its everydayness as Being-in-the-world. 
  
Being-in-the-world. 
 
Heidegger here attempts to sketch out a preliminary picture of what he means by 
“Being-in-the-world”. In keeping with his hermeneutic approach, the understanding 
here gleaned of Being-in-the-world must necessarily be incomplete without being 
illuminated by the later stages of Being and Time’s methodological approach. 
Heidegger explains that Being-in-the-world is ‘a unitary phenomenon.’51 Yet whilst 
this means it ‘cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together, this 
does not prevent it from having several constitutive elements in its structure.’52 
Heidegger posits three constitutive elements of Being-in-the world: ‘First, the ‘in-the-
world’… Second, that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world [and]… Third, 
Being-in as such’.53 Each of these is examined in detail in the chapters which follow in 
Being and Time. At this preliminary stage Heidegger is keen to insist that his references 
to Dasein being “in-the-world” have nothing to do with spatiality. Heidegger 
acknowledges that Dasein does indeed have a spatial element – not to do so would 
surely have been a fatal blow to the credibility of his philosophy – but maintains that 
this ‘is possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world in general... Being-in is not to 
be explained ontologically by some ontical characterisation.’54 
 Heidegger moves to discuss the first of his constitutive elements of Being-in-
the-world, the “in-the-world”, under the heading of “the worldhood of the world”. He 
sets out three steps in the analysis of worldhood: ‘(A) the analysis of environmentality 
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and worldhood in general; (B) an illustrative contrast between our analysis of 
worldhood and Descartes’ ontology of the ‘world’; (C) the aroundness of the 
environment, and the ‘spatiality’ of Dasein.’55 In dealing with the first step, Heidegger 
explains that ‘the Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be 
exhibited phenomenologically if we take as out clue our everyday Being-in-the-world, 
which we also call our “dealings” in the world and with entities within-the-world… 
The kind of dealing which is closest to us is… not a bare perceptual cognition, but 
rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use.’56 Heidegger 
calls these entities equipment. He warns against taking “equipment” too literally as a 
single entity hovering in a void, for ‘to the Being of any equipment there always 
belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is.’57 
Equipment which is used by Dasein in its everydayness towards a task – for example, a 
hammer – which is proximally ready-to-hand is not grasped by Dasein in a theoretical 
fashion. Heidegger suggests that for a tool (equipment that we use in order to do 
something) to be ready-at-hand it must ‘withdraw in order to be ready-to- hand quite 
authentically.’58 Heidegger explains that this is so because ‘that with which our 
everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [but]… the work – that 
which is to be produced at the time.’59 The work or task being completed by Dasein 
provides the ‘referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.’60 That 
which is produced by our hypothetical hammering follows the same pattern, with the 
product being ready-to-hand to complete a task – the hanging up of my coat provides 
the referential totality within which my newly made coat stand is encountered. 
Heidegger is careful to differentiate between “present-at-hand” and “ready-to-hand”. 
He explains, ‘readiness to hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ 
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are defined ontologico-categorically. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, 
‘is there’ anything ready-to-hand.’61 Despite this, Heidegger dismisses the notion that 
we can get nearer to understanding by reducing everything to variations of the present-
at-hand any more than we can understand the world by making a list of all the things 
occurrent within it. 
 Continuing his perceptive analysis of those entities which are ready-to-hand to 
Dasein, Heidegger introduces the occasions during which the smoothly flowing process 
described above does not work out. He suggests that it is possible ‘the tool turns out to 
be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is… ready-to-
hand. We discover its unusability… not by looking at it and establishing its properties, 
but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it.’62 When equipment 
which is unusable is conspicuous in this way, its Being does not in some way degrade 
into the merely present-at-hand, even though its readiness-to-hand in this context has 
the appearance to this conspicuousness of being unready-to-hand.
63
 Unusable 
equipment is not the only possible barrier to Dasein’s concernful dealings – the 
equipment might be missing altogether, and hence genuinely unready-to-hand. A third 
problem might be equipment that gets in the way of the task I wish to perform. Even 
this third case is not just a “thing” which is present-at-hand, but still equipment ready-
to-hand albeit ‘in the sense of something which one would like to shove out of the 
way.’64 Such problems causes there to be ‘a break in… referential contexts which 
circumspection discovers.’65 Heidegger continues to explain that when an equipment is 
missing ‘our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first 
time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand 
for. The environment announces itself afresh. What is thus lit up is not itself just one 
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thing ready-to-hand among others; still less is it something present-at-hand upon which 
equipment ready-to-hand is somehow founded: it is in the ‘there’ before anyone has 
observed or ascertained it.’66 Heidegger later continues to explain that ‘if the world can, 
in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it has already been disclosed 
beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessible for 
circumspective concern. The world is therefore something ‘wherein’ Dasein as an 
entity already was, and if in any manner it explicitly comes away from anything, it can 
never do more than come back to the world.’67 To continue this line of inquiry more 
deeply, Heidegger moves to discuss reference and signs. 
 Within his initial discussion of the ready-to-hand, Heidegger had already 
touched upon the referential property of equipment ready-to-hand. Here he discusses 
equipment which has the towards-which of indicating as a sign. Heidegger rejects the 
conception of a sign as being one thing which stands for another thing, preferring to 
understand it as ‘an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment 
into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-
hand announces itself.’68 Heidegger gives the examples of a certain wind direction 
being taken as a sign by a farmer that rain is coming, and tying a knot in a handkerchief 
as a sign to remind oneself of something to show that differing circumspections of 
Dasein allow the differing Beings of equipments ready-to-hand be discovered in their 
Being as a sign. In the first case, ‘the circumspection with which one takes account of 
things in farming’69 is required to discover the Being as a sign of the wind direction. 
That the handkerchief knot in the second example can stand as a sign for numerous 
different things – of my need to go to a shop after work, of a need to telephone a 
relative, of a need to remember a promise to a loved one to stop smoking, and so on – 
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and as such, the intelligibility and usefulness of the knot as a sign can diminish. 
Heidegger explains that ‘not only is it, for the most part, ready-to-hand as a sign only 
for the person who ‘establishes’ it, but it can even become inaccessible to him, so that 
another sign is needed if the first is to be used circumspectively at all.’70 If one has used 
the knot to signify numerous differing things in the past, a secondary sign may be 
necessary to remind oneself of what the knot is to signify this time around. This 
confusion regarding the knot in my handkerchief does not mean for Heidegger that it 
has ceased to have the character of a sign, but that ‘it acquires the disturbing 
obtrusiveness of something most closely ready-to-hand.’71 Signs, even somewhat 
confusingly ambiguous ones, are thus a further way in which the worldhood of the 
world is encountered by Dasein. 
 After continuing the discussion of Dasein’s involvement with entities within the 
world (the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, and so on) and the way in which this 
involvement is made possible by Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, Heidegger turns to 
contrast the differences between his conception of worldhood and Descartes’. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, he finds the latter to be lacking. Descartes’ philosophy is accused of 
failing to either ‘seek the phenomenon of the world at all [or to]… at least define some 
entity within-the-world fully enough so that the worldly character of this entity can be 
made visible in it.’72 Heidegger’s aim of usurping groundless modern metaphysics is 
undoubtedly the motive for this attack on its Cartesian foundations. 
 Returning to more positive contributions to philosophy, Heidegger turns to the 
final part of his elucidation of the worldhood of the world – the spatiality of Dasein. 
Heidegger rejects that Dasein can be thought of as having the spatiality of occurring in 
some position like something Being-present-at-hand or Being-ready-to-hand. Yet 
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‘Dasein… is ‘in’ the world in the sense that it deals with entities encountered within-
the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity.’73 Heidegger characterises 
Dasein’s spatiality as consisting of ‘de-severance and directionality.’74 De-severance 
being ‘a circumspective bringing close – bringing something close by, in the sense of 
procuring it, putting it in readiness, having it to hand.’75 Bringing close does not mean 
for Heidegger that Dasein moves something into a spatial position nearer to itself, for it 
may be what is physically closest (Heidegger gives the examples of spectacles, a 
telephone receiver and the floor on which we walk) which is the furthest from our 
circumspective de-severing.
76
 Heidegger’s explanation of directionality is somewhat 
brief, being largely made up of a critique of Kant’s view regarding the phenomenon of 
orientation. Kant is taken as wanting ‘to show that every orientation requires a 
‘subjective principle’. Here ‘subjective’ is meant to signify that this principle is a 
priori.’77 Heidegger explains that Kant’s position is flawed as ‘the a priori character of 
directedness with regard to right and left is based upon the ‘subjective’ a priori of 
Being-in-the-world, which has nothing to do with any determinate character restricted 
beforehand to a worldless subject.’78 Dasein is always already Being-in-the-world, as is 
each and every entity (present-at-hand and ready-to-hand) Dasein encounters. The 
wordless subject is a meaningless abstraction, and as such any philosophy which has 
this as a basis is groundless abstraction. 
  
Being-with-Others. 
 
Now Heidegger’s philosophy has been grounded in the worldhood of the world and has 
described much of Dasein’s interaction with inanimate entities with the word, the next 
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step is to introduce the others with whom Dasein dwells within the world. This chapter 
of Being and Time is identified by Dreyfus as being one of the most problematic in that 
there is a discrepancy between what on the one hand readers such as Sartre have 
understood by it, and on the other hand what Heidegger actually meant. Dreyfus is 
blunt in apportioning blame for this divergence, arguing that if ‘careful readers like 
[Heidegger scholar Frederick] Olafson and Sartre have missed Heidegger’s point… it is 
mostly his own fault.’79 The problem seems to lie in that Heidegger’s chapter appears 
to fall into the transcendental solipsism which was a feature of Husserlian thought. 
Dreyfus explains that both Husserl and Sartre ‘claim that philosophy must start with a 
separate sphere of ownness, a self contained source of intentionality that first gives 
meaning to transcendental intersubjectivity and finally to a common world.’80 Dreyfus 
maintains that Heidegger has avoided this position, even if it is unclearly explained in 
Being and Time. He explains that the confusion is perhaps caused by an attempt to 
synthesise the thought of Dilthey and Kierkegaard in this area. ‘Heidegger takes up and 
extends the Diltheyan insight that intelligibility and truth arises only in the context of 
public, historical practices, but he is also deeply influenced by the Kierkegaardian view 
that “the truth is never in the crowd.” If Heidegger had explicitly distinguished these 
opposed views and then integrated them, this could have been a rich and coherent 
chapter.’81 Instead, as we shall see, these strands of thought intertwine in this section of 
Being and Time in a sometimes unseemly mess. However, just because Heidegger’s 
articulation of this point is ungainly this should not lead us to the immediate conclusion 
that his attempt has been unsuccessful. 
 Heidegger earlier maintained that Dasein is I myself – it is not an alien object or 
being that I encounter. That there are others for whom the mode of Being is also Dasein 
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requires no leap of faith for Heidegger’s phenomenological method. Previously he had 
mentioned the equipment a craftsman encounters ready-to-hand, for instance a hammer. 
In the work directed towards producing something with the equipment, ‘those Others 
for whom the ‘work’ is destined are ‘encountered too’… Similarly, when equipment is 
put to use, we encounter its producer or ‘supplier’ as one who ‘serves’ well or badly.’82 
Heidegger explains that these ‘Others who are thus ‘encountered’ in a ready-to-hand, 
environmental context of equipment, are not somehow added on in thought to some 
Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand; such ‘Things’ are encountered from 
out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others – a world which is always 
mine too in advance.’83 It is around this point in his discussion that Heidegger rejects 
the Husserlian notion that a phenomenological philosophy of existence needs to begin 
with an isolated subject. He explains that in speaking of Others, no subject-object 
dualism is implied. When Heidegger refers to Others, he insists this does not mean 
everybody else who exists outside of the concernful “I”, but that ‘they are rather those 
from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom 
one is too.’84 Dasein is ‘Being-there-too with’85 Others. Heidegger explains that the use 
of the word “too” implies that there is ‘a sameness of Being as circumspectively 
concernful Being-in-the-world’86 between the Dasein which I am myself, and the 
Others whose way of Being is also Dasein which each is themselves. For Dasein, 
Being-in-the-world is always a Being-with-Others-in-the-world – the world is always 
shared with Others, for ‘the world of Dasein is a with-world.’87 As such it would be 
nonsense to infer that Dasein exists, then in a first step discovers the world, followed 
by a second step in which Others are discovered – Dasein is always already Being-in-
the-world, and always already Being-with-Others-in-the-world. Heidegger rejects that 
223 
 
his conception of Being-with should be interpreted as stating that for Dasein, Others are 
always proximally ‘present-at-hand or perceived.’88 Even if there is no Other perceived 
at all, Dasein is still Being-with. 
 Heidegger describes the Being-towards the Others whom Dasein is Being-with 
as ‘solicitude’.89 He differentiates between positive and negative forms of solicitude, 
turning to the latter first so as to avoid misunderstanding solicitude in an overly narrow 
sense. Negative solicitude are the forms of Being-with-one-another which are deficient 
and indifferent, namely ‘passing one another by, not “mattering” to one another’.90 
Heidegger suggests that such deficient solicitude could easily be mistaken for ‘the mere 
Being-present-at-hand of several subjects… yet ontologically there is an essential 
distinction between the ‘indifferent’ way in which Things at random occur together and 
the way in which entities who are with one another do not “matter” to one another.’91 
This essential difference is that Dasein’s Being is always Being-with – this is not 
changed in any way if a particular person takes up a stance of indifference towards the 
Others with whom he is Being-in-the-world. 
 The positive form of solicitude is split into two possibilities. Firstly, solicitude 
can ‘take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position of concern: it can 
leap in for him.’92 The opposite extreme is for solicitude to ‘leap ahead of [the 
Other]… not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him 
authentically as such for the first time.’93 For Heidegger, the authenticity of the second 
form of positive solicitude derives from it pertaining ‘to the existence of the Other, not 
to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to 
himself in his care and to become free for it.’94 Put more plainly, the first form of 
solicitude addresses the care – perhaps work task needing to be performed – as a 
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burden for the Other, a burden for which it matters not who endures the burden as long 
as it is endured. The second form recognises that Dasein’s way of Being is care (as we 
shall see later in Being and Time), and thus recognises the importance of the Other’s 
care to the Being of the Other. It would be a mistake to interpret Heidegger’s point here 
as being that one should never aid another in the completion of a task – he explains that 
in such a situation it is possible to ‘become authentically bound together [in a way 
which]… makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the Other in his 
freedom for himself.’95 Heidegger associates the first form of positive solicitude as 
being a form of domination, whilst the second is a form of liberation. By taking over 
the care of the Other, we dominate him and make him dependent upon us – this dilutes 
his ability to live authentically as Dasein. It does not take too much of a leap from this 
point to arrive at the kind of criticisms expressed by modern critics of an overbearing 
welfare state. Heidegger explains that ‘everyday Being-with-one-another maintains 
itself between the two extremes.’96 Different degrees of each are possible, yet he goes 
no further on this point so as not to deviate too far from the main thrust of his work. 
Heidegger explains that just as concern with the ready-to-hand is guided by 
circumspection, positive ‘solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance 
[whilst negative solicitude is guided by]… inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for 
which indifference leads the way.’97 This leads into Heidegger’s contested depiction of 
the “they”. 
 The “they” is for Heidegger the depersonalised subject (in German, das Man). 
He differentiates this from other possible interpretations, explaining it ‘is not this one, 
not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all.’98 Similarly, 
Heidegger rejects that the “they” is ‘a ‘universal subject’ which a plurality of objects 
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have hovering above them.’99 He explains that ‘in utilising public means of transport 
and in making use of information services like the newspaper, every Other is like the 
next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the 
kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable 
and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, 
the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded.’100 Here Heidegger’s problem is not with 
public transport and newspapers as such – he makes similar remarks about taking 
pleasure, art appreciation and reading literature
101
 – but what he calls “publicness”. 
Publicness is a collective term for the Being of the They’s tendency towards 
‘distantiality, averageness and levelling down.’102 With echoes of Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger decries the ‘averageness with which [the They]… prescribes what can and 
may be ventured [and]… keeps watch over everything exceptional’.103 He condemns 
the covering up of the primordial and the appropriation of all gained through the 
struggle of great men. This is perhaps the most explicit piece of social criticism to be 
found in Being and Time, pitting Heidegger’s conservative elitism against stultifying 
egalitarianism. 
 Whilst we shall turn to Heidegger’s politics in detail later, at this point it will be 
useful to further examine the social criticism expressed here. Most importantly, it is 
necessary to explore whether these social criticisms are connected to Heidegger’s 
understanding of the Being of Dasein, or are instead tagged on with little in the way of 
a philosophical basis. Heidegger’s concept of the inauthentic solicitude which focusses 
upon the care instead of the individual and their relationship with the care is clearly 
related to his critique of levelling. In attempting to create a more egalitarian society, the 
means through which this greater spread of equality is achieved can be overlooked as a 
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secondary concern. Yet Heidegger would correctly argue that there is a vast difference 
between authentic and inauthentic solicitude on this point. If the care the person if 
concerned with is a need for money, inauthentic solicitude would support a hand-out as 
this would immediately take away the care from the person. Authentic solicitude would 
instead support assisting the person with their care through, for example, passing on 
training which might lead to work or offering work in return for the money. Levelling 
down can be seen as another example of inauthentic solicitude in action. If, for 
example, some ideas or concepts in society are too complex for a number of persons to 
grasp, for inauthentic solicitude the aim would be to remove this difficulty from the 
person, perhaps through a form of “dumbing down” the ideas so that even the least able 
is able to access them. Authentic solicitude instead would advocate assisting the person 
to increase their knowledge and understanding in order to achieve their goal of 
grasping the complex issue. It is clearly easier to bring public discourse down to the 
lowest level than to attempt to raise each and every person to the level of the 
exceptional (be this, for example, in philosophy, science, literature or political 
understanding). As such, it should not be surprising that in the modern world it seems 
that the utilitarian calculation has been made in favour of the levelled masses against 
the outstanding exceptions. Yet despite this ease and apparent fairness, levelling is 
antithetical to authentic Being as understood by Heidegger, and he is therefore 
philosophically correct to oppose it within the context of Being and Time. 
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Being-in. 
 
Heidegger next moves to discuss “Being-in as such”. Already Being-in-the-world has 
been discussed, but Heidegger now turns to other aspects of Being-in beyond Dasein’s 
knowing the world. Being-in is taken to be ‘the Being of the “there”’.104 The ‘there’ of 
Dasein is a reference to its disclosedness, for Heidegger explains that ‘Dasein is its 
disclosedness [which means]… that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its 
very Being is to be its ‘there’’.105 More plainly, Being-in as such is the Being of the 
“there” in its everydayness – it is Dasein’s disclosedness (Dasein must be disclosed in 
order to be Dasein) in its everydayness. Heidegger suggests that there are two 
equiprimordial ways of Being the “there” – ‘in understanding and state-of-mind’.106 
Heidegger will use these phenomena to discuss ‘the existential Constitution of the 
“there” [before turning to]… the everyday Being of the “there”, and the falling of 
Dasein’.107 
 Heidegger explains that “state-of-mind” is the ontological term for what is 
ontically given the term “mood”.108 Although they may ‘deteriorate or change over 
time… in every case Dasein always have some mood.’109 Heidegger speaks of Dasein 
being assailed by moods. He suggests it would be wrong to envisage these as 
emanating from either outside or inside, but explains that instead a mood ‘arises out of 
Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being.’110 In particular, Heidegger examines fear 
as a possible state-of-mind, analysing ‘(1) that in the face of which we fear, (2) fearing, 
and (3) that about which we fear.’111 Together these make up the constituent elements 
of fear as a mode of Dasein’s state-of-mind. Heidegger begins by explaining that in line 
with his theory of Dasein, that in the face of which Dasein fears is encountered within-
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the-world. As such, ‘the ‘fearsome’… may have either readiness-to-hand, presence-at-
hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being.’112 The fearsome’s form of involvement 
within-the-world is detrimentality, the target and source of this detrimentality are both 
known to Dasein, as is the veracity of the detrimentality of the fearsome. Heidegger 
describes the fearsome as being outside of the possible striking distance, but at the 
same time drawing-close – a drawing-close which may result in the fearsome becoming 
detrimentally involved with Dasein, but may also end with the fearsome passing by 
with no such occurrence. This unknown element is for Heidegger what makes the 
fearsome even more feared.
113
 He explains that Dasein does not first notice something 
drawing close and then fear it, but that what is drawing close is discovered in its 
fearsomeness. Heidegger describes fearing as being ‘a slumbering possibility of Being-
in-the-world in a state-of-mind [which]… has already disclosed the world, in that out of 
it something like the fearsome may come close.’114 That which Dasein fears about is 
Dasein itself. Heidegger explains that ‘fearing discloses [Dasein]… as endangered and 
abandoned to itself.’115 He rejects that fearing about one’s house, for example, 
disproves his understanding, for ‘Dasein is in every case concernful Being-
alongside’,116 meaning that a detrimental action towards what we are concernfully 
Being-alongside is detrimental towards Dasein itself. Heidegger acknowledges that 
Dasein can fear for Others. Yet even this form of ‘fearing-about is “being-afraid-for-
oneself”.’117 It is a fear that the Other with whom Dasein is Being-with ‘might be torn 
away’,118 with this having a detrimental effect on Dasein itself. As was previously 
stated, fear is but one of the possible states-of-mind of Dasein, and it may exist in 
numerous variations of that expounded by Heidegger. Heidegger’s point here has not 
been to provide a definitive illustration of fearing in all its myriad forms, but to 
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demonstrate how fearing is ‘an existential possibility of the essential state-of-mind of 
Dasein in general’.119 Dasein’s state-of-mind as fearing is just one of many ways of 
Dasein Being the “there”. 
 Heidegger aims to provide a similar example in his discussion of understanding. 
As previously mentioned, state-of-mind and understanding are equiprimordial for 
‘state-of-mind always has its understanding [and]… understanding always has its 
mood.’120 This remains true even when suppressed. Heidegger differentiates between 
understanding as a competence over a task and over ‘Being as existing.’121 The latter is 
unsurprisingly what Heidegger has in mind, linking this to possibility. He describes 
Dasein as being ‘primarily Being-possible[, meaning it]… is in every case what it can 
be, and in the way in which it is its possibility.’122 Here it is possible to see Heidegger’s 
conception of Dasein as time-oriented, though this is not the first such hint in Being 
and Time. Already when discussing the ready-to-hand in relation to tasks we have 
implicitly accepted that Dasein works towards future goals, yet here the importance of 
time to Heidegger’s thought is becoming more explicit. The possibilities for Dasein are 
in no way infinite, nor does Heidegger reject the importance of actuality and necessity. 
Dasein has ‘definite possibilities’123 which it may make the most of, allow to pass by or 
mistakenly handle – each of these opens up and closes off access to later possibilities. 
Understanding is Dasein’s authentic knowing of what it can and cannot be in its 
‘thrown possibility’.124 
 Interpretation is for Heidegger how understanding ‘becomes itself. [It is]… the 
working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.’125 He rejects groundless 
conceptions of interpretation, reminding the reader that ‘whenever something is 
interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-
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having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. An interpretation is never… 
presuppositionless’.126 This is what Heidegger refers to as the “fore-structure” in which 
interpretation operates. Here Heidegger adds the what at first appears paradoxical 
explanation that due to the necessity of this fore-structure, ‘any interpretation which is 
to contribute to understanding, must already have understood what is to be 
interpreted.’127 Heidegger suggests it would be amiss to despairingly characterise this 
as a vicious circle which needs to be avoided. Instead, ‘in the circle is hidden a positive 
possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.’128 In reawakening awareness of 
the primordial basis of the understanding we might take to be common sense, a deeper 
and fuller understanding can come about. Assertion is a derivative form of 
interpretation – ‘a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which 
communicates.’129 For communication to occur, the existence of Others (as we have 
already discussed) is necessary in order for Dasein to have someone with whom to 
communicate his assertion. Also necessary for communication of an assertion is 
language which Heidegger moves on to discuss in one of its everyday modes as idle 
talk. 
 Idle talk is the first topic in the second part of Heidegger’s discussion of Being-
in as such – the everyday Being of the “there” and the falling of Dasein. Heidegger is 
keen to distance himself from the negative value judgement normally implied, instead 
insisting ‘it signifies a positive phenomenon which constitutes the kind of Being of 
everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting.’130 The importance of Dasein’s use 
of language in discourse to communicate is that ‘its tendency of Being is aimed at 
bringing the hearer [the Other or Others] to participate in disclosed Being towards what 
is talked about in the discourse.’131 The reference to “the hearer” should not in any way 
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lead to the inference that Heidegger fails to recognise or account for other forms of 
discourse, but instead is his recognition that for the most part Dasein’s everyday 
discourse tends overwhelmingly to be conducted verbally. It is mistaken to assume that 
what is talked about in the discourse is understood totally, for Heidegger explains it ‘is 
understood only approximately and superficially. We have the same thing in view, 
because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is 
said.’132 Despite Heidegger’s insistence of avoiding a disparaging initial understanding 
of the term “idle talk”, he goes on to condemn the averageness entailed. Idle talk does 
not let the entity being talked about ‘be appropriated in a primordial manner, [yet]… 
what is said-in-the-talk… spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative 
character.’133 Heidegger equates this type of groundless gossiping with its written form, 
“scribbling”. Here Heidegger continues his devastating critique of the levelled masses. 
Scribbling ‘feeds upon superficial reading. The average understanding of the reader 
will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a 
struggle, and how much is just gossip. The average understanding, moreover, will not 
want any distinction, and does not need it, because, of course, it understands 
everything.’134 This passage, sarcasm seemingly dripping from the pen, appears almost 
as a rejoinder against his philosophical critics before they have even emerged. Not all 
discourse undertaken by Dasein is the groundless covering up (as opposed to 
disclosing) that is idle talk, but idle talk remains a possibility for Dasein in its Being. 
When Heidegger complains of the ‘obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways 
in which things have been interpreted’,135 it is not difficult to see parallels with the 
ways in which the question of Being has been covered up by two millennia of 
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philosophy. Dasein has for the most part been uprooted from its primordial ground, and 
yet in its everydayness tends to be completely unaware that it is floating.
136
 
 Ambiguity is the result of everybody having something to say about something, 
for ‘it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, 
and what is not.’137 This ambiguity is the nemesis to the early Heidegger’s decisionist 
action-based philosophy. He complains that in the ambiguity of the way things have 
been publicly interpreted, talking about things ahead of the game and making surmises 
about them curiously, gets passed off as what is really happening, while taking action 
and carrying something through gets stamped as something merely subsequent and 
unimportant.’138 The curiosity Heidegger is talking about here is not curiosity in 
general, but the tendency to want to see things for the sake of seeing them, instead of in 
order to understand.
139
 This curiosity, along with ambiguity and idle talk, makes up ‘the 
way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its ‘there’ – the disclosedness of 
Being-in-the-world.’140 In them is revealed Dasein’s falling. 
 “Falling” is another term into which Heidegger is insistent that no necessarily 
negative undertones should be read. Instead it signifies ‘that Dasein is proximally and 
for the most part alongside the ‘world’ of its concern… mostly [with] the character of 
Being-lost in the publicness of the “they”’.141 It is here that Heidegger introduces a 
more detailed account of inauthentic Being. This is when Dasein ‘is completely 
fascinated with the ‘world’ and by the Dasein-with of Others in the “they”[, but is] Not-
Being-its-self’.142 In this way Dasein ‘has fallen into the world, which itself belongs to 
its Being.’143 Heidegger describes the ways in which idle talk, ambiguity and curiosity 
result in this inauthenticity. 
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Idle talk discloses to Dasein a Being towards its world, towards Others, and 
towards itself – a Being in which these are understood, but in a mode of groundless 
floating. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way that Being-
in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein’s 
understanding, but only in order that Being-in-the-world should be suppressed in 
this uprooted “everywhere and nowhere”.144 
 
Heidegger sketches out the temptation Dasein has towards falling and how noticing the 
seemingly authentic lives led by the “they” has a tranquilising effect.145 Yet what this 
results in is alienation, self-entanglement and turbulence.
146
 If falling is Dasein’s Being 
inauthentic, the final chapter of the first division of Being and Time will set out 
Dasein’s possibility for authentic Being – Being as care. 
 Heidegger cites anxiety as a way in which Dasein is disclosed in its primordial 
structural whole (for Dasein is always whole). For Heidegger anxiety is both ‘anxiety 
in the face of something [and]… as a state-of-mind… also anxiety about something.’147 
That which Dasein in anxiety is anxious in the face of and what Dasein in anxiety is 
anxious about is the same thing – Being-in-the-world. He explains that ‘here the 
disclosure and the disclosed are existentially selfsame in such a way that in the latter 
the world has been disclosed as a world, and Being-in has been disclosed as a 
potentiality-for-Being which is individualised, pure, and thrown; this makes it plain 
that with the phenomenon of anxiety a distinctive state-of-mind becomes a theme for 
interpretation.’148 Heidegger argues that ‘the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows 
Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world.’149 Through anxiety, the totality of 
Dasein can be grasped. Here anxiety plays a similar role for Heidegger as it did for 
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Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety, in which anxiety as a state-of-mind is educative 
towards the individual getting a greater understanding of his own existence.
150
 
  
Care. 
 
Dasein’s temporal nature is raised again by Heidegger, with its future-orientation being 
associated with its potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger here equates it with Dasein 
‘Being-ahead-of-itself’.151 Taking this together with what we already know of Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world and Being-with, Heidegger explains that ‘the Being of Dasein 
means ahead-of-itself-already-in(- the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered 
within-the-world).’152 This long definition is what Heidegger means by the term “care” 
and when he explains that the meaning of Dasein’s Being is care. Heidegger argues that 
‘care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ every factical ‘attitude’ and 
‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies 
in them.’153 It ‘is essentially something that cannot be torn asunder; so any attempts to 
trace it back to special acts or drives like willing and wishing or urge and addiction, or 
to construct it out of these, will be unsuccessful.’154 Care is ontologically prior to all of 
these, thus any attempt to ground Dasein’s Being in the will, for example, shall 
necessarily be inauthentic and incomplete. 
 Heidegger turns to discuss Reality and its relationship to Dasein’s Being as 
care. He begins by handling the question of whether the external world can be proven 
to exist. In particular, Heidegger challenges Kant’s assertion in his Critique of Pure 
Reason that ‘idealism, which… pleads our inability to prove any existence except our 
own by means of immediate experience, is reasonable and is in accordance with a 
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sound philosophical mode of thought; namely, it allows no decisive judgement before a 
sufficient proof has been found.’155 In a note to the preface to the second edition of the 
work, Kant had decried the ‘scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general, 
that we should have to accept the existence of things outside us… merely on trust, and 
have no satisfactory proof with which to counter any opponent who chooses to doubt 
it.’156 It is undoubtedly this Heidegger has in mind when he counters that ‘the ‘scandal 
of philosophy’ is not that this proof is yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected 
and attempted again and again.’157 Heidegger attributes this to the inherently flawed 
philosophical starting point of a worldless subject. The tendency has been, as we have 
seen, to introduce a worldless subject and then to attempt to reconstruct a world around 
them. As Dasein is always Being-in-the-world, and Being-with-entities-within-the-
world, there is no need to construct convoluted theories and arguments to disprove 
solipsistic worldviews. Heidegger argues that it is ‘only as long as Dasein is (… only as 
long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ Being.’158 As such, 
just as ‘Being (not entities) is dependent upon the understanding of Being…, Reality 
(not the Real) is dependent on care.’159 By this Heidegger means that one can only 
conceive of Reality because each of us is Dasein which is, as we have seen, ahead-of-
itself-already-in(- the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-
world). 
  
Truth. 
 
Finally for this chapter, and the first division of Being and Time, Heidegger discusses 
truth. He begins with the ontological foundations of the traditional conception of truth. 
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He cites ‘three theses which characterise the way in which the essence of truth has been 
traditionally taken.’160 These are: 
 
(1) That the ‘locus’ of truth is assertion (judgement) 
(2) That the essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ of the judgement with its object 
(3) That Aristotle… not only has assigned truth to the judgement as its primordial 
locus but has set going the definition of “truth” as ‘agreement’.161 
 
Heidegger finds all three to be lacking, preferring, perhaps unsurprisingly, a more 
primordial conception. He explains that ‘“Being-true” (“truth”) means Being-
uncovering.’162 That this is the primordial understanding of truth is supported by 
Heidegger’s citing of Heraclitus’ first fragment.163 As is typical in Heidegger’s 
works
164
 his rendering of the fragment differs somewhat from traditional 
interpretations, yet not so much that the meaning has been changed – rather the 
importance of certain aspects has been enhanced and highlighted. In Heidegger’s 
rendering, he explains how Heraclitus contrasts those that speak and understand logos 
(discourse) with those who do not understand. For the latter, understanding of logos 
remains hidden, whilst for the former it is unhidden.
165
 The truth, which is imparted in 
the discourse, is thus equated with being unhidden, or uncoveredness. Heidegger thus 
states that ‘the most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-
ontological foundations of uncovering.’166 All this is intrinsically related to Dasein’s 
Being that we have discussed up to this point. This relationship is summarised by 
Heidegger as being that ‘Dasein is in the truth’.167 
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 Heidegger returns to four characteristics of Dasein’s Being – that disclosedness 
(the phenomenon of care), thrownness (that Dasein is thrown into an already existing 
world alongside other existing entities), projection (Dasein’s Being-possibility) and 
falling (Dasein being lost within its world) all belong to Dasein’s state of Being.168 He 
describes the way in which Dasein has to wrestle the truth from entities, and to pull 
them out of their hiddenness, for ‘the factical uncoveredness of anything is always, as it 
were, a kind of robbery.’169 With the need for (metaphorical) violence for Dasein to 
uncover truth, it is perhaps unsurprising that Heidegger suggests that Dasein is in 
untruth. To disentangle the possibly paradoxical suggestion that Dasein is in both truth 
and untruth, Heidegger again turns to pre-Socratic philosophy, this time in the form of 
Parmenides. In his great poem On Nature (of which only fragments survive), 
Parmenides describes the Goddess of Truth who describes two pathways.
170
 Heidegger 
interprets the two pathways as being ‘one of uncovering [and] one of hiding… this 
signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth.’171 
Dasein must choose which pathway to go down. 
 To end the first division of Being and Time, Heidegger finally turns to discuss 
the kind of Being of truth. He asserts that ‘Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is 
essentially in the truth.’172 That is, in disclosedness, Dasein has chosen the Goddess’ 
path of uncovering. Heidegger argues that the existence of Dasein is a prerequisite for 
there to be truth. He explains that ‘before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor 
will there be after Dasein is no more.’173 This is because if we accept that truth is 
uncoveredness, there needs to be a Dasein in order to do the uncovering. Heidegger 
further explains this point with reference to Newton’s laws of motion. 
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To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that 
before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by 
those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them entities became 
accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show 
themselves precisely as entities which beforehand they already were. Such 
uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to ‘truth’.174 
 
Until a truth has been uncovered by being wrestled from hiddenness, it is neither true 
nor false. After it has been uncovered – in this case by Newton – the entities become 
accessible to Dasein now. Dasein is also able to access what entities in the past already 
were, even though it was hidden at the time. Whilst truth is reliant on the existence of 
Dasein, Heidegger rejects the Kierkegaardian notion that truth can be understood as 
being subjective. He explains that ‘if one interprets ‘subjective’ as ‘left to the subject’s 
discretion’, then [truth is not subjective]… For uncovering… takes asserting out of the 
province of Dasein’s discretion, and brings the uncovering Dasein face to face with the 
entities themselves.’175 The entities are what they are, and if Dasein uncovers what the 
entities themselves are, this is the truth. A subjective interpretation of the entities not 
grounded in the Being of the entities themselves would not be uncovering, but rather an 
act of obscurification (willing or otherwise) making the entities less not more disclosed. 
Heidegger argues that ‘we must presuppose truth’176 because of the kind of Being 
Dasein has – it is in the truth. He denies that the existence of truth can be proven and 
that sceptics arguing against this can be disproved, for – as when writing against Kant 
above – such proof is neither possible nor required.  
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 At the end of the first division of Being and Time Heidegger summarises what 
he claims to have achieved up to this point in the discussion. He explains that ‘the 
answer to the question of the meaning of Being has yet to be given.’177 What has been 
achieved is that ‘by laying bare the phenomenon of care, we have clarified the state of 
Being of that entity to whose Being something like an understanding of Being 
belongs.’178 As well as clarifying the state of Being of Dasein, Heidegger has also 
distinguished this ‘from other modes of Being (readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, 
Reality) which characterise entities with a character other than that of Dasein.’179 The 
first division of Being and Time does not describe the Being of Dasein in its entirety, 
but it does provide the foundations for Heidegger’s later attempts to add further 
explanations both in the second half of the work and in his subsequent works. It is these 
further explanations that we shall now discuss before turning to the issue of 
Heidegger’s politics. 
  
Being-towards-death. 
 
The second division of Being and Time often finds Heidegger in a much more 
existential (in the Sartrean sense) mode than in any of his other writings. He begins by 
characterising Dasein as Being-towards-death. Hoffman explains that it is only in 
Being-towards-death that ‘Dasein’s totality can be revealed [for]… as long as a human 
individual is alive… his identity is not a sealed matter’.180 Whilst an individual Dasein 
is alive, its Being is still thrown possibility. The decisions Dasein makes shape the 
further possibilities it will then have – only in death are there no more possibilities to 
be enacted. Heidegger explains his position in his lecture course held two years before 
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the publication of Being and Time, later published as History of the Concept of Time. 
‘The utmost possibility of death is the way of Being of Dasein in which it is purely and 
simply thrown back upon itself, so absolutely that even Being-with in its concretion of 
“to be with others” becomes irrelevant. Of course, even in dying, Dasein is of its 
essence Being-in-the-world and Being-with with others, but the Being is now 
transposed directly to the ‘I am.’ Only in dying can I to some extent say absolutely, ‘I 
am.’’181 Dying is perhaps the only certain possibility in Dasein’s existence, and is the 
possibility to end all possibilities. In death Dasein is whole, yet ‘upon reaching its 
wholeness and precisely in it, it becomes no-longer-Dasein. Its wholeness makes it 
vanish.’182 Incompleteness is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein – its Being-
possibility. When ‘nothing more is outstanding for it as an entity… it is also no longer 
Dasein.’183 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger differentiates between authentic and inauthentic 
Being-towards-death. Inauthentic Being-towards-death is the tendency which, whilst 
not denying the certainty of the death of Dasein, envisages it in an ‘ambiguous manner 
just in order to weaken that certainty by covering up dying still more and to alleviate its 
[Dasein’s] own thrownness into death.’184 Just as in its everydayness, Dasein engages 
in idle talk which covers over what has been gained primordially by struggle. The 
everyday approach to death covers over the certainty of death – Dasein’s own death – 
with a film of platitudes and generalities, which hides the possibility of authentic 
Being-towards-death from view. Heidegger explains that in its inauthentic form, 
Dasein’s certainty of death is a certainty which betrays its inauthentic ground in the 
“they”. He argues that ‘one says, “Death certainly comes, but not right away.” With 
this ‘but…’, the “they” denies that death is certain.’185 This putting aside of the 
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immediate possibility of death by general opinion ‘covers up what is peculiar in death’s 
certainty – that it is possible at any moment.’186 Heidegger associates this tendency 
with the way in which the “they” covers over Dasein’s Being-ahead-of-itself. He 
condemns the way in which ‘the phenomenon of the “not-yet” has been taken over 
from the “ahead-of-itself”… this “ahead-of-itself” is what first of all makes such a 
Being-towards-the-end possible.’187 Authentic Being-towards-death is thus possible if 
Dasein avoids this ‘everyday evasion in the face of death’.188 
 Heidegger explains that ‘authentic Being-towards-death can not evade its 
ownmost non-relational possibility, or cover up this possibility by thus fleeing from it, 
or give a new explanation for it to accord with the common sense of the “they”.’189 
Dasein’s Being-towards-death is ‘Being towards a possibility… towards a distinctive 
possibility of Dasein itself.’190 Death is a possibility for Dasein that it is Being-towards 
which is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand. If Dasein were to set about 
actualising this possibility concernfully (such as the possibility of producing a bench on 
which to sit or the possibility of learning to speak German), ‘Dasein would deprive 
itself of the very ground for an existing Being-towards-death.’191 Camus famously 
asserted in his essay The Myth of Sisyphus that ‘there is but one truly serious 
philosophical problem and that is suicide.’192 If he had made more careful study of 
Being and Time, he might have found that Heidegger had already here provided 
philosophical argument for authentic existence against self-destruction. Although he 
lacked Camus’ more accessible philosophical prose, Heidegger had already shown that 
the individual should choose life over death, even though this death is possible at any 
moment. The only remaining justification for suicide would be if each and every 
possibility Dasein is Being-towards were so unbearable that Dasein’s only option to 
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avoid these is the termination of its own Being as Dasein. Unless if the near infinitude 
of possibilities had been closed off by a previously enacted possibility, there seem to be 
few situations in which such a position could be considered authentic. The problem of 
suicide may remain for specific exceptions, but taking into account Heidegger’s 
understanding of authentic Being, it is difficult to accept that suicide is as general a 
philosophical problem as Camus insists. Heidegger summarises the importance of 
understanding Dasein’s Being-towards-death for an understanding of Dasein’s Being: 
‘anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face 
with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but 
of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has 
been released from the Illusions of the “they”, and which is factical, certain of itself, 
and anxious.’193 The anticipation of one’s own death (my own death, not that of a 
hypothetical other) personalises what in everydayness is something thought about in 
generalities and is experienced as something happening to others. This anticipation 
owes nothing to any other Dasein, but is something which I can only be myself – only I 
will die my own death. Authentically Dasein will naturally be anxious about its demise 
which may occur at any unexpected moment. Yet authentically Dasein should not 
respond to this anxiety by retreating into the “they” and covering over this certainty 
with generalities.  
  
Conscience. 
 
The second division of Being and Time also contains a discussion by Heidegger of 
Dasein’s conscience which he characterises as being ‘Dasein’s everyday interpretation 
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of itself’.194 Conscience is a form of discourse in which Dasein’s Being is disclosed.195 
The discourse of conscience is a call which appeals ‘to the they-self in its Self; as such 
an appeal it summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus calls 
Dasein forth to its possibilities.’196 Heidegger describes how this is the way in which 
‘conscience summons Dasein’s Self from its lostness in the “they”’.197 He addresses the 
possibly problematic nature of the way in which Dasein is here both caller and called. 
He explains that though I myself am the caller, the call is ‘something which we 
ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed… ‘It’ calls, 
against our expectations and even against our will.’198 Yet it would still be meaningless 
to assert that the call of conscience emanates from anyone but myself. As Heidegger 
asserts, ‘the call comes from me and yet from beyond me.’199 Heidegger rejects 
explanations founded upon both theological and biological powers (that the call 
emanates from God or body chemistry) for passing ‘over the phenomenal findings too 
hastily’.200 Instead he argues that whilst ‘that it is factically, may be obscure and hidden 
as regards the “why” of it… the “that-it-is” has itself been disclosed to Dasein.’201 
Heidegger’s phenomenological method – the focus upon the things themselves – means 
that whilst there may be no clear reason for there to be a conscience, that we experience 
being called by conscience means it cannot be dismissed. Despite this, Heidegger is 
quick to refute ‘that the ordinary ontical way of understanding conscience must be 
recognised as the first court of appeal for an ontological Interpretation.’202  
 Heidegger describes the identification of Dasein’s conscience as ‘the call 
[which] either addresses Dasein as ‘Guilty!’, or, as in the case when the conscience 
gives warning, refers to a possible ‘Guilty!’ or affirms… that one is ‘conscious of no 
guilt’’.203 Yet by asserting that the call of conscience is related to guilt, Heidegger 
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argues that we have not yet fully uncovered what is called in the call of conscience. He 
explains that Being-guilty can be understood ‘in the sense of ‘owing’, of ‘having 
something due on account’ [and also]… of ‘being responsible for’ – that is, being the 
cause or author of something, or even ‘being the occasion for something.’204 Heidegger 
describes the two senses of guilt – owing something to someone and being responsible 
for something – as being ‘a kind of behaviour which we call ‘making oneself 
responsible’’.205 As such Heidegger asserts Dasein’s responsibility for its own actions 
(taken in the widest sense), and asserts Dasein’s role as the judge of its own actions. He 
describes that ‘wanting to have a conscience is, as an understanding of oneself in one’s 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, a way in which Dasein has been disclosed.’206 Again it 
is important to remember here that Heidegger has rejected the possibility that the call of 
Dasein’s conscience is controlled by the will. By stating that Dasein wants to have a 
conscience, Heidegger means that Dasein has a readiness for conscience which itself 
‘becomes readiness for anxiety.’207 The cause of anxiety is that in the call of 
conscience, ‘Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness’208 – its 
thrownness into the world. Heidegger explains that ‘this distinctive and authentic 
disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience – this reticent self-
projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety – we 
call “resoluteness”.’209 Resoluteness is for Heidegger ‘authentic Being-one’s-Self, 
[which] does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a 
free-floating “I”.’210 Dasein in resoluteness is still Being-in-the-world and Being-with-
others, but through the call of conscience (a call in Dasein itself, not an erroneous 
world-conscience emanating from without) it is disclosed to itself, and as such is able 
to authentically Be-its-Self. 
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Time. 
 
In the final chapters of Being and Time, Heidegger finally turns to discuss time in 
detail. Temporality is not something merely bolted on to the end of Heidegger’s 
discussion, but is related to his ongoing discussion of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-
a-whole. Heidegger criticises the inauthentic temporality from which ‘the conceptions 
of ‘future’, ‘past’ and ‘Present’ have first arisen’.211 Yet he argues that this ‘inauthentic 
temporality has its source in temporality which is primordial and authentic’.212 This 
primordial, authentic temporality is what makes the resoluteness (‘the mode of 
authentic care’213) discussed above possible. Heidegger reminds us that ‘Dasein’s 
totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)… The primordial unity of the 
structure of care lies in temporality.’214 Dasein’s Being-ahead-of-itself – Dasein’s 
Being-its-possibility – ‘is grounded in the future.’215 Its already-being-in must mean 
that ‘the character of “having been” is made known.’216 That Dasein is Being-alongside 
entities within-the-world only ‘becomes possible in making present.’217 Heidegger 
argues that this does not mean that care should ‘be conceived as an entity which occurs 
and runs its course ‘in time’ [as then]… Dasein would become something [merely] 
present-at-hand.’218 Heidegger aims to discuss ‘everydayness and historicality 
temporally [so as to]… get a steady enough view of primordial time to expose it as the 
condition which makes the everyday experience of time both possible and 
necessary.’219 We shall move to these discussions next. 
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 Heidegger begins his discussion of the temporality of everydayness by turning 
to the temporality of Dasein’s disclosedness, through looking at the temporality of its 
component parts of understanding, state-of-mind, falling and discourse. He summarises 
his position on these, arguing that: 
 
Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or 
awaiting). States-of-mind temporalise themselves primarily in having been 
(whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its temporal roots 
primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of vision). 
All the same, understanding is in every case a Present which ‘is in the process of 
having been’. All the same, one’s state-of-mind temporalises itself as a future 
which is ‘making present’. And all the same, the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future 
that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future.
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What is growing is a verbal picture of a unity of time, much more complex than the 
everyday notion of the line of time in which an entity present-at-hand is either in the 
present, has been in the past or will be in the future. Heidegger uses the term “ecstasis” 
to refer to ‘the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the 
present’.221 He argues that through looking at the temporality of Dasein’s disclosedness 
‘we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalises itself as a whole; and this 
means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalised itself 
currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and 
falling – that is, the unity of the care-structure.’222 The unity of Dasein’s Being as care 
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is only possible because of ecstatical unity (the interrelated unity of past, present and 
future), and thus Dasein’s Being-a-whole is only possible because of time. 
 Historicality is a term Heidegger uses to describe Dasein’s relationship with 
history. He describes the connectedness of the whole of Dasein’s life as being a 
movement, or stretching-along. This ‘specific movement in which Dasein is stretched 
along and stretches itself along, we call its “historicising”.’223 Heidegger argues that 
the common understanding of history is flawed. The term history is often used to 
describe things that are ‘“no longer present-at-hand”, or even “still present-at-hand… 
but without having any ‘effect’ on the ‘Present’”.’224 The term history is also used to 
signify ‘a ‘context’ of events and ‘effects’, which draws on through ‘the past’, the 
‘Present’, and the ‘future’’.225 With this usage ‘the past has no special priority’226 over 
the development of the thing which is said to have a history. A further common use of 
the term history is to signify ‘the totality of those entities which change ‘in time’, and 
indeed the transformations and vicissitudes of men, of human groupings and their 
‘cultures’, as distinguished from Nature, which likewise operates ‘in time’.’227 A final 
usage is to describe ‘whatever has been handed down to us’,228 whether it is something 
we acknowledge to be so or something which has passed into the realm of common 
sense. Heidegger addresses these common uses of the word history through a 
discussion of historical artefacts of the sort typically found in museums. This 
equipment is something ‘not yet past’229 as it is still present-at-hand, yet we still deem it 
to be something historical. Heidegger questions precisely what it is about such 
equipment that makes us decide that it is now “historical”. He rejects that it is because 
these items have changed over time and have now become weakened. He suggests that 
what makes us call these things historical is that the ‘world in which they belonged to a 
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context of equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a concernful 
Dasein who was-in-the-world’230 is no longer. That we say the world in which these 
items were ready-to-hand is no longer is because ‘a world is only in the manner of 
existing Dasein, which factically is as Being-the-world.’231 Heidegger argues that this 
shows that it is ‘Dasein that is what is primarily historical’,232 and that other entities are 
conceived of as being historical only in relation to this. 
 Heidegger introduces the concept of “fate” for Dasein’s authentic historicality. 
He defines fate as being ‘that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness 
for adversities – the power of projecting oneself upon one’s own Being-guilty, and of 
doing so reticently, with readiness for anxiety.’233 Heidegger argues that ‘only if death, 
guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the Being 
of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist in the mode of fate… only then can 
it be historical in the very depths of its existence.’234 Dasein that exists in an inauthentic 
mode of Being is still historical, yet, Heidegger suggests, it may be ‘Dasein’s 
inauthentic historicality that has… blocked off our access to authentic historicality and 
its own peculiar ‘connectedness’’.235 Dasein existing authentically in the mode of fate 
is able to engage in repetition of possibilities of existence. This does not mean that 
Dasein brings ‘again something that is ‘past’, nor does it bind the ‘Present’ back to that 
which has already been ‘outstripped’.’236 Heidegger explains that instead, ‘repeating is 
handing down explicitly – that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein 
that has-been-there.’237 It is being aware of previous possibilities encountered by 
Dasein, and applying these to itself. It is here that Heidegger suggests that ‘Dasein may 
choose its hero’,238 a great Dasein that has-been-there, whose possibilities Dasein can 
be handed down through authentic historicality – though of course this does not mean 
249 
 
to actualise the same outcome. Heidegger contrasts this with inauthentic historicality 
which ‘in awaiting the next new thing… has already forgotten the old one.’239 Lost in 
the they-self, ‘Dasein makes present its ‘today’… The “they” evades all choice. Blind 
to possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been’.240 Unlike inauthentic historicality 
which ‘understands the ‘past’ in terms of the ‘Present’… the temporality of authentic 
historicality… deprives the “today” of its character as present… it understands history 
as the ‘recurrence’ of what is possible’.241 
 For the final chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger discusses the way in which 
the ordinary conception of time is grounded in Dasein’s temporality. He describes how 
Dasein’s ‘concern, as concernfully reckoning up, planning, preventing, or taking 
precautions, always says (whether audibly or not) that something is to happen ‘then’, 
that something else is to be attended to ‘beforehand’, that something that has failed or 
eluded us ‘on that former occasion’ is something that we must ‘now’ make up for.’242 
Heidegger explains that ‘the ‘now’, the ‘then’, and ‘on the former occasion’ [which are 
implied by this]… have a seemingly obvious relational structure which we call 
‘datability’.243 This dating may refer to an actual date (the eleventh of June 1983, for 
example), or may be much less specific whilst still being ‘dated more or less 
definitely.’244 Heidegger asserts that whilst inquiries into the ground of this datability 
might (like the question of Being) seem unnecessary because it is something everybody 
already knows, datability ‘has ‘time’ itself in mind, and how this is possible, and what 
‘time’ signifies… are matters of which we have no conception in our natural 
understanding of the ‘now’ and so forth.’245 He argues that in using such significations 
as “now that…”, Dasein is ‘the making-present which awaits and retains, interprets 
itself.’246 Making-present authentically is the bringing of something into vision to be 
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understood. When Dasein interprets something authentically, ‘it expresses itself too 
[because by doing so]… it expresses its Being alongside the ready-to-hand’247 which it 
is interpreting. Heidegger explains that ‘the fact that the structure of datability [is 
thus]… becomes the most elemental proof that what has thus been interpreted has 
originated in the temporality which interprets itself.’248 
 Heidegger criticises Hegel’s understanding of time, referring to his assertion in 
The Philosophy of History that ‘history in general is… the development of Spirit in 
time’.249 Heidegger explains that Hegel does not aver ‘that the within-time-ness of 
spirit is a Fact, but [instead he] seeks to understand how it is possible for spirit to fall 
into time’.250 Heidegger discusses this by turning first to the essence of time in Hegel, 
followed by the essence of spirit. Heidegger finds the former to be expounded in the 
second part of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Philosophy of 
Nature), in which time is discussed alongside space.
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 Heidegger explains that for 
Hegel ‘space ‘is’ time; that is, time is the ‘truth’ of space… [The] Being of space 
unveils itself as time.’252 Space is taken by Hegel to be ‘the abstract multiplicity of the 
points which are differentiable in it. Space is not interrupted by these; but neither does 
it arise from them by way of joining together.’253 Hegel’s understanding of time 
follows in a similar fashion, in line with the common understanding, as a series of 
connected “nows”. As such, ‘only the Present is; the “before” and “after” are not’,254 
though this does not imply they are entirely unrelated. The relationship between time 
and spirit in Hegel is shown in the previous quotation regarding the way in which the 
spirit develops over time. Heidegger argues that ‘just as Hegel casts little light on the 
source of the time which has thus been levelled off [in his theory], he leaves totally 
unexamined the question of whether the way in which the spirit is essentially 
251 
 
constituted [by him] as the negating of a negation, is possible in any other manner than 
on the basis of temporality.’255 Against the Hegelian position Heidegger states that his 
‘existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary, starts with the ‘concretion’ of factically 
thrown existence itself in order to unveil temporality as that which primordially makes 
such existence possible. ‘Spirit’ does not first fall into time, but it exists as primordial 
temporalising of temporality.’256 Without the acceptance that temporality and the 
existence of Dasein are equiprimordial, philosophies such as those of Hegel will always 
inherently misconstrue the nature of Dasein’s Being.  
 To end Being and Time, Heidegger looks back on what has been achieved thus 
far, and sets his sights on what might have been achieved if his vision of the completed 
work had come to fruition. He rejects any methodology which would ‘carry on 
researches into the source and possibility of the ‘idea’ of Being in general simply by 
means of the ‘abstractions’ of formal logic’.257 Such an approach would lack the secure 
ground provided by the phenomenological approach. Heidegger suggests that 
‘something like ‘Being’ has been disclosed in the understanding-of-Being which 
belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it understands.’258 Yet, the task of asking 
the question of Being is not near completion. What has been worked out in Being and 
Time is a preliminary, non-conceptual disclosure of Being. Whether philosophy can go 
further than Heidegger has done in Being and Time is for later philosophising to show. 
Indeed it will be argued later that Heidegger himself was able to advance upon his early 
success, whilst using the discoveries of Being and Time as a foundation, in his later 
writings. What seems certain is that by returning to questioning the primordial 
understanding of Dasein’s Being, Heidegger shifted the ground of philosophy to an 
extent arguably not done so since Hegel. 
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The rectorship and National Socialism. 
 
Nothing has done more to dampen the flame lit by Heidegger in Being and Time than 
the philosopher’s involvement with National Socialism. Too often, discussion of 
Heidegger’s politics is used as an effortless way of discrediting his philosophical 
achievements. It seems as though, as long as one can discredit the man, there is no need 
to go to the effort to discredit the philosophy. However, particularly in a study in which 
the relationship between ontology and politics is central, it would be an act of unsubtle 
self-censorship if no mention were to be made of Heidegger’s political actions during 
the early days of National Socialist rule. Heidegger’s official engagement with National 
Socialism began at the time he was elected as rector of Freiburg University. The 
previous rector, the Social Democrat von Möllendorff, had been forced to resign after 
only a few days in the job in the face of overwhelming political pressure.
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 Heidegger 
was elected nearly unanimously as von Möllendorff’s successor. Hugo Ott reports that 
by the time of Heidegger’s ascension to the top of the university, Jewish members of 
the governing body had already been removed. Of those still legally eligible to vote, a 
number were absent at the time of Heidegger’s election.260 These cracks in the 
seemingly unanimous support for Heidegger’s rectorship would conspire to ensure that 
although Heidegger lasted considerably longer in the post than von Möllendorff, his 
time as rector would still be brief. Shortly after becoming rector, Heidegger joined the 
NSDAP at a time and in a way designed to achieve maximum publicity value, as 
discussed with party authorities.
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 As rector, Heidegger enacted the Führerprinzip (leader principle) at the 
university before such university reforms were officially introduced by the Party. 
Safranski describes the way in which as rector, Heidegger ‘for months on end failed to 
call the academic senate and thereby brought about its emasculation. His 
memorandums and circulars to the faculty bodies and departments were drafted in the 
shrill tone of command. Heidegger, a man without front-line experience in the World 
War, was fascinated by the notion of introducing a military spirit to the teaching 
staff.’262 He introduced an honour code based on that of the officer corps in order to 
cleanse the university of those with ‘inadequate professional and character 
qualifications’.263 The main tenets of his proposed university reform were set out in his 
rectorship address entitled The Self-Assertion of the German University which was 
delivered upon his inauguration as rector on 27
th
 May 1933. The reforms suggested in 
the address are much more subtle than the crudeness normally implied by National 
Socialism, and as such deserve closer attention here. 
 In The Self-Assertion of the German University Heidegger describes the 
assumption of the rectorship as committing himself ‘to leading [the]… university 
spiritually.’264 He explains that we should ‘regard the German university as the 
advanced school which from science [in the broader German sense] and through 
science educates and disciplines the leaders and guardians of the fate of the German 
people.’265 Heidegger proclaims that ‘the will to the essence of the German university 
is the will to science as the will to the historical, spiritual mission of the German people 
as a people that knows itself in its state.’266 Here Heidegger seems to be equating the 
state with the essence of the German people – a particularly National Socialist idea. In 
Being and Time Heidegger called for a return to ancient Greek thought. In his rector’s 
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address he makes a similar call, proclaiming that science can exist ‘for us and through 
us… only when we submit to the power of the beginning of our spiritual-historical 
experience’267 He connects all forms of science to the origins of Greek philosophy, 
arguing that it is from here that the strength of the essence of science emanates. 
Heidegger concedes that the transitions of science through the Christian-theological 
and the modern mathematical-technical interpretations of the world may ‘have removed 
science from its beginnings both temporally and with regard to its objects.’268 Yet in 
spite of this, he asserts that ‘the beginning still exists. It does not lie behind us as 
something long past, but rather stands before us. As the greatest moment, the beginning 
has in advance already passed over all that is to come and thus over us as well.’269 This 
point relates back to the instruction in Being and Time that authentic Dasein should aim 
to repeat the possibilities of past heroes. The great heights of Greek thought stand as 
the great possibilities for our future, if only we are open to repetition. What Heidegger 
is aiming at is nothing less than that ‘science must become the fundamental event of 
our spiritual existence as a people.’270 To achieve such an aim, Heidegger employs his 
now infamous conception of “knowledge service”. 
 Whether Heidegger’s attempt to place the activities of the universities on a par 
with the activities of industry and the military is a cheapening or exaltation of the 
possibilities of academia is perhaps down to one’s own vision of the university’s place 
in wider society. Heidegger reminds his audience of the importance of labour service 
and military service within the National Socialist state. The former ‘obligates one to 
share cooperatively in the toil, the striving, and the abilities of all classes and members 
of the nation.’271 The latter ‘demands the preparedness, secured in knowledge and 
ability and firmed up through discipline, to follow one’s duty to the end.’272 University 
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students are to have no special dispensation from these duties, and should expect to 
contribute to the health of the nation just as much as those not fortunate enough to 
receive a university education. Heidegger introduces knowledge service, describing it 
as ‘the bond… that binds students to the spiritual mission of the German people.’273 He 
explains that ‘this people [the German people] shapes its fate by placing its history into 
the openness of the overpowering might of all the world-shaping forces of human 
existence, and by capturing its spiritual world anew. Thus exposed to the extreme 
questionableness of its own existence, this people has the will to be a spiritual people. 
It demands of itself and for itself, and of its leaders and guardians, the harshest clarity 
that comes from the highest, broadest and richest knowledge.’274 Nurturing and 
conveying this highest, broadest and richest knowledge will be the duty of the 
university community. Heidegger describes ‘the three bonds [as being]… 
equiprimordial aspects of the German essence.’275 He confirms that in his view the 
university should hold no privileged position in the reinvigorated National Socialist 
society. Labour, military and knowledge service ‘are equally necessary and of equal 
rank.’276 
 Heidegger emphasises the struggle to come in the reinvigoration of the German 
universities. It is difficult not to consider Heidegger’s numerous uses of the term 
struggle (kampf) throughout the address as being a nod towards Nazi terminology. 
Although Heidegger later claimed never to have read through the whole of Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf
277
, even the most politically unaware German must at this point have been 
aware of the importance of struggle to National Socialist rhetoric. In the address, whilst 
discussing the university’s teachers’ and students’ wills towards the essence of science, 
Heidegger argues that ‘both wills must prepare themselves for mutual struggle. All 
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capacities of will and thought, all strengths of the heart, and all capabilities of the body 
must be developed through struggle, must be intensified in struggle, and must remain 
preserved as struggle.’278 Yet in amongst this politically appropriate call to struggle, 
Heidegger makes a call towards a level of freedom antithetical to traditional National 
Socialist doctrine as it was to develop. He asserts that ‘all leadership must allow its 
following to have its own strength. All following carries resistance within it. This 
essential opposition between leading and following must neither be covered over nor, 
indeed, be obliterated altogether. Struggle alone will keep this opposition open and 
implant within the entire body of teachers and students that fundamental mood out of 
which self-limiting self-assertion will empower resolute self-reflection to true self-
governance.’279 Although Heidegger is explicitly referring to the relationship between 
university teacher and university student, it does not take any sort of leap to extend his 
argument to cover the relationship between party leadership and party followers. 
Heidegger later claimed that his disillusionment in the NSDAP had come about after 
the Röhm putsch.
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 Heidegger’s distaste towards the party leadership’s ruthless 
obliteration of the internal dissention of the SA is completely in line with his belief in 
the necessity of opposition between followers and the followed. 
 Heidegger’s time as rector of Freiburg University was to last for less than a 
year. During this time the führer-rector seems to have thrown himself into his role with 
gusto. In the summer and autumn of 1933, Heidegger presided over a series of 
academic camps – quite how many is uncertain. One of the camps in Todtnauberg was 
described by Heidegger in a posthumously released piece. In his description, Heidegger 
aims to show that factional clashes at the camp were caused by his desire to swim 
against the official party structure.
281
 Despite Heidegger’s retrospective attempts to 
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paint himself as a rebel against the National Socialist establishment, documents 
unearthed by various biographers have demonstrated that he was more than willing to 
use the party structure in an attempt to destroy other academics’ careers if he felt they 
were politically unsuitable. Safranski describes the way in which Heidegger denounced 
Eduard Baumgarten whom he felt was only superficially loyal to National Socialism 
for careerist reasons. In a letter Heidegger argues that: 
 
By family and spiritual attitudes, Dr. Baumgarten comes from that liberal-
democratic circle of intellectuals gathered around Max Weber [who was 
Baumgarten’s uncle]. During his time here [in Freiburg] he was everything but a 
National Socialist… After disappointing me, he became closely tied to the Jew 
Fränkel who had been active at Göttingen and was later expelled…. I deem it 
impossible to bring Baumgarten into the SA as well as to bring him into the 
teaching body. Baumgarten is a gifted speaker. In his philosophy, however, I think 
he is pompous and without solid and true knowledge.
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Safranski explains that even the recipient of this denunciation regarded Heidegger’s 
intervention to be ‘“charged with hate” and… “useless”’.283 Heidegger made similar 
moves against the later Nobel Prize winning chemist Hermann Staudinger for his 
pacifism during the First World War. This attempt was just as successful at that against 
Baumgarten.
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 In 1935, just over a year after resigning the rectorship, Heidegger was 
to place it alongside his struggle with Catholicism as ‘the two great thorns in my 
flesh’.285 Heidegger’s shame even then at his failure to enact his grand vision to 
reinvigorate the university perhaps, at least in part, explains Heidegger’s withdrawal 
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from frontline politics (he himself would of course point towards his growing 
disillusionment in the Party, as opposed to disillusionment in his own abilities). Despite 
this withdrawal, Heidegger was to remain a card carrying member of the NSDAP until 
the end of the war. This is not to suggest Heidegger remained totally in favour with 
party authorities – he later claimed to have been put under constant surveillance.286 
 We have already seen that in his letter denouncing Baumgarten that Heidegger 
was willing to play the “Jewish card” in order to blacken the name of others. Yet this 
does not in any way definitively prove whether Heidegger was himself anti-Semitic, or 
just willing to play to others’ anti-Semitism in order to get his own way. There have 
been reams of studies dedicated to this question – this is not the place to add much 
more to this. It does seem that if Heidegger was at all anti-Semitic, it was more likely 
to be for cultural chauvinistic reasons, than crude racial biologism. His close 
relationships with Jewish students and colleagues such as Hannah Arendt suggest that 
Heidegger did not harbour an irrational hatred and distrust of all Jews. The breakdown 
in the relationship between Heidegger and his philosophical mentor Edmund Husserl is 
often cited as an example of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, yet this seems to be clouded in 
much rumour and supposition. One particularly scurrilous rumour which has been 
repeated as fact is that as rector, Heidegger banned Husserl from using the university’s 
library. Hugo Ott confirms that, despite repetition in scholarly publications, ‘Heidegger 
did not issue a ban of any kind on the use of the university library or the departmental 
library. This oft-repeated charge is without foundation’.287 On the philosophical level, it 
is clear that Heidegger believed that even as early as Being and Time that he was 
writing against Husserl’s brand of phenomenology – he confirmed this in a letter to 
Karl Jaspers.
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 Yet it is difficult to argue against the position that Heidegger’s 
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philosophical position owed more to Husserl than he was willing to acknowledge as he 
was trying to escape from his mentor’s shadow.289 On a human level it is difficult to 
offer any sort of justification for Heidegger’s behaviour. Relations between the two 
philosophers were broken off shortly after Heidegger had been appointed to Husserl’s 
philosophical seat at Freiburg (on Husserl’s retirement) in 1928. Husserl had actively 
supported Heidegger’s appointment – the cooling of relations within the next few 
months that followed seems to have deeply troubled Husserl.
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 By the time of 
Husserl’s death in 1938, Heidegger did not attend the funeral. Ott reports that only ‘a 
pathetically small number of Faculty members [did so, demonstrating]… how very few 
dared to show their last respects to a man who had been outlawed by Hitler’s 
Germany.’291 In the interview he gave to Der Spiegel in 1966 to be published 
posthumously, Heidegger explains that ‘In May 1933 [the start of the rectorship], my 
wife wrote a letter to Mrs. Husserl in both our names, expressing our “unchanging 
gratitude”… it is a human failure of mine not to have expressed my gratitude once 
again at Husserl’s sickbed and death.’292 He also claims to have expressed this later 
regret in a letter to Husserl’s widow. Even during the darkest days of National 
Socialism, when Heidegger was forced to have the dedication to Husserl ‘in friendship 
and admiration’293 removed from the front of Being and Time, he ensured the 
dedication remained as a more subtle footnote.
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 Would Heidegger have gone to this 
effort to state his gratitude to a Jew – a Jew he hardly now spoke to – at a time where 
all positive references to Jewish writers were being purged if he had been an all-out 
anti-Semite? Heidegger actions can clearly be interpreted as being rather thoughtless 
towards his great benefactor Husserl, but it does seem that this is more due to one 
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philosopher trying to stake out an individual position away from another, rather than 
evidence of racial prejudice. 
  
Introduction to Metaphysics and the Heidegger controversy. 
 
The conflicted relationship of Heidegger and National Socialism is perhaps best 
demonstrated in two works based on lectures delivered during the National Socialist 
period, but only published later: Introduction to Metaphysics and the four-volume 
Nietzsche. In the preface to the seventh edition of Being and Time where Heidegger 
concedes that the work will never receive its concluding sections, Introduction to 
Metaphysics (which was being published at the same time as this edition) is cited as 
offering an elucidation of the question of Being.
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 The lectures delivered in 1935 that 
make up Introduction to Metaphysics were to reignite the controversy surrounding 
Heidegger and Nazism when they were published in 1953. The focus of this storm of 
controversy was a reference in the text to ‘the inner truth and greatness’296 of National 
Socialism. A young Jürgen Habermas – until then an ardent Heideggerian – wrote a 
review essay attacking the way in which he saw Heidegger bringing the question of 
Being together with the success of the National Socialist revolution. As this had not 
been expunged from the 1953 publication, he argues that ‘it may be supposed that they 
reproduce unchanged Heidegger’s view today.’297 The full quotation in the 1953 
publication is in the context of an attack by Heidegger on the Kantian tendency in 
philosophy to surmount Being with “the ought”. Instead of philosophy studying Being 
as it is, it instead focuses on how beings ought to be. Values are introduced as ‘the 
ground of the ought. But because values stand opposed to the Being of beings, in the 
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sense of facts, they themselves cannot be. So instead one says that they are valid.’298 
Heidegger describes the way in which ‘in order to prop up… the ought which has been 
raised to the level of values, one attributes a Being to values themselves… With the 
Being of values, the maximum in confusion and deracination has been reached.’299 He 
suggests that because of an overuse of the term “values”, this was then replaced with 
“totalities”. After suggesting that the number of works expounding such an approach 
has increased massively of late, Heidegger then makes the infamous remark: 
 
All this calls itself philosophy. In particular what is peddled about nowadays as the 
philosophy of National Socialism, but which has not the least to do with the inner 
truth and greatness of this movement (namely, the encounter between global 
technology and modern humanity), is fishing in these troubled waters of “values” 
and “totalities”.300 
 
The section in parentheses makes up what is perhaps the most contested phrase in the 
whole of Heidegger’s works. Heidegger insisted that the reference to global technology 
was present in his manuscript from the beginning, later explaining ‘the reason that I did 
not read this passage aloud was that I was convinced of my audience’s correct 
understanding. The idiots, spies, and snoopers [party observers at his lectures] 
understood it differently—but they wanted to.’301 Despite Heidegger’s protestations, 
this is now generally accepted to be untrue. Not only is it almost certain that the 
parenthetical addition was added much later than 1935, but the original lecture when 
delivered used the phrase “National Socialism” instead of the vaguer “this 
movement”.302 Richard Wolin explains that around the time of Habermas’ article, 
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Heidegger confirmed the view expressed by Christian Lewalter that the use of the word 
“greatness” should not be understood as containing a positive value judgement. That 
instead ‘the Nazi movement is a symptom for the tragic collision of man and 
technology, as such a symptom it has its ‘greatness’ because it affects the entirety of 
the West and threatens to pull it into destruction.’303 
 Whilst it may be almost certain that Heidegger added the remark about 
technology discussed above (that the original manuscript page is missing adds to the 
mystery), this is not the only reference to technology to be found in his Introduction to 
Metaphysics. Earlier in the work Heidegger paints the picture of Europe besieged. ‘This 
Europe, in its unholy blindness always on the point of cutting its own throat, lies today 
in the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on the other. Russia 
and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of 
unchained technology and of the rootless organisation of the average man.’304 Here 
Heidegger associates the groundlessness of modern man with the unquestioning faith in 
technological progress: 
 
When the farthest corner of the globe has been conquered technologically and can 
be exploited economically; when any incident you like, in any place you like, at any 
time you like, becomes accessible as fast as you like;… when time is nothing but 
speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity; and time as history has vanished from all 
Dasein of all peoples; when a boxer counts as the great man of the people; when the 
tallies of millions at mass meetings are a triumph; then, yes then, there still looms 
like a spectre overall this uproar the question: what for? – where to? – and what 
then?
305
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Whether intentionally or not, much of this could very easily be construed as a criticism 
of National Socialist Germany, as well as the rest of the West. Heidegger denies that 
his worldview should be thought of as a form of cultural pessimism, ‘for the darkening 
of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the reduction of human 
beings to a mass, the hatred and mistrust of everything creative and free has already 
reached such proportions throughout the whole earth that such childish categories as 
pessimism and optimism have long become laughable.’306 If Heidegger’s 1950s 
interpretation of Introduction to Metaphysics adds meanings to the lectures he had 
never intended at the time as his critics allege, then it is passages like this that suggest 
this interpretation is still a credible one. It is difficult to read Heidegger’s attack on the 
exultation of athleticism over intellectualism, and the cult of the mass meeting (surely 
an example of Dasein being lost in the they-self) without seeing some sort of criticism 
of the way National Socialism had veered from what Heidegger seems to have hoped it 
could be. 
  
The Question Concerning Technology. 
 
Heidegger’s concern about the unquestioning everyday view of technology is a theme 
which became more prominent in his later writings. The essay The Question 
Concerning Technology questions the essence of technology. What follows is not an 
immediate rejection of all but the most basic technology, such as is found in the 
writings of Theodore Kaczynski
307
 and the anarcho-primitivists,
308
 but something more 
nuanced. Heidegger questions the common assumption that the essence of technology 
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is something technological. Because of this misunderstanding, he suggests we ‘remain 
unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it.’309 
Heidegger suggests that the everyday answers to the question of what technology is 
asserts that it is ‘a means to an end [and]… a human activity… [These can] be called 
the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.’310 Heidegger does not 
deny that there is truth to these definitions, but argues that there is more to the essence 
of technology than just this. All technology, he suggests, ‘is a way of revealing.’311 
Modern technology is a way of revealing too, but this revealing ‘is a challenging, 
which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be 
extracted and stored as such.’312 He contrasts the way in which a windmill’s motion 
leaves the wind’s blowing as it is with the way in which mining a piece of land and a 
hydroelectric plant on the Rhine affect these natural phenomena.
313
 We should leave 
aside here the fact that the wind is affected (albeit only slightly) by the imposition of 
the windmill, and also the somewhat scientifically awkward notion of “unlocking 
energy” from natural sources. Heidegger’s main point seems to be against the 
assumption in modern technological discourse that everything is a potential resource to 
be used up. 
 Heidegger warns that ‘the essence of modern technology lies in enframing’.314 
Enframing (Ge-stell) is the term Heidegger uses to describe modern technology’s 
tendency towards encompassing all beings as resources towards technological ends. 
Enframing endangers ‘man in his relationship to himself and everything that is [and]… 
banishes man into the kind of revealing that is an ordering.’315 This prevents Dasein 
from the revealing necessary for authentic Being. Enframing is dangerous to Dasein, 
yet Heidegger suggests that all is not hopeless. He quotes Hölderlin’s assertion from 
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the hymn Patmos that ‘where danger threatens, that which saves from it also grows’.316 
In the mysterious essence of technology lies Dasein’s possible salvation from the 
danger of enframing. Enframing itself ‘lets man endure – as yet inexperienced, but 
perhaps more experienced in the future – that he may be the one who is needed and 
used for the safekeeping of the essence of truth.’317 Heidegger argues that ‘human 
activity [and]… achievement alone can never banish’318 the danger of enframing. This 
can only be achieved by human reflection. Heidegger suggests that ‘because the 
essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection on technology and 
decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to 
the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.’319 Art – 
painting, poetry, music, and so on – is to be the vehicle for this questioning. This is not 
to say Heidegger viewed the essence of art to be any less mysterious than that of 
technology (he discusses the essence of art in The Origin of the Work of Art
320
). 
  
Two controversial later remarks in philosophical context. 
 
Heidegger’s concerns about the modern technological ordering of people in 
Introduction to Metaphysics may be less elaborate than the discussion in The Question 
Concerning Technology, but these concerns are still present. Heidegger has often been 
reproved for his lack of comment about the holocaust after the war.
321
 In a lecture in 
1949, Heidegger remarked that: 
 
Agriculture is now a motorised food industry, in essence the same as the 
manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same 
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as the starvation and the blockade of the countryside, the same as the production of 
hydrogen bombs.
322
 
 
When this statement was made public it, perhaps unsurprisingly, was considered rather 
controversial.
323
 Yet if read with an understanding of Heidegger’s conception of 
enframing (the lectures which later were reworked into The Question Concerning 
Technology were first delivered in 1949), the remarks seem less flippant than they first 
appear. Heidegger seems to be suggesting that all of the phenomena listed are the 
effects of technology’s enframing – all involve a conception of beings as nothing more 
than resources to be ordered, used and/or destroyed. It is possible that Heidegger 
considered the condemnation of the Nazi death camps to be so inherent in his 
philosophy as to not need stating. In a reply to questioning by Herbert Marcuse over 
why after 1945 he did not apologise for his conduct in supporting the National 
Socialists (at least at first), Heidegger argues that ‘a confession after 1945 was 
impossible for me, because the Nazi partisans demonstrated their change of heart in a 
disgusting manner, and I have nothing in common with them.’324 Heidegger seems to 
be suggesting that words are too easy to have any meaning on such a grave matter. 
 Similar controversy to the agricultural analogy surrounds remarks made in 
another 1949 lecture which although lengthy, are worth quoting in full. Directly 
referring to the fate of those in the concentration camps, Heidegger questions: 
 
Hundreds of thousands die en masse. Do they die? They perish. They are put down. 
Do they die? They become supply pieces for stock in the fabrication of corpses. Do 
they die? They are liquidated unnoticed in death camps. And also, without such – 
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millions in China sunken in poverty perish from hunger. But to die means to carry 
out death in its essence. To be able to die means to be able to carry out this 
resolution. We can only do this if our essence likes the essence of death. But in the 
middle of innumerable deaths the essence of death remains unrecognisable. Death 
is neither empty nothingness, nor just the passage from one state to another. Death 
pertains to the Dasein of the man who appears out of the essence of Being. Thus it 
shelters the essence of Being. Death is the loftiest shelter of the truth of Being, the 
shelter which shelters within itself the hidden character of the essence of Being and 
draws together the saving of its essence. This is why man can die if and only if 
Being itself appropriates the essence of man in to the essence of Being on the basis 
of the truth of its essence. Death is the shelter of Being in the poem of the world. To 
be able toward death in its essence means to be able to die. Only those who can die 
are mortals in the apposite sense of the word.
325 
 
Critics have taken this somewhat dense and cryptic explanation as clear example of 
Heidegger’s sheer inhumanity towards the victims of the holocaust even after the war 
and the National Socialist reign had ended. Foremost amongst these critics recently has 
been Emmanuel Faye, in whose Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into 
Philosophy it is claimed that ‘this text surpasses anything the National Socialists could 
assert… According to Heidegger, no one died in a death camp, because none of those 
who were exterminated there bore within their essence the possibility of death.’326 He 
accuses Heidegger of not just  ‘revisionism but… total negationism… It is impossible 
to go further in the negation of the human being than Heidegger does.’327 According to 
Faye, Heidegger has denied the very humanness of the concentration camp victims. Yet 
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an alternate interpretation remains, even if it is refused by Faye himself,
328
 namely that 
the victims of the holocaust were denied an authentic death by the situation in which 
they were placed. They were not only denied the status of being a citizen, their very 
Being itself as Dasein was denied. 
A similar point to this interpretation of Heidegger is made in a much clearer and 
less cryptic way by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism. She explains: 
 
Murder is only a limited evil. The murderer who kills a man – a man who has to die 
anyway – still moves within the realm of life and death familiar to us… The 
murderer leaves a corpse behind and does not pretend that his victim has never 
existed; if he wipes out any traces, they are those of his own identity, and not the 
memory and grief of the persons who loved his victim; he destroys a life, but he 
does not destroy the fact of existence itself… The very horror of the concentration 
and extermination camps lies in the fact the inmates, even if they happen to keep 
alive, are more effectively cut off from the wold of the living than if they had 
died… Here murder is as impersonal as the squashing of a gnat… it is as if there 
were a possibility to give permanence to the process of dying itself and to enforce 
the condition in which both death and life are obstructed equally effectively.
329
 
 
It does seem that this was the meaning Heidegger intended to impart in the contested 
remarks. That, as Arendt argues, ‘there are no parallels to the life in the concentration 
camps. Its horror can never be full embraced by the imagination for the very reason that 
it stands outside of life and death.’330 The victims of the holocaust could not die, in 
Heidegger’s turn of phrase, because the extermination camps themselves had already 
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removed the very possibility of Being. We should not follow Faye’s conclusion that 
this is a judgement on those innumerable victims, but rather it is a judgment on the 
technological enframing which lies behind the justification of the camps, and the 
impersonal murder which followed. 
 
Politics in Nietzsche and Contributions to Philosophy. 
 
After the war, Heidegger always pointed to his lectures on Nietzsche delivered between 
1936 and 1940 as proof of his protest from the lectern.
 
When speaking to Der Spiegel 
he asserted that ‘anyone with ears to hear heard in these lectures a confrontation with 
National Socialism.’331 Farías disagrees that Heidegger’s opposition was as clear as he 
claimed, arguing that ‘the “distancing” of Heidegger from National Socialism ended in 
a “spiritual” restoration of the very fundamentals of the National Socialist 
worldview.’332 David Farrell Krell, in his introduction to the English translation of 
Nietzsche identifies four areas in which ‘Heidegger’s involvement in or resistance to 
National Socialism comes to the fore… Heidegger’s nationalism, his… decisionism, 
his protracted and difficult discussion of nihilism, and his ambivalent position vis-à-vis 
Nietzsche’s alleged biologism.’333 We shall address each of these in turn to try discover 
more about Heidegger’s relationship with National Socialism at this time. 
 Heidegger’s nationalism is more complex than crude generalisation might 
depict. Krell explains that it is ‘a nationalism of high cultural expectations and 
intellectual demands, shaped by Hölderlin’s and Nietzsche’s challenges to the German 
people.’334 Apart from the occasional timely disparaging reference to Germany’s war 
enemies (Heidegger criticises Britain’s 1940 bombing of the French fleet at Oran335), 
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Krell explains that for the most part Heidegger’s nationalist flourishes in Nietzsche are 
rather subtle. Equally subtle is the nationalism inherent in Heidegger’s criticising 
‘Nietzsche by suggesting that his primary motivation in metaphysical matters was 
Latin, Roman, or Italianate, rather than pristinely Greek [and]… more worryingly 
[in]… Heidegger’s suppression of Nietzsche’s acerbic anti-Germanism and his positive 
pan-Europeanism.’336 Elsewhere in Heidegger’s works, his German nationalism is quite 
explicit. In particular, throughout his philosophical career, Heidegger emphasised the 
importance of the German language. In his interview with Der Spiegel Heidegger 
agrees that the Germans have a special task in thought, a task for which they are 
qualified because of the German language. He explains that he ‘has in mind the special 
inner relationship of the German language with that of the Greeks and their thought.’337 
He compares this with the weakness of the French language, suggesting that from his 
experiences and discussions with French academics, ‘when they begin to think, they 
speak German, assuring that they could not get by with their own language.’338 John 
Macquarrie, one of the English translators of Being and Time explains that when he and 
Edward Robinson were working on the translation, they ‘were given the impression by 
the German publishers that Heidegger did not care much whether [Being and Time]… 
got translated into English or not… [Yet] as time went on, we gathered Heidegger was 
becoming more interested in the translation.’339 In a letter Macquarrie later received 
from Heidegger, he expresses his pleasure at the fact Being and Time has been so 
competently translated despite the language difficulties involved, acknowledging the 
need for such a translation.’340 This all suggests that despite the hallowed place the 
German language held for Heidegger, his opinion was nothing of the sort of “German 
or nothing”. He would undoubtedly have been aware of the hypocrisy of such a stance 
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from a philosopher who argued that Classical Greek was the language of thinking, yet 
wrote in German (surely a second best, even accepting the two languages’ close 
affinity). Heidegger is certainly a German Nationalist, but nothing in his work or 
behaviour suggests that this nationalism is in anyway dangerous or harbours any wishes 
to enslave or eradicate any other nationality (or nationalism). 
 Decisionism is a term perhaps most closely associated with Heidegger’s 
academic contemporary Carl Schmidt. The political philosopher was another of the 
major academic figures to join the NSDAP, but unlike Heidegger supported the Röhm-
putsch.
341
 In his Political Theology, Schmitt asserts that ‘sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception.’342 Schmitt argues that no matter how intricate a legal framework 
may be, there will always be exceptional cases for which there is no clear cut response 
dictated by the legal code. The sovereign is the one willing and able to make a decisive 
decision on such questions. Heidegger’s decisionism stretches beyond the purely 
legalistic. Krell highlights the intimate connection between decision and thinking in 
Heidegger’s thought.343 In Nietzsche, Heidegger asserts that ‘in a time of decline, a 
time when all is counterfeit and pointless activity, thinking in the grand style is genuine 
action, indeed, action in its most powerful – though most silent – form. Here the actual 
distinction between “mere theory” and useful “praxis” makes no sense.’344 This 
position seems far from the National Socialist preference for praxis over thought. 
 Heidegger’s discussion of nihilism makes up the whole of his fourth volume of 
lectures on Nietzsche. As such, like Krell, it would impossible to claim to do justice to 
the complexities of Heidegger’s position in such brief discussion. Krell explains that 
‘Heidegger is concerned to show that all the sundry diagnoses and proffered therapies 
of nihilism are bound to fail [and may even]… aggravate our situation by dangling 
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hopes of facile solutions before our eyes.’345 He describes Heidegger’s diagnosis that 
‘nihilism results from our persistent failure to think the nothing, to confront in our 
thought the power of the nihil in human existence, which is mortal existence, and in 
history, which is the history of the oblivion of Being and the abandonment by Being.’346 
In Being and Time, Heidegger characterised authentic Dasein’s Being-towards-death, 
that is Being-towards the annihilation of Dasein. It is perhaps such “dangerous” views 
that led to Ernst Krieck, the favoured Nazi pedagogue, to accuse Heidegger in 1934 of 
being a nihilist. Krieck, who was one of the lead academics in National Socialist 
Germany, argued that ‘the fundamental ideological tone of Heidegger’s teaching is 
determined by the concept of concern and anxiety, both of which aim at nothingness. 
The meaning of his philosophy is downright atheism and metaphysical nihilism of the 
kind that used to be represented in our country by Jewish literati – in other worlds, an 
enzyme of decomposition and dissolution for the German people.’347 Krieck either 
could not see, or chose not to see, that instead of fermenting nihilism, Heidegger’s 
philosophy was a challenge to the nihilism inherent throughout the history of Western 
metaphysics. Krieck’s interjection certainly suggests that Heidegger’s views regarding 
nihilism were entirely different from the “official” National Socialist view. 
 Krell reports that in his lectures, Heidegger on occasion treats the issue of 
biologism with sarcasm, but that this does not fully explain Heidegger’s relationship 
with this issue.
348
 Around 1934/1935, he mocked a writer who suggested ‘that poetry 
“is a biologically necessary function of the Volk” [suggesting that]… Digestion too is 
an essential biological function of a people – especially a healthy people.’349 Yet in his 
lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger’s position at times seems to be more ambiguous. 
Krell argues that when Heidegger caricatures Nietzsche’s ‘overman as a product of 
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technological mechanisation and machination, Heidegger avoids levelling the charge of 
biologism’.350 Yet with or without the charge of biologism, Heidegger’s concerns 
regarding enframing from his later works are surely here in early form in his discussion 
of the ‘total “mechanisation” of things and the breeding of human beings.’351 
 Krell cites Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), which 
was written around the same time as the Nietzsche lectures, but was only posthumously 
published in 1989, as a work in which ‘Heidegger’s nationalism and decisionism 
remain profoundly disconcerting.’352 As Krell accepts, the Heidegger found in this 
work which was not monitored by party officials (unlike his lectures at the time) takes 
a more robust position against the biologism central to National Socialist doctrine. One 
example of this is his use of biologism as an example of the ‘renewed variations of 
“metaphysics” which become increasingly more crude, more without ground and 
aim’.353 Elsewhere in the work, Heidegger disparagingly questions the pseudo-
scientific biological and ethnological approaches to race.
354
 Yet despite this, 
Contributions to Philosophy certainly does not mark any sort of “road to Damascus” 
conversion to the political left. Heidegger’s references to liberalism throughout are 
disparaging.
355
 Unsurprisingly given Heidegger’s ardent anti-communism, Bolshevism 
is similarly vilified throughout. For instance, at one point he refers to Bolshevism as 
being a barely disguised form of ‘crude nihilism’.356 In a section appearing in 
parentheses, Heidegger addresses the oft-cited connection between Bolshevism and 
Judaism. 
 
Bolshevism is originally Western, a European possibility: the emergence of the 
masses, ethnicity, the dying off of Christianity; but insofar as the dominance of 
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reason, the equalisation of people is merely the consequence of Christianity and 
Christianity is fundamentally of Jewish origins… Bolshevism is actually Jewish; 
but then Christianity is fundamentally Bolshevist! And what decisions become 
necessary from this point on?
357
 
 
The Bolshevik revolution seemed to point to many rabid anti-Semites as proof that the 
plan to gain ‘sovereignty over all the world’358 in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
was being enacted. In Mein Kampf Hitler had warned of the dangers of Bolshevism to 
Germany, arguing that ‘in Russian Bolshevism we must see the attempt undertaken by 
the Jews in the twentieth century to achieve world domination.’359 Whilst seeming to 
agree about the threat to humanity posed by Bolshevism, Heidegger seems to be 
questioning the simplistic parallels between Bolshevism and Judaism. If the poison of 
Bolshevism comes from its Jewish roots, then surely Christianity must similarly be 
poisoned. Yet despite the difficult relations between the NSDAP and the Christian 
Churches, and the attempts to purge Christian influence from Germany, there had been 
no step to purge Germany and German life of Christians themselves. This must surely 
be the “necessary decisions” to which Heidegger is referring to. Even Heidegger at his 
most unchristian (his religiousness seems to have ebbed and flowed at various points 
throughout his life) would surely never have supported the deportation of Christians 
from Germany. For Heidegger Judaism, like Christianity, like liberalism, like most of 
the history of Western philosophy, has been a pernicious influence on our 
understanding of our own Being, leading to it being more and more concealed. The task 
for each Dasein to overcome this is to regain our primordial understanding of our own 
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Being, not ethnic cleansing. This seems implicit in Heidegger’s works, and it is a deep 
pity that he never said so explicitly. 
  
Conclusion. 
 
It is common when discussing Heideggerian politics to bring up the tale of Thales of 
Miletus who was so busy looking at the stars, he fell into a well.
360
 In his poetic work 
The Thinker as Poet from 1947, Heidegger includes the line ‘he who thinks greatly 
must err greatly.’361 He expresses similar thoughts in a letter, stating that ‘greater men 
have made such mistakes – Hegel saw Napoleon as the World Spirit, and Hölderlin saw 
him as the prince of the feast to which the gods and Christ had been invited.’362 So why 
should such attention be paid to Heidegger’s politics? Is it not possible for 
Heideggerian ontology to be great thought, and Heideggerian politics to be great error? 
Heidegger himself makes the best argument for why this cannot be the case. In his 
essay The Age of the World Picture he argues that, 
 
Metaphysics grounds an age in that, through a particular interpretation of beings 
and through a particular comprehension of truth, it provides that age with the 
ground of its essential shape. This ground governs throughout all phenomena 
distinctive of the age. Conversely, in order for there to be an adequate reflection on 
these phenomena, their metaphysical ground must allow itself to be recognised in 
them.
363
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To try to separate Heidegger’s philosophy from the rest of the world is to make a 
mockery of it. The whole point of the phenomenological method was to reconnect 
philosophy and the “things” that are being philosophised about. It is thus such a deep 
shame that Heidegger attached himself (for whatever length of time) to a political 
movement completely at odds with his conception of Dasein’s Being. In the conclusion 
which follows, it will be argued that Heidegger’s insights into the nature of our Being 
lead to a much more radical conclusion than he might have been willing to admit. The 
above quotation refers to the grounding power of metaphysics – the later Heidegger 
was to move far away from such a designation. Before turning to this, it will be useful 
to briefly reiterate Heidegger’s achievements to this date. 
 Through the analyses of Being and Time Heidegger achieved what the 
philosophies of the other thinkers discussed in this study had attempted – to reintroduce 
the individual person and his experiences of Being into philosophy. Much of this 
success comes from Heidegger’s return to the inception of philosophy – to the question 
of Being – in order to rebuild from sturdier foundations, as opposed to the absolute 
rejection of Stirner, Kierkegaard’s role as the aloof outsider and Pringle-Pattison’s 
position as reformer. By building up the description of Dasein’s Being from the start, 
Heidegger was able to avoid the misconceptions and irrelevancies which have accrued 
throughout the history of the philosophical tradition. In many ways it can be argued 
that through Heidegger, in particular through Being and Time, subjectivism reached its 
limits. Heidegger’s early approach enables us to better understand the nature of 
Dasein’s Being, but we are still some distance away from grasping Being itself in 
general. For this, subjectivism needs to be transcended, not back into objectivism, but 
into a new realm altogether. The start along this path is achieved, as we shall see, in 
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Heidegger’s later thought. Heidegger’s early (pre-Nazi) political thought already places 
the anti-levelling conservatism of Kierkegaard on a surer footing, his later thought 
would point towards a politics much more radical than anything he seems to have 
suggested before – a politics much more suitable to the nature of Being because of this 
radicalism. 
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The Later Heidegger: Beyond Subjectivism 
 
In the discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy in the previous chapter, the main focus 
was on the revolution inaugurated by Being and Time. It is difficult to overstate the 
philosophical importance of this work: it is arguable that in the century following its 
publication, we have been operating in the post-Heideggerian age, with Heidegger´s 
philosophy having influenced myriad later trends such as Sartrean existentialism, 
Derridian deconstructionism, as well as figures working outside of continental 
philosophy such as Richard Rorty. Yet Heidegger himself was to later move away from 
the approach he took in Being and Time, particularly after his involvement with 
National Socialism. The question of Being (or the question of the question of Being) 
remains the focus of Heidegger’s attention from beginning to end, yet the approach to 
this problem taken in the later works is both stronger and more radical than that found 
in Being and Time. Before turning to the radicalism of the later works, it will first be of 
use to return to the early Heidegger discussed previously. Before, much was made of 
the many strengths of the approach to the question of Being in Being and Time. Here 
this acknowledgement should not be presumed to have diminished, but it will be 
important to discuss the work’s flaws in order to show precisely why a more radical 
approach was needed, before turning to the later works in which this more radical 
approach is provided. In particular, Heidegger’s later works will be read through the 
prism of the deconstructionist approach found in the works of Reiner Schürmann which 
conclude that after Heidegger, philosophy can no longer be thought of as providing the 
ground for practical action. 
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 Heidegger’s approach in Being and Time is undoubtedly anthropocentric. At the 
time he was of the opinion that in order to approach the question of Being in general, it 
would be necessary to approach the Being of human individuals in particular (Dasein). 
Gaining an understanding of Dasein’s Being was hoped to provide the entrance to the 
realm in which the question of Being in general would become clearer. There is 
certainly a logical line of reasoning to such an approach as Dasein is the only being for 
which its own Being is a question. Dasein’s unique level of self-awareness and ability 
for self-interpretation surely places it in a privileged position above other beings in 
being able to ask the question of Being. Yet Heidegger was to later recognise the 
pitfalls of such an approach, as is particularly made clear in his Letter on Humanism 
from 1946/47. Written as a response to questioning by Jean Beaufret in the wake of 
Sartre’s Existentialism and Humanism, the short work warns against the hasty adoption 
of philosophical humanism. He asks his correspondent whether ‘the damage caused by 
all such terms [is] still not sufficiently obvious… “-isms” have for a long time now 
been suspect.’1 Heidegger depicts the public clamour for a new “-ism”, suggesting that 
such terms (logic, ethics and physics included) ‘begin to flourish… when original 
thinking comes to an end.’2 Here Heidegger embarks upon a theme common in his later 
writings: the opposition of thinking and philosophy. Using terms which foreshadow his 
later The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger describes how ‘thinking comes 
to an end by slipping out of its element [replacing]… this loss by procuring a validity 
for itself as technē, as an instrument of education and therefore as a classroom matter 
and later a cultural concern. By and by philosophy becomes a technique for explaining 
from highest causes. One no longer thinks; one occupies oneself with “philosophy”. In 
competition with one another, such occupations publicly offer themselves as “-isms” 
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and try to offer more than the others.’3 Heidegger equates this tendency with the 
modern ‘dictatorship of the public realm’4 – the “they” of Being and Time. Turning his 
aim towards Sartre, Heidegger asserts that he could never approve of a humanism 
which is an existentialism resting upon the premise that ‘we are precisely in a situation 
where there are only human beings’.5 Instead the alternative premise that ‘we are 
precisely in a situation where principally there is Being’6 is posited. It is perhaps this 
sort of misinterpretation of the position in Being and Time found in Sartre which spurs 
the later Heidegger to move further away from anthropocentrism. Equally relevant to 
this is Heidegger’s position during his involvement with National Socialism. 
 
Break with the will in the Nietzsche lectures. 
 
During Heidegger’s brief but career-staining official association with Nazism, he was 
to adhere to a controversial but persuasive reading of Nietzschean philosophy. In 
Nietzsche, Heidegger found above all else a veneration of the will. That such an 
opinion was formed was certainly aided by the general acceptance at the time that the 
posthumous The Will to Power was ‘Nietzsche’s crowning systematic achievement’7 
instead of the selectively edited pastiche of Nietzsche’s thought it actually was. That 
Heidegger subscribed to this prevailing view is clear from the central role The Will to 
Power plays in his Nietzsche lectures from the mid-to-late-1930s which were published 
in 1961 alongside additions from the early-to-mid-1940s: in one he directly refers to it 
as Nietzsche’s ‘major work’.8 As was noted before, Heidegger held up this set of 
lectures as his covert protest from the lectern against the National Socialist state. This 
protest largely takes the form of a turn against the will, with The Will to Power being 
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taken as the culmination of Western metaphysics. If Heidegger’s protestations are to be 
believed, through criticising the supremacy of the will in Nietzschean thought he is 
attacking the National Socialist state through its foundation in latter-stage metaphysics. 
Yet before this point, whilst Heidegger remained in a status of reciprocal favour with 
the party authorities, he had no qualms in using the terminology of Being and Time 
whilst exalting the importance of a strong will to authentic Being. One such example of 
this is when early in Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger defines questioning as 
‘willing-to-know’.9 He contrasts willing-to-know with wishing-to-know, which appears 
to be questioning but ‘does not get beyond saying the question’.10 Using heavily 
romanticised language Heidegger implores that ‘whoever wills, whoever lays his whole 
Dasein into a will, is resolute. Resoluteness delays nothing, does not shirk, but acts 
from the moment and without fail. Open resoluteness is no mere resolution to act; it is 
the decisive inception of action that reaches ahead of and through all action.’11 In an 
addition from around the time of publication in 1953, Heidegger attempts to explain 
this passage in a way which dilutes its original force. He claims that ‘the essence of 
open resoluteness lies in the de-concealment of human Dasein for the clearing and by 
no means in an accumulation of energy for “activity”… the relation to Being is 
letting.’12 This refocus upon “letting” is certainly in keeping with the later Heidegger, 
yet it is difficult to view this as anything other than blatant and not particularly 
successful revisionism on Heidegger’s part. This reinterpretation of his conception of 
the will from this period would make nonsense of the multiple references to the will in 
his rector’s speech, such as the importance of the will of the German people in averting 
the collapse of the spiritual strength of the West.
13
 It is inconceivable that references to 
‘our will that our people fulfil its historical mission’14 could mean anything like letting. 
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 Heidegger’s break with the adulation of the will in his Nietzsche lectures 
coincides with the coming to the fore of the critique of technology which continues 
throughout his later work. Heidegger is accused by Kaufmann and others of having 
wilfully misinterpreted Nietzsche in these lectures for his own ends.
15
 Whilst it is 
undoubted that Heidegger himself would have strenuously denied such an accusation, 
there is an element of truth to the view of Heidegger using what are ostensibly 
discussions of other philosophers as a stage from which to project his own vision. In 
this context, Schürmann is correct to assert that whilst ‘Heidegger’s texts on 
Nietzsche… speak formally about Nietzsche... materially [they speak] about 
technology’.16 Schürmann’s view is that in his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger used 
Nietzschean terminology to ruminate on the technological. Rather than taking this point 
out of context, it will be of more use to follow Schürmann’s argument from the start so 
as to better assess his radical reinterpretation of the consequences of the later 
Heidegger’s thought. 
  
Broken hegemonies. 
 
In his posthumous masterwork Broken Hegemonies, Reiner Schürmann traces the 
history of philosophy as being a series of dominant ideas which gained hegemony 
before collapsing and being replaced by another dominant philosophical idea. 
Schürmann’s work details three successive rises and falls – the final of which is 
relevant to our purposes here.
17
 This final hegemonic idea is the importance of the role 
of the consciousness which is found in the works of Luther and Kant. As Schürmann 
explains: 
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Self-consciousness is the philosophical terrain where the moderns believe 
themselves to be at home. Here they find a certitude capable of assuaging their 
pangs of doubt, an achievement sufficiently neutral to lend itself to being 
concretised in a moral conscience, a strategic instrument with a view to critical and 
revolutionary emancipations, also as a guarantee of an enclosed garden, interior 
and ultimate, and finally, as a source of new sciences.
18
 
 
In this study the focus has been upon philosophers offering various subjectivist 
alternatives to the objectivity of Hegelianism. In Schürmann’s understanding, both the 
Hegelians and the likes of Stirner, Kierkegaard and Pringle-Pattison are operating 
within the hegemony of self-consciousness – the same can also be said of the 
Heidegger of Being and Time. This does not mean that Schürmann interprets the 
Hegelian position (‘the world spirit disjointing all things as it creates them, but 
reconciling all things as it thinks them’19) and the subjectivist approaches discussed 
here as being more or less philosophically the same. Each hegemonic idea is thought to 
contain within its development the seeds of its own collapse, and as such the progress 
within each of these philosophical epochs can be thought of as the gradual (perhaps 
unnoticed) decay of the hegemonic idea which frames the epoch. It is certainly a 
persuasive view to see the subjectivist writings against Hegelianism as part of the 
process of the epoch of self-consciousness nearing its logical conclusion (echoing the 
Kierkegaardian maxim, it seems clear that philosophy like life is best understood in 
reverse). It is perhaps best to view Schürmann’s vision of the history of philosophy as 
being illustrative of a general point, namely the rise and fall of dominant ideas once 
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their inherent flaws become apparent in application, rather than seeing it as a literal 
explanation of progression of the totality of philosophy. To take the thesis of Broken 
Hegemonies too seriously would be to risk falling back into Hegelian historicism, in 
which history (in this case the history of philosophy) progresses and nears completion 
with little heed paid to the beings whose existence makes up this progression. What 
Schürmann’s epochal view of philosophy does illustrate is the revolutionary nature of 
the later Heidegger’s thought, and the way in which it supersedes Hegelian objectivity 
and anti-Hegelian subjectivist positions, as well as the Heidegger of Being and Time, to 
arrive at a position at which the goal set out in Being and Time to advance beyond 
metaphysics starts to be achieved. 
 In discussing the radical approach beyond both objective and subjective in the 
later Heidegger, the argument of Reiner Schürmann in his Heidegger on Being and 
Acting will be a constant presence implicitly at first, before we turn to it in detail. The 
thesis of Schürmann’s Heidegger… is, briefly put, that after the revolution of thought 
instigated by the later Heidegger, philosophy can no longer provide a ground for 
practical action – including politics. This view of Heidegger is supplanted into his later 
Broken Hegemonies to argue that the later Heidegger brings to an end the epoch of self-
consciousness and, instead of replacing this hegemonic idea with another, leaves us 
with no hegemonic philosophical idea. Whilst Schürmann’s arguments will not be 
adhered to entirely, they will play an important role in illuminating Heidegger’s later 
work. 
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The Principle of Reason. 
 
The far-reaching nature of the later Heidegger’s thought is perhaps best introduced 
through his The Principle of Reason. The work is a compilation of Heidegger’s lectures 
and a standalone address bearing the same title and covering the same topic – namely, 
the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz. Heidegger had already touched upon the 
principle of reason during his 1933 course The Fundamental Question of Philosophy, 
delivered during his rectorship of Freiburg University.
20
 In many ways the lectures 
making up The Principle of Reason can be considered to be an extension and expansion 
of Heidegger’s brief musings on this topic from the midst of his overtly National 
Socialist period. Over the course of thirteen lectures, Heidegger builds up a response to 
Leibniz which at times reveals a radicalism with consequences Heidegger himself may 
not have been willing to admit. Leibniz’s principle is ‘nihil est sine ratione; nothing is 
without reason.’21 Heidegger insists that positively Leibniz’s principle must assert that 
‘everything that in any manner is necessarily has a reason’.22 He explains that 
‘philosophy includes [the principle of reason]… among the supreme fundamental 
principles’.23 It is one of the fundamental principles, if not the fundamental principle, 
which has informed the history of Western philosophy. Despite the important role the 
unspoken principle of reason played in the development of philosophy, Heidegger 
explains that ‘it took two thousand three hundred years [for it to be]… expressly stated 
as a principle’.24 Heidegger later states that elsewhere Leibniz was to extend his 
original definition of the principle of reason to assert that ‘for every truth… the reason 
can be rendered’.25 This rendering, ‘the demand that reasons be rendered, [Heidegger 
explains] now speaks unabatedly and without surcease across the modern age’.26 In 
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typical Heideggerian fashion, the connection between the principle of reason 
(particularly in its longer form) and the technological enframing of the modern age is 
explained as being more subtle than a simple cause and effect relationship. Heidegger 
insists that science, the driving force behind the technological ordering in society, 
‘responds to the demand [to render reasons, but]… it nevertheless does not hear it in 
such a way that it can meditate upon it.’27 If science were to truly hear what it called 
for by the principle of reason, and were to meditate upon what it says, a much more 
authentic mode of Being for modern man might follow. Heidegger suggests that ‘there 
is an enigmatic interconnection between the demand to render reasons and the 
withdrawal of roots.’28 The forward march of technological reasoning and its inherent 
utilitarianism leads to a disconnection from the traditions which would enrich our mode 
of Being – undoubtedly Heidegger has the insights of the pre-Socratic masters firmly in 
mind here. 
 The difficulty of unthinkingly accepting that for everything that is, a reason can 
rendered is illustrated by Heidegger through a fragment from Angelus Silesius’ 
Cherubinic Wanderer: 
  
The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms, 
 It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen.
29
 
 
The first line is of particular interest for it appears to directly contradict Leibniz’s 
principle of reason. Leibniz insists that nothing is without reason, whilst Silesius 
suggests that the rose is precisely this – it is without why. The second half of the first 
line of the fragment complicates matters further. The first half appears to deny that 
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there is a reason for the rose’s blooming, but the second half’s “because” then appears 
to provide a reason. Heidegger suggests that these two positions may not be as 
contradictory as they initially seem when they are viewed superficially. He explains 
that the rose in the fragment ‘is indeed without why, yet it is not without a ground. 
[They]… are not equivalent.’30 As something that is the rose falls under Leibniz’s 
principle of reason, yet, as Heidegger explains, ‘the way it belongs within this orbit is 
unique and thereby different from the way we humans, who also reside within the orbit 
of the principle of reason, belong there.’31 It might seem that from this Heidegger is 
arguing that there is an inherent fundamental difference between the ways in which 
human beings and roses dwell under the principle of reason – and indeed there is a 
difference between modern man under technological enframing who is certainly “with 
why” and the rose which is “without why”. Yet Heidegger leaves open the radical 
proposition that human beings might not only be able to dwell under the principle of 
reason without why, but even that this might be a more authentic mode of Being. He 
writes: 
 
What is left unsaid in the fragment – and everything depends on this – instead says 
humans, in the concealed grounds of their essential Being, first truly are when in 
their own way they are like the rose – without why. We cannot pursue this thought 
any further here.
32
 
 
Unlike Heidegger, we can and will pursue this thought further here. 
 Schürmann highlights in Meister Eckhart an almost identical position to that in 
Silesius’ fragment, except in this case the link to human praxis is explicit instead of 
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implicit. Eckhart suggests that ‘if you were to ask a genuine man who acted from his 
own ground, “Why do you do what you are doing?” if he were to answer rightly, he 
would say no more than, “I do it because I do it”.’33 Eckhart’s genuine man, like 
Silesius’ rose, is without why, but still has ground. For a brief moment Heidegger 
appears to suggest a vision of authentic Being that is synonymous with Eckhart’s 
genuine man. If this one sentence of Heidegger’s was the only sign of his reaching 
towards such conclusions, it would be perhaps foolish to devote such time to discussing 
it. Yet as we shall see, such a position remains implicitly below the surface throughout 
Heidegger’s later writings, and it is because of this that they provide a welcome 
corrective against the flaws inherent in both Hegelian objectivity and its subjectivist 
critics. 
 For human beings to have an authentic relationship with the principle of reason, 
Heidegger insists that a leap needs to be taken. He outlines the four steps his discussion 
of the principle took before the fifth step which is the leap. 
 
1. The incubation of the principle of reason. 
2. The setting up of the principle of reason as one of the supreme fundamental 
principles. 
3. The claim of the principle of reason as the claim of the mighty Principle that 
determines our age. 
4. Ground/reason as “why” and as “because”. 
5. The change of tonality in the principle of reason.34 
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This change in tonality is described by Heidegger as the ‘free and open possibility of 
thinking’.35 It is the leap from the history of Western thinking where the principle of 
reason is interpreted as ‘the supreme fundamental principle about beings into [a realm 
where the interpretation of] the principle of reason as an utterance about Being 
occurs.’36 As will be discussed shortly, one of the clearest dividing lines between the 
Heidegger of Being and Time and the later Heidegger is the shift from the interrogation 
of Being through beings (namely Dasein) to the interrogation of Being apart from 
beings. After the leap, instead of understanding the principle as meaning that all beings 
have a ground/reason, the principle of reason now asserts that Being is the same as 
ground/reason.
37
 Much earlier in his lectures Heidegger was insistent that his audience 
understand the difference between equality and identity. He explains that ‘equality is 
something other than identity… Identity can mean that something is the same and 
nothing more than the same… but something is equal only where there is a 
multitude.’38 This differentiation is relevant for when Heidegger writes ‘Being and 
ground/reason: the same.’39 He does not mean that “Being” is identical or a synonym 
for “reason” or “ground” – the relationship is more complex. He also writes ‘Being: the 
a-byss [ab-grund].’40 The two positions seem mutually incompatible – how can Being 
be both ground and abyss? Heidegger explains that ‘this is what shows itself as what is 
to be thought now, namely, Being “is” the a-byss insofar as Being and ground/reason: 
the same. Insofar as Being “is” what grounds, and only insofar as it is so, it has no 
ground/reason.’41 In the 1933 lecture mentioned earlier, Heidegger had already touched 
upon this idea when discussing the principle of Being. There he questions ‘under which 
principle… can Being be put? Is there anything that stands even above Being, that 
accordingly is non-“Being”? What could that be? Can such a thing still even be at all? 
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Obviously not, for if it is, then it is a being, and as a being it stands beneath Being.’42 
He continues to ponder the possibility that the principle of Being is nothing, addressing 
criticism about how such a principle could be grasped: 
 
Can the nothing be grasped as the principle of Being at all? Can anything be 
delimited by the nothing? One would like to counter this in advance by pointing 
out that if the nothing is grasped at all – however it may be grasped, if it is 
simply grasped at all – then it is already something, and never is nothing. But 
inasmuch as the nothing is not graspable at all, then the question of through 
what and how it should be grasped also becomes superfluous.
43
 
 
 Heidegger’s position in this area was certainly deepened in this area since the early 
1930s, but this does illustrate how the seeds of his later radicalism were already present 
during his ardently National Socialist period. His points regarding the superfluous 
nature of attempting to grasp the nothing also foreshadow the difficulties and often 
convoluted prose when attempting to discuss the abyss in the later works. 
Heidegger’s thinking about the abyss is certainly far from traditional 
metaphysical thinking. Instead of the firm grounding of the atomic age where all beings 
can seemingly be grounded in the interactions of minute invisible chemical elements 
and the subatomic particles of which they are composed, we are left with beings 
grounded by Being which is itself the abyss because it is ungrounded. The importance 
of the introduction of the abyss should not be overlooked, for it appears to leave our 
way of Being without a form of external validation through some form of timeless 
truth. A passionate decisionism is still called for, but there is no objective criterion 
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against which to judge the decision. The introduction of the abyss and the anarchy 
which follows this introduction heralds a radical freedom of possibility for Dasein, but 
also introduces a great deal of uncertainty. Where once metaphysics could be seen to 
provide the tools with which to judge our decisions, there is now a profound loneliness 
– a void, an abyss. Despite the discomfort this realisation may cause, it should certainly 
not cause us to turn back here in order to retreat to “safer” ground. 
 Thinking is at this point in the leap from the history of Western thinking. 
Heidegger responds to the hypothetical query of whether by taking this leap we 
therefore fall into the fathomless. He answers ‘yes and no. Yes – insofar as Being can 
no longer be given a basis in the sense of beings and explained in terms of beings. No – 
insofar as Being is now finally to be thought qua Being.’44 As such, thinking is able to 
move closer to the authentic truth of the question of Being. The implications of this 
shift in thinking are radical, and return us to the previous discussion of Silesius’ rose 
and Eckhart’s genuine man. In the closing stages of the closing (thirteenth) lecture on 
the principle of reason, Heidegger introduces the importance of play. Here there are 
echoes of another piece from Meister Eckhart, this time his sermon Woman, the Hour is 
Coming. In the sermon Eckhart discusses the detachment needed in order to come 
closer to God. He rejects the seeking of God for one’s own advantage, for in such a 
case ‘you are not looking for God at all.’45 The good man, when questioned as to why 
he is living would respond ‘“My word, I do not know! But I am happy to be alive.”’46 
This precisely is living without why. Heidegger cites a fragment from Heraclitus which 
in his characteristically idiosyncratic translation states that ‘The Geschick [sending, 
destiny] of Being, a child that plays.’47 This playing is something new and alien. 
Heidegger explains that ‘so far we have barely experienced this play and have not yet 
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considered its nature, which means, what the play plays and who plays it, and how the 
playing is to be thought’.48 Returning briefly to the importance of death which was 
such a key aspect of Being and Time, Heidegger deftly illustrates the role of death as 
the ‘yet unthought standard of measure of the unfathomable, which means, of the most 
elevated play in which humans are engaged in on earth, a play in which they are at 
stake.’49 Play, like Silesius’ rose, like Eckhart’s good and genuine men, is without why. 
Closing his lectures, Heidegger asserts that ‘the “because” withers away in play… it 
plays since it plays… The question remains whether and how we, hearing the 
movements of this play, play along and accommodate ourselves to the play.’50 The 
“without why” of play is difficult to describe both because it is alien to the traditional 
modes of Western thinking, and also due to the issues in trying to adequately describe 
an intangible absence as mentioned in the 1933 lecture. In an aside from the final 
lecture on the principle of reason, Heidegger perhaps best illustrates the area in which 
his thought is leading us: 
 
Is it not merely a playful act if now, at the close of the lecture course on the 
principle of reason, we almost violently haul in thoughts about play and about the 
belonging-together of Being and ground/reason with play?
51
 
 
Heidegger thinks not. Yet there is a degree to which Heidegger’s later thought might be 
equally or even better suited to the designation of “philosophy at play” which Paterson 
used to describe the work of Max Stirner. 
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The Principle of Identity. 
 
The Principle of Identity from the collection Identity and Difference explains the way 
in which man and Being belong together. In The Principle of Reason, the idea of Being 
as the abyss was introduced. Here Heidegger defines this abyss as being ‘the event of 
appropriation.’52 The event of appropriation is Joan Stambaugh’s translation of the 
word Ereignis which plays a key role in much of Heidegger’s later writings. She 
usefully defines it as ‘the realm in which man and Being reach each other in their very 
core. They lose the determinations placed on them by metaphysics.’53 Another attempt 
to render the term into English is as “enowning” by the English translators of the 
posthumously published Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)
54
 – this 
perhaps gets us closer to the strangeness of Heidegger’s use of the term, but still leaves 
its meaning rather opaque. The difficulty of understanding precisely what Heidegger 
means by Ereignis is such that Blackwell’s Heidegger companion assigns the term its 
own chapter.
55
 We cannot take too much of a diversion into the discussion of the term 
here, but a very brief summary of Richard Polt’s investigation of Ereignis should 
enable us to better understand the term in this context. According to Polt, Heidegger’s 
use of the term Ereignis differed over the course of his writings. Around the time of the 
writing of his Contributions to Philosophy in the mid-1930s, Heidegger depicts 
Ereignis as something ‘extremely rare’.56 By the time of the texts we are discussing 
here, Ereignis has become ‘an ultimate that we think without reference to particular 
beings’.57 This understanding of Ereignis is in keeping with the insistence of the later 
Heidegger of the need to think Being without reference to beings. Polt raises the 
objection to such a conception of Ereignis, arguing that ‘it becomes very difficult to 
310 
 
connect it to our own experience’58 – this is something that shall be addressed as the 
discussion here progresses. For our purposes here we shall maintain Stambaugh’s 
definition of Ereignis as the event of appropriation, but with the caveat of keeping the 
numerous difficulties in grasping Heidegger’s fluid understanding of the term in mind. 
 Before the brief detour into terminology, we had approached Heidegger’s 
understanding of the abyss of Being as the event of appropriation. In The Principle of 
Reason the abyss of Being had been reached by the leap in thought away from the 
thinking of metaphysics. In this new tonality of the principle of Being brought about by 
the leap, Being grounds beings, but is simultaneously itself the abyss. Heidegger has 
now defined this abyss as being the event of appropriation – the realm in which the 
belonging together of Being and man is achieved. Through the event of appropriation, 
technological enframing – the way in which the technological conception of the world 
conceives of and orders all beings as the means for reaching technological ends – is 
overcome. Technology returns ‘from its dominance back to servitude’.59 Heidegger’s 
brief veneration of the will is a distant memory as he describes the relationship between 
Being and man as ‘a belonging together… in which the letting belong first determines 
the manner of the “together” and its unity.’60 Gone are the violent metaphors of 
wrestling with beings to bring them into uncoveredness.
61
 Now instead there is the 
sense of letting beings Be. There is certainly here a sense of the mystical, but we should 
not yet acquiesce to Polt’s concerns that later Heideggerian philosophy has lost all 
connection with human existence.
62
 Heidegger’s later thought may separate itself from 
the moorings of our traditional metaphysical understanding of our existence, but it is 
still grounded in our experience, albeit in a radically different way. 
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Time and Being. 
 
On Time and Being contains two complementary pieces which mark the culmination of 
the later Heidegger’s thought – the near synonymously titled Time and Being and The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking. The former piece shares the title with the 
projected third section of the first half of Being and Time, but this should not be 
mistaken as a sign of Heidegger’s returning to the philosophical positions of his earlier 
work. At the beginning of Time and Being Heidegger addresses the lack of immediate 
intelligibility of poetry, works of art and theoretical physics. He suggests that it might 
therefore be amiss to expect immediate intelligibility from ‘the thinking that is called 
philosophy… which must give thought to matters from which even the painting and the 
poetry we have mentioned and the theory of mathematical physics receive their 
determination.’63 This assertion should be considered carefully to avoid 
misinterpretation. Heidegger here does not assert that it is philosophical thinking which 
determines poetry, artworks, theoretical physics, and so on, but that the proper subject 
for thinking is the matter from which these (and not these alone) receive their 
determination, namely Being. 
 Time and Being continues the later Heidegger’s theme of the need to think 
Being without reference to beings. He explains this need as being ‘necessary because 
otherwise, it seems to me, there is no longer any possibility of explicitly bringing into 
view the Being of what is today all over the earth, let alone adequately determining the 
relation of what has been called “Being” up to now.’64 Unfortunately, Heidegger does 
not explain more clearly the reasoning behind the “it seems to me”. As such it is 
necessary that here an attempt should be made to sketch out the possible reasoning for 
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the necessity to think Being without reference to beings before moving forward. 
Thinking of Being with reference to beings – for instance with reference to Dasein in 
Being and Time – will always necessarily result in a partial view of Being. We only get 
closer to seeing and understanding the elements or characteristics of Being which are 
elements or characteristics of beings. Using Heidegger’s descriptions in The Principle 
of Reason for example, we learn of Being that it is the reason/ground of beings when 
we inquire of Being with reference to beings. This insight will always only describe the 
relationship between beings and Being – neither can be explained by this without 
reference to the other. Being is the ground/reason for beings – beings have their 
ground/reason in Being. Yet when we come to the assertion that Being is the abyss, and 
later that this abyss is the event of appropriation (Ereignis), these are insights into 
Being that can only be reached by inquiry into Being without reference to beings. This 
position can only be reached by the attempt to think Being without beings. 
 Returning now to Time and Being, Heidegger begins by questioning why it is 
that time and Being are thought of together. He explains that neither Being nor time can 
be thought of as a thing. Heidegger uses the example of the lecture hall: ‘This lecture 
hall is. The lecture hall is illuminated. We recognise the illuminated lecture hall at once 
and with no reservations as something that is. But where in the whole do we find the 
“is”? Nowhere among things do we find Being.’65 Time similarly is not something 
which can be found as another “thing” amongst beings. The interrelation of time and 
Being is complex and seemingly paradoxical. ‘Being is not a thing, thus nothing 
temporal, and yet is determined by time as presence. Time is not a thing, thus nothing 
which is, and yet it remains constant in passing away without being something 
temporal like the beings in time.’66 All beings are in time, yet Being is not a being (a 
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thing) and so is not in time. Being is presencing – it is what lets beings be present 
(letting-presence). Presence is necessarily determined by time – presencing makes no 
sense without reference to time – and thus Being is determined by time without being 
temporal (in time). Time constantly passes away, as do beings in time. Yet whilst 
constantly passing away, ‘time remains as time. To remain means: not to disappear, 
thus, to presence.’67 Being is what lets beings be present, yet whilst time is present it is 
not temporal and not a being (a thing). Heidegger rejects a dialectical approach to 
addressing the contradictory nature of the relation between Being and time for the 
dialectic ‘would be a way out which evades the matters and the issues in question’.68 
With the “easy” option discounted, Heidegger’s analysis continues to progress. 
 In order to better understand the relation between Being and time, Heidegger 
first proceeds to think of each separately. He asserts that ‘we do not say: Being is, time 
is, but rather there is Being and there is time.’69 In translation, Heidegger’s point is 
easily lost. The German “there is” (es gibt) is more literally “it gives” – Heidegger had 
previously said that this “it” which gives is Being.70 It is this conception of Being 
which Heidegger returns to when he attempts to think Being separately. Instead of the 
thinking of Being with reference to beings which was discussed above, Being is to be 
thought of ‘as the gift of this It gives, Being belongs to giving.’71 As letting-presence, 
Being is the gift of unconcealing (‘Being as the unconcealing of presencing’72). 
Heidegger cites the many ways in which presencing has been understood in the history 
of Western thinking:  
 
as the hen, the unifying unique One, as the logos, the gathering that preserves the 
All, as idea, ousia, energeia, substantia, actualitas, perception, monad, as 
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objectivity, as the being posited of self-positing, in the sense of the will of reason, 
of love, of the spirit, of power, as the will to will in the eternal recurrence of the 
same.
73
 
 
Heidegger interprets these stages as being the history of Being. He does not deny any 
form of insight to these understandings of Being, but insists that Being has remained 
obscured by the various imperfect understandings. Heidegger argues that ‘only the 
gradual removal of these obscuring covers… procures for thinking a preliminary 
insight into what then reveals itself as the destiny of Being.’74 This removal of 
obscuring covers is precisely what Heidegger had diagnosed as being needed when he 
called for the destruction of the history of ontology.
75
 
 In order to pursue the “it” which gives Being (in “there is – it gives – Being”), 
Heidegger turns to time. He returns to his understanding of time as the necessary 
ecstatic interrelation of the past, present and future (in contrast to the ultimately flawed 
conception of time as a series of fleeing “nows”). Whilst we have come to the position 
that time is not a thing, Heidegger warns that we should not therefore assume that time 
is nothing, hence the assertion that “there is (it gives) time” instead of “time is”.76 He 
warns of equating “present” in the sense of presence and “present” in the sense of now 
– the former is what is at stake here, explaining that ‘to presence means to last. But we 
are too quickly content to conceive lasting as mere duration, and to conceive duration 
in terms of the customary representation of time as a span of time from one now to a 
subsequent now.’77 After discussing the interplay of the three dimensions of time (past, 
present and future), Heidegger introduces a fourth dimension – ‘the giving that 
determines all.’78 The giving, which Heidegger in this context calls ‘“nearing nearness” 
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[or] “nearhood”’,79 has a complex relation with the other three dimensions. Nearing 
nearness ‘brings future, past and present near to one another by distancing them.’80 The 
giving that is nearing nearness provides the structure for the ecstatic nature of time, ‘it 
grants the openness of time-space and preserves what remains denied in what has-been 
[the past], what is withheld in approach [the future].’81 
 Heidegger warns that when we think of the “it” which gives time and the “it” 
which gives Being, we must not ‘arbitrarily posit an indeterminate power which is 
supposed to bring about all giving of Being and time.’82 After an interesting discussion 
about the role of the “it” – whether it is significant or whether it is something merely 
thrust upon us by grammar which has little importance to our understanding of the “it 
gives” – Heidegger turns to discuss Ereignis. It is appropriation which ‘lets the two 
matters [Being and time] belong together, what brings the two into their own and, even 
more, maintains and holds them in their belonging together’.83 He insists that it is a 
mistake to think of the relationship between Being and time is something imposed upon 
the pair sometime after they come into existence as completely separate entities. To use 
the language of Being and Time – time, Being and the relationship between time and 
Being are equiprimordial. Heidegger admits that there is one clear question arising 
from this explanation – ‘what is the event of appropriation?’84 We earlier encountered 
the unclear nature of the abyss when discussing The Principle of Identity. In Time and 
Being things are somewhat clearer, but difficulties remain.  
 The remainder of Time and Being is devoted to the question of what the event 
of appropriation is. In typically Heideggerian style, this involves a questioning of the 
question. Heidegger questions what is entailed by answering a question, responding 
that ‘answer means the Saying that co-responds to the matter at stake’.85 The matter at 
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stake here is appropriation, and hence in response to the question “what is the event of 
appropriation” there is needed to be a Saying which corresponds to this. The question 
seems to be asking about the essence or Being of appropriation but, Heidegger 
suggests, ‘if Being itself proves to be such that it belongs to appropriation and from 
there receives its determination as presence, then our question takes us back to what 
first of all demands its own determination: Being in terms of time.’86 We seem to be 
stuck in a bit of a loop – time and Being are inseparably related, appropriation is what 
maintains this, and in order to question appropriation we must ask about its Being. 
Heidegger attempts to slightly clarify thinking regarding appropriation, suggesting that 
it would be a grave misunderstanding to take the word “event” in “event of 
appropriation” to mean ‘an occurrence and happening [instead of]… as the extending 
and sending which opens and preserves.’87 Heidegger also rejects as ‘too cheap’88 the 
possibility of inverting the relationship between Being and appropriation, explaining 
away the difficulties by having appropriation as some sort of meta-concept into which 
both Being and time can be subsumed. Eventually Heidegger suggests the following 
explanation: ‘appropriation appropriates.’89 Heidegger is not unaware that this has the 
appearance of being a glib and meaningless way of avoiding explaining precisely what 
has been spoken about. ‘It does indeed say nothing so long as we hear a mere sentence 
in what was said, and expose that sentence to the cross-examination of logic. But what 
if we take what was said and adopt it unceasingly as the guide for our thinking.’90 We 
are clearly here in a position where Heideggerian thinking is differentiating itself not 
only in content, but also in method from traditional metaphysical thinking. 
Heidegger explains that his aim of thinking ‘Being without beings means: to think 
Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet a regard for metaphysics still prevails in the 
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intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore our task is to cease all overcoming, and 
leave metaphysics to itself.’91 The inability of Time and Being to move us much closer 
to gaining a working definition of what is meant by the event of appropriation is 
acknowledged at the end of the lecture. Heidegger insists that the attempt to say the 
meaning of appropriation in the context of the lecture was an obstacle to its saying – 
‘the lecture has spoken merely in propositional statements.’92 The tools of metaphysics 
are still being used to explicate what is the proper matter for non-metaphysical 
thinking. In the final lecture of Heidegger’s we shall discuss, the task for thinking at the 
end of philosophy will be made clearer. 
  
The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking. 
 
In The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking Heidegger openly expresses the 
lineage between the task he set himself in Being and Time and his task nearly four 
decades later. He explains that since 1930 he has attempted ‘again and again… to shape 
the question of Being and Time in a more primal way… to subject the point of 
departure of the question in Being and Time to an immanent criticism.’93 In this 
context, Heidegger formulates his inquiry into two interrelated questions: ‘1. What 
does it mean that philosophy in the present age has entered its final stage? 2. What task 
is reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?’94 The separation into two questions 
helps indicate the two logical steps at play, namely what the end of philosophy is and 
what the task for thinking is now that we have reached the end of philosophy. Either 
question alone would be lacking its partner; merged together the distinction would be 
lost. As such, we turn first to Heidegger’s depiction of the end of philosophy. 
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 By the philosophy which is at an end Heidegger means metaphysics which 
‘thinks being as a whole – the world, man, God – with respect to Being, with respect to 
the belonging together of beings in Being.’95 Metaphysical thinking ‘thinks beings as 
being in the manner of representational thinking which gives reasons.’96 It sets out to 
ground the ground of beings, and in doing so ‘departs from what is present in its 
presence, and thus represents it in terms of its ground as something grounded.’97 
Heidegger explains that philosophy as metaphysical thinking is at and end not because 
it has stopped, but because it has been completed. This clearly is not because 
metaphysics has been perfected. Heidegger indicates that this would be impossible to 
assert because we ‘lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection 
of an epoch of metaphysics as compared with any other epoch… Each epoch of 
philosophy has its own necessity… It is not our business to prefer one to the other’.98 
Instead, by “end” Heidegger means ‘the place in which the whole of philosophy’s 
history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this 
gathering.’99 Philosophy (which is metaphysics, which is Platonism) enters its final 
stages in the reversals of metaphysics in Marx and Nietzsche.
100
 The development and 
independence of the sciences (most recently anthropology, psychology, sociology, and 
so on) from philosophy ‘looks like the mere dissolution of philosophy, and is in truth 
its completion.’101 
Heidegger foresees ‘that the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be 
determined and guided by the new fundamental science which is called cybernetics.’102 
His warnings here are perhaps now even more strongly prescient at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century than they were when first delivered in the 1960s. Heidegger’s 
previous warnings about the position of man under technological enframing again 
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come to the fore, perhaps more directly than before, in his explanation of the coming 
reign of cybernetics. ‘This science corresponds to the determination of man as an acting 
social being. For it is the theory of the steering of the possible planning and 
arrangement of human labour. Cybernetics transforms language into an exchange of 
news. The arts become regulated-regulating instruments of information.’103 For 
Heidegger the technological and cybernetic modes of thinking (‘representational-
calculative thinking’104) are synonymous and dominant. He argues that the origins of 
the sciences in philosophy can still be heard today – they ‘still speak about the Being of 
beings in the unavoidable supposition of their regional categories. They just don’t say 
so.’105 For Heidegger, ‘the end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the 
manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of the social order 
proper to this world. The end of philosophy means: the beginning of world civilisation 
based upon Western European thinking.’106 Despite these almost eschatological 
overtones, Heidegger believes that there is a task for thinking which remained 
concealed in the history of philosophy. A thinking which is separate both from 
metaphysics and the numerous sciences which have branched out from philosophy.
107 
It 
is this task of thinking which we shall turn to next. 
 The possibility of thinking is not, as a cruder analysis might suggest, the 
absolute overthrow and destruction of the scientific/technological worldview. Rather it 
is the ‘thinking of the possibility that the world civilisation which is just now beginning 
might one day overcome the technological-scientific-industrial character as the sole 
criterion of man’s world sojourn.’108 The three words “the sole criterion” do much to 
indicate that the technological worldview does have its place – it is its absolute 
dominance which is being questioned. Heidegger is less clear about precisely what 
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thinking entails. He returns to the discussion of alētheia (unconcealment), emphasising 
the role of opening to unconcealment. Returning to his favourite metaphor of the forest, 
Heidegger describes the way in which an opening or clearing allows the light in so 
what is in the clearing can be seen. He is insistent that we not misunderstand the 
relationship between the openness and the light – ‘light never first creates openness. 
Rather, light presupposes openness.’109 Instead of dragging beings into unconcealment, 
Heidegger seems to be suggesting that the proper role of thinking is to experience the 
light which shines when beings open themselves up for us. He acknowledges that 
technological scientific thinking can successfully demonstrate what is true, yet we are 
reminded that truth (the traditional translation of alētheia) and unconcealment 
(Heidegger’s translation) are not the same. Heidegger asks, ‘is the manifest character of 
what-is exhausted by what is demonstrable? Doesn’t the insistence on what is 
demonstrable block the way to what-is?’110 He illustrates this point using a quote from 
Aristotle which has appeared elsewhere in his writings: ‘For it is uneducated not to 
have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof, and when this is not 
necessary.’111 The scientific worldview may be able to demonstrate why it is that a 
person enjoys a particular piece of music, finds a particular scenery to be beautiful or 
savours a particular food’s flavour, but by doing so gets no nearer to the enjoyment, 
beauty or savouring. Being able to demonstrate the neurone pathways which trigger a 
particular emotion can only ever partly get us closer to what-is that emotion – be it 
love, hate, terror or boredom. In reflection of the task of thinking in waiting for beings 
to open themselves up to us in their presence, Heidegger wonders if the task ‘read 
instead of Being and Time: Opening and Presence’.112 
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The benefits of the later Heidegger’s approach. 
 
Before turning to the political consequences of this new position, it will be useful for 
our purposes to explicitly examine why the position taken by the later Heidegger is 
more successful than both the objectivity personified by the Hegelians and the 
subjectivism of the thinkers discussed previously. Turning to the latter first, the later 
Heidegger is more successful because of his recognition that trying to gain an 
understanding of Being through the interrogation of (human) beings is 
methodologically flawed. Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein came closer to responding 
to the question of Being than any of the other thinkers discussed, but was only ever 
able to mention Being as a characteristic of Dasein (human beings). As the arguments 
in The Principle of Reason demonstrated, the assertion that Being is what grounds 
beings says very little about Being. It comes nowhere near acknowledging that whilst 
Being grounds beings, it is itself without ground – it is the abyss. As the subjectivist 
position never recognises that Being is the abyss, it certainly never even recognises that 
this abyss is the event of appropriation (or encounters the profound difficulties of 
explaining what appropriation is). The subjectivist approaches also fail to realise that 
technological enframing, and the dangers which follow from it, cannot be escaped 
without escaping the boundaries of metaphysics. Pringle-Pattison was criticised for his 
reformist approach towards the Hegelianism of British idealism, but the more 
antagonistic approaches of Stirner, Kierkegaard and even the early Heidegger get not 
much further. Having escaped the shell of Hegelian objectivism, the philosophers are 
still operating within – even advancing the progression of – the history of Western 
metaphysics which, it would seem, necessarily results in the ascendency of cybernetics. 
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As the later Heidegger realised, even in engaging with metaphysics in order to 
overcome it, one is still stuck in metaphysical thinking. What is needed is a thinking 
which is neither metaphysical nor scientific. Precisely what this thinking entails is still 
as yet unclear but, as Heidegger suggests at the end of The End of Philosophy, ‘the task 
of thinking would then be the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the 
matter of thinking.’113 
 It is certainly possible to argue that the argument of the study has come full 
circle. We started off by rejecting the abstract universal “Absolute” of Hegelianism, 
and then went through various forms of subjectivism which were each in turn rejected, 
only in order to adopt another abstract universal – “Being”. This argument can be 
rebutted by citing the major difference between the Hegelian Absolute and 
Heideggerian Being, namely that the latter respects the dignity of the beings which 
have their ground in Being. As was highlighted earlier through the debate between 
Pringle-Pattison and Bosanquet, the component parts of the Hegelian Absolute are 
attributed little more than adjectival status. They are the containers into which the 
content of the Absolute is distributed, with minuscule lasting importance to the 
progression of the Absolute. Later Heidegger speaks of letting beings Be – of allowing 
beings to open up in order for the light to flow in so that we may better experience 
them in their Being. 
 In our adoption of the positions taken by the later Heidegger, there has been 
little or nothing said about practical matters (apart from brief mention of the misgivings 
of Polt). The philosophical positions taken certainly have the appearance of having a 
touch of the mystical about them. Caputo highlights the criticism of Hühnerfeld that 
‘Meister Eckhart would never have taken the mystical step if he had believed that he 
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was leaping into Nothingness instead of into the arms of God.’114 Yet surely this leap 
into nothingness – into the abyss – is the only way in which we can live life “without 
why”. When there is still some external purpose, we are still not living because we live. 
It is because of this that Schürmann characterises the later Heidegger’s thought as 
being an-archic. Schürmann’s analysis in his brilliant Heidegger on Being and Acting is 
at times incredibly dense, but that should not dissuade us from engaging with it for our 
purposes here. In the work Schürmann uses Heidegger’s writings (particularly the later 
writings) in order to deconstruct the traditional philosophical relationship between 
ontology and praxis. He explains: ‘I would like to show what happens to the old 
problem of the unity between thinking and acting once ‘thinking’ no longer means 
securing some rational foundation upon which one may establish the sum total of what 
is knowable, and once ‘acting’ no longer means conforming one’s daily enterprises, 
both public and private, to the foundation so secured.’115 In our discussions of the later 
Heidegger’s works, we have already reached the point of the new post-metaphysical 
thinking which is without why. As such, we can move directly to Schürmann’s 
suggestions about how this affects practical action and politics. 
  
Politics/practical action and the later Heidegger’s approach. 
 
Schürmann explains that ‘the way Heidegger displaces the received issues of norms, 
standards and commands for action – the ‘rules’, ‘holds’, and ‘injunctions’ – is the 
most striking proof that his thinking… has moved beyond the mere deconstruction of 
transmitted referential edifices.’116 Heidegger has not done this in order to rebuild 
another structure in his own image. Schürmann insists that neither does Heidegger 
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‘declare anything [in the history of Western thinking] valueless. What he prepares is 
more modest than any value assessment… it is what he calls simple dwelling.’117 
Heidegger’s conception of dwelling is developed in his lecture Building Dwelling 
Thinking. In the lecture Heidegger explains that dwelling is the way in which mortals 
exist in the fourfold, ‘on earth, under the sky [and] before the divinities.’118 When 
writing about the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals, Julian Young decried 
‘the almost total absence by Heidegger scholars to explain what it is.’119 With this in 
mind, and to enable us to better understand Heidegger’s conception of dwelling, we 
must address the fourfold. 
 Heidegger’s conception of dwelling is directly related to the way in which 
mortals (human beings) interact with the fourfold, of which they are a part. Firstly, 
‘mortals dwell in that they save the earth’.120 Heidegger is insistent that we understand 
that ‘to save properly means to set something free into its own essence… Saving the 
earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it’.121 This is entirely in keeping 
with the Heideggerian critique of technological enframing. Not only does Heidegger 
decry the ordering of human beings as resources, this concern stretches to all “things” 
within the world. Secondly, ‘mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky.’122 
Whilst it may not currently be scientifically possible to do otherwise, dwelling entails 
allowing all celestial bodies to go about their path. Heidegger’s concerns about turning 
night into day could be taken as a criticism of the overabundance of artificial lighting 
which thrusts a large proportion of the Western world into eternal daylight. Thirdly, 
‘mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities.’123 This injunction may 
seem strange from a philosopher whose writings are consistently secular, and who 
never retreats to theological explanations of difficulties. Yet Heidegger’s position is 
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consistent, as he implores that dwelling mortals ‘wait for intimations of their [the 
gods’] coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence. They do not make their 
gods for themselves and do not worship idols.’124 Heidegger is warning against the 
tendency of projecting the ideally human into the heavens, or mistake the earthly for 
the divine. This position was echoed in Heidegger’s posthumous Der Spiegel interview, 
in which he famously proclaims that: 
 
Only a god can still save us. I see the only possibility of salvation in the process of 
preparing a readiness, through thinking and poetising, for the appearance of the god 
or for the absence of the god in the decline. We will not “croak”, to put it bluntly, 
but rather, if we go under, we will do so face-to-face with an absent god.
125
 
 
As mortals dwell, they must prepare in thinking for the coming of the god or the 
absence of the god – only through such thinking can mortals be prepared for either 
eventuality. The final interaction of mortals with the fourfold is with themselves – 
‘mortals dwell in that they initiate their own essential Being - their being capable of 
death as death – into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good 
death.’126 Death is not the goal for mortals, but mortals should have an authentic 
relationship with their own death of the sort depicted in Being and Time.
127
 Heidegger 
describes the way in which ‘dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing the essence of 
the fourfold into things. But things themselves secure the fourfold only when they 
themselves as things are let Be in their essence.’128 When mortals as beings are allowed 
to Be they can dwell – dwelling is not possible if this is not the case. 
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 Heidegger’s conception of the fourfold is central to his understanding of 
dwelling. Schürmann explains that Heidegger’s thought assigns to man ‘his finite 
economic site… the truth of Being.’129 The escape from the realm of metaphysics into 
the realm of thinking which is neither metaphysical nor scientific allows man to dwell 
in the truth of Being, that is in his own essence, in communion with sky, earth and 
divinities. With the edifices of metaphysics from which actions could derive grounds 
displaced, and with no constructions devised to replace them, thinking and acting can 
no longer have philosophically derived ends or goals.
130
 The result is what Schürmann 
calls economic self-regulation. He explains that ‘every economy of presence is self-
regulated… But not every economy of presence is self-regulated by one identity held to 
be its ultimate regulator – a principle.’131 The economies of presence of the 
metaphysical epochs were all regulated by a guiding principle – be it the one, nature or 
self-consciousness.
132
 The philosophy of the later Heidegger marks a break from the 
history of metaphysics precisely because it displaces the guiding principles of the prior 
epoch without positing an alternative guiding principle as a replacement. With no 
ultimate regulating principle, the later Heidegger’s thought is truly anarchic. 
 The later Heidegger, perhaps unsurprisingly, explicitly commented very 
scarcely on the issue of politics. In the Der Spiegel interview, during a discussion of the 
way in which global technology determines political systems both capitalist and 
communist, Heidegger elucidates his later political position: 
 
It has become evident in the last thirty years that the global movement of modern 
technology is a force whose scope in determining history can hardly be 
overestimated. It is a decisive question for me today how any political system can 
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be assigned to the current technological age – and if so, which system? I do not 
have an answer to this question. I am not convinced it is democracy.
133
 
 
Just as the metaphysical systems of old have failed to hold back the dominance of the 
technological worldview, traditional political systems have also failed to moderate the 
continuous drive forward of the consequences of this worldview. Traditional political 
systems have failed because, as with the metaphysical system, they all rely upon an 
ultimate principle – capitalism on the functioning of the market, communism on the 
equality of all men, socialism on the redistribution of wealth, conservatism on the value 
of tradition, and so on. These may be over-simplified caricatures used in order to 
illustrate the point, but all political systems are guided by principles derived from 
metaphysical reasoning. In order to dwell authentically within the world, a change 
needs to be made. It is unlikely that the conservative Heidegger would greatly 
appreciate his thought being pulled in this direction, but it is a testament to his thinking 
that he never shrank back from following his thought to the destination where it led. 
The anarchical thinking of the later Heidegger can only be expressed in equally 
anarchical politics. 
 It is incredibly important at this point to raise a distinction very carefully made 
by Schürmann regarding the difference between economic anarchy and anarchy of 
power. He insists that ‘economic anarchy is opposed to the anarchy of power as 
lawfulness is to lawlessness, as thinking is to the irrational, and as liberty is to 
oppression.’134 It would make little or no sense after numerous citations of the 
importance of letting-Be and dwelling to the later Heidegger’s thought, to then force 
upon this thinking some sort of neo-Stirnerite politics which had been so resoundingly 
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rejected several chapters early. Stirner’s philosophy is metaphysical, despite all his 
protests. The dangers of technological enframing can find no better expression than in 
Stirner’s guiding principle of utilising all other beings as means towards reaching the 
end of self-enjoyment. Schürmann reminds us that the anarchical nature of Heidegger’s 
thought is not of the sort found in the writings of the classical anarchist thinkers, who 
aim to replace the dominant idea of the society at the time with a guiding principle of 
their own.
135
 The anarchical conclusions of the later Heidegger are perhaps better 
contrasted with the anarchical tendency inherent in Buddhism. 
 The affinities between Heidegger’s writings and Buddhism have often been 
commented upon, but this has not tended to be connected to the anarchical nature of 
both. Michael Zimmerman traces the connections between Heidegger’s thought and 
Zen Buddhism. Amongst the similarities he explains are that ‘both Heidegger and the 
Zen tradition maintain that once one is released from the constricted self-understanding 
associated with dualistic egocentrism, other people and things in the world no longer 
appear as radically separate and threatening, but instead as profoundly interrelated 
phenomena.’136 Both also ‘emphasise the importance of human existence, without 
hereby promoting a narrow anthropocentrism.’137 In his unsurpassed chronicle of the 
history of anarchism, Peter Marshall charts the anarchical themes present in Zen 
Buddhism. He describes how it has ‘a strong libertarian spirit. [It rejects]… hierarchy 
and domination. [It seeks]… growth in self-disciplined freedom and assert[s] that all 
are capable of enlightenment. [It is]… concerned with personal autonomy and social 
well-being [and recognises]… that each person is not only part of society, but of 
organic nature itself’.138 It would not be too difficult to extend such a description so as 
to cover the later Heidegger. Zimmerman recognises this anarchical similarity, 
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suggesting both Heidegger and Zen Buddhism were susceptible to the same flaws. He 
suggests that ‘zeal for the mystical idea of anarchy, which allegedly brings forth 
boundless compassion, must be tempered by insight into humanity’s enormous capacity 
for self-delusion.’139 He has in mind the way in which both the Japanese Zen masters 
and Heidegger embraced their own national authoritarianisms during the second world 
war. This brings us back to Schürmann’s insistence on the difference between 
economic anarchy and anarchism of power. The National Socialist movement was an 
example of the latter with its guiding principle of the ‘superiority of a race’.140 If 
Heidegger’s philosophical views were at this time nearing his later position at this time 
(as we have seen from 1933’s The Fundamental Question of Philosophy this may well 
have been the case), Heidegger’s Nazism would be a precise example of what 
Zimmerman is referring to when he speaks of man’s enormous capacity for self-
delusion. 
 Perhaps the most obvious criticism which will be levelled against the sort of 
political anarchism deriving from the philosophical anarchism of the later Heidegger is 
that it is utopian. It is all well and good calling theoretically for economic anarchy, but 
can such a thing be implemented in reality? Not in such a way that other beings within 
the world are manipulated and used in order to reach this new reality – to “implement” 
the economic anarchy found in the writings of the later Heidegger would be a 
contradiction of terms. What is needed is for the each individual to leave the realm of 
the metaphysical/scientific/technological and to enter the realm of thinking via a leap. 
We are not too far here from the task of becoming a Christian expressed in the writings 
of Kierkegaard – no one may be forced into undertaking the task of thinking, they must 
take on the task themselves. In keeping with the link between Heideggerian and Zen 
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Buddhist thought, this point is perhaps best illustrated by the Zen master Wumen 
Huikai who wrote: 
  
Do not fight with another’s bow and arrow. 
 Do not ride another’s horse. 
 Do not discuss another’s faults. 
 Do not interfere with another’s work.141 
 
If we are to enter into the thinking which has the motto “letting-Be” engraved above 
the door, it would be entirely inappropriate to drag others along against their will. 
Surely this is a better antidote against the self-delusion of man than anything else – if it 
is only yourself you are deluding, there is not so much likelihood of this resulting in the 
industrial-scale slaughter which so stained the history of the twentieth century. 
 Silesius’ (and Eckhart’s) exaltation of the “without why” and Heidegger’s own 
suggestion that life should be a kind of play are both positive and unprescriptive. 
Instead of yet another philosophical instruction on how one should think and how one 
must act, there is possibility. Clearly this is not absolute unqualified possibility – the 
importance of letting-Be through dwelling is key – but it still represents a radical 
alternative to the way in which we have lived together and thought about the world for 
over two millennia. The various environmental crises facing mankind today would no 
longer be so threatening if we had an authentic relationship with the earth in the 
fourfold. Yet despite all this, one cannot help but be as pessimistic as Heidegger was in 
his Der Spiegel interview. In the technological worldview lies the possibility for 
entering into post-metaphysical thinking, but it is unclear when or if this possibility will 
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become an actuality. Maybe Heidegger is correct when he suggests that only a god can 
save us. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the philosophies of Max Stirner, Søren Kierkegaard, Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison 
and Martin Heidegger we have seen various responses of differing success to the 
problems inherent not only in the Hegelian tradition, but more the widely throughout 
the history of Western metaphysics as a whole. It was argued before that Martin 
Heidegger’s earlier philosophy was the most successful of these responses, bringing 
about in many ways the culmination of the subjectivist approach to philosophy. Yet 
even at its most successful, the subjectivist approach remains limited. It allows us to get 
closer to understanding the kind of Being of human individuals, but Being in general 
still seems distant and foreign. It is only in Heidegger’s later philosophy that the 
problems of both the objective and subjective approaches are transcended, allowing us 
to better appreciate Being without recourse to beings. After the revolution of thought in 
the later Heidegger, philosophy can no longer be relied upon to provide the ground for 
practical action. The post-Heideggerian age should therefore be thought of as being 
anarchical. Before turning to the radicalism of the later Heidegger, we shall first return 
to the approaches discussed before. Particular reference will be made as to why these 
approaches, despite their strengths, are comparatively weaker than the approach taken 
by the later Heidegger. 
 
Max Stirner. 
 
As was argued earlier, the great strength of Max Stirner’s philosophy lies in its 
willingness to question (almost) everything. In particular, his condemnation of the 
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philosophical habit of considering human existence as a pristine laboratory sample 
instead of the awkward, messy and often bewildering thing it really is marks a great 
leap forward philosophically. His insistence that the philosopher must always be aware 
and acknowledge that he is himself the subject of his philosophising provides a much-
needed antidote against the abstracting tendencies present in much of the so-called 
“scientific” philosophies. In The Ego and His Own Stirner challenges and deconstructs 
every relationship the unique individual has with the external world. He is correct to 
question the often unquestioned allegiances the individual is expected to adhere to. If 
our loyalty to state, family, God, and so on, cannot be explained and justified, it would 
be entirely correct for these connections to be eschewed. Yet whilst correctly holding 
that everything needs to be questioned, Stirner always has the same answer: the thing in 
question is a “spook”, a means of dampening the unique individual’s true potential. At 
no point does Stirner address or accept that there might be positive aspects to social 
relations. His proposed union of egoists might account for the cooperation between 
individuals to achieve a mutual goal such as security, but it does not account for the 
complexities of the myriad variations of human relations. At the heart of this flaw is the 
absolute hedonism central to Stirner’s philosophy. 
 It might be tempting to label Max Stirner’s philosophy as nihilistic (as R. W. K. 
Paterson did
1
), yet this claim must be examined in greater detail. Taking the term 
literally, Stirner is not a nihilist. As Stirner expounds the importance of self-enjoyment 
as the guiding motive for the unique individual’s actions, it cannot be convincingly 
argued that his philosophy lacks values. A true nihilist would surely be indifferent as to 
whether or not the individual is gaining pleasure from their actions. Perhaps it might be 
better to think of Stirner’s philosophy as being an extreme form of individual 
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utilitarianism. Everything is tested for its utility to the unique individual as they move 
towards their goal of self-enjoyment, with anything seeming to be a barrier to this goal 
being cast aside. Yet despite this, it is certainly arguable that Stirner’s philosophy is 
part of the general trend towards nihilism of the sort Heidegger was to later criticise in 
the final volume of his Nietzsche lectures.
2
 Like Nietzsche, it could be argued that 
instead of heralding the beginning of a post-metaphysical age, Stirner’s philosophy 
marks the culmination of the history of metaphysics. Nietzsche’s veneration of the will 
and Stirner’s call to self-enjoyment both celebrate the mastery of the elite individual 
over other existents encountered within the world. Neither philosopher seems 
particularly concerned whether or not these other beings (human or otherwise) should 
only be thought of as material to be manipulated in order to reach goals which are not 
their own. Taken to their logical conclusion, Stirner’s ideas seem utterly dystopian – a 
potential war of all against all. His conception of human beings as being purely 
hedonistic, with all their actions driven solely by self-enjoyment, is an 
oversimplification which would be both offensive and ridiculous if it were not for the 
suspicion that Stirner is being rather playful. Paterson’s characterisation of Stirner’s 
work as being ‘philosophy at play’3 may be an obscurification which allows a 
multitude of flaws to be overlooked, but at the same time it is utterly in keeping with 
Stirner’s stated intentions within his work. If Stirner is staying true to his own 
principles, there is no reason why writing a philosophical tract should be exempted 
from the criteria of self-enjoyment. 
 Whether or not The Ego and His Own is an outlet for Stirner’s self-enjoyment, 
or a seriously intended manifesto for asocial individuals with passive-aggressive 
tendencies, is immaterial. What we must applaud Stirner for are the questions he asks. 
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By challenging everything except his own narrow criterion of value, Stirner in some 
ways makes steps towards the Heideggerian task of the destruction of the history of 
metaphysics. For Stirner, no tradition was too lofty and no thinker too renowned or 
respected to be immune from criticism. Whilst his answers leave much to be desired, 
Stirner’s impassioned questioning of all the features of existence echo the key feature 
of successful philosophy since its inception: to ask questions about everything. 
  
Søren Kierkegaard. 
 
Søren Kierkegaard’s thought, particularly after its popularisation during the twentieth 
century, has provided inspiration for countless thinkers. His penetrating glances into 
the human condition have furnished the philosophy of the last century with much of its 
vocabulary and source material. Kierkegaard is at his best when examining the inner 
workings of the individual. The passionate decisionism demanded by Either/Or 
introduces the theme of personal responsibility which runs throughout Kierkegaard’s 
writings. His continuing focus on the steps needed in order to become a Christian led 
him to emphasise struggle over comfort, and the inner over the outer in order to lead an 
authentic life. Just like Stirner, Kierkegaard abandons any pretence of being a neutral 
commentator on existence, using his brilliant web of pseudonyms to personalise every 
element of the discussions in which he engages. Instead of considering points of view 
abstractly, Kierkegaard attributes these to a more or less fully rounded character whose 
way of living reflects the philosophical argument. 
 Kierkegaard’s psychological insights are perhaps unrivalled in the whole of the 
history of philosophy – even if his skills seem to have mostly been applied to exploring 
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the darker side of the human psyche. Through The Concept of Anxiety Kierkegaard 
introduced the concept which would become central to the later existentialist 
movement. The importance of this step cannot be overstated. For Kierkegaard anxiety 
is a moment of self-awareness. It is through anxiety that the individual self becomes 
aware of the nature of its own Being. Anxiety is only possible due to the temporality of 
man’s Being – in a draft of The Concept of Anxiety Kierkegaard highlights this by 
stating how ‘natural scientists agree that animals do not have anxiety because by nature 
they are not qualified as spirit.’4 As animals lack, as far as Kierkegaard is aware, any 
form of presentiment and only fear what is present, they are unable to be anxious in the 
same way that human selves can be. For there to be the possibility of anxiety it is 
absolutely necessary that the anxious self is comported towards future possibilities 
(about which the self is anxious). This anxiousness must also be comported towards the 
self’s past – its successes, failures, wasted possibilities, and so on. As such it is not too 
much of a leap to move from Kierkegaardian anxiety to the Heideggerian ecstasis 
discussed earlier. For Kierkegaard, anxiety’s role is as a step up the ladder towards 
Christian faith. It makes man aware of his relationship with the finite and infinite, 
extolling the possibility of renouncing the former in order to achieve eternal happiness 
in the latter. It ‘is freedom’s possibility, and only such anxiety is through faith 
absolutely educative, because it consumes all finite ends and discovers all their 
deceptiveness.’5 As Heidegger was to do in Being and Time, Kierkegaard celebrates 
possibility as ‘the weightiest of all categories.’6 For Kierkegaard it is precisely through 
possibility that the self has its connection with the infinite. 
 Kierkegaard’s criticisms of contemporary society in A Literary Review were, as 
mentioned earlier, an unacknowledged source for much of the early Heidegger’s social 
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criticism. Parallels can also be drawn between Kierkegaard’s criticisms of societal 
levelling and the later Heidegger’s warnings about technology and the process of 
enframing. Kierkegaardian criticism of levelling centres on the ways in which all 
passionate and exceptional people and things are watered down by the contemporary 
age in order to achieve a bland equality. Levelling cares not for the myriad possibilities 
open to Being, but only that all are condemned to the same unspectacular 
everydayness. Yet despite the pertinence of his criticisms, Kierkegaard’s philosophical 
solution is perhaps just as flawed because of his general failure to account satisfactorily 
for the individual person’s relationships with other individual persons. 
 Kierkegaard’s subjectivism is much more satisfactory as Christian philosophy 
than as a secular philosophy removed from all theological moorings. His form of 
religious individualism, whilst not entirely orthodox, is easily supported by his readings 
of Christian scripture. Citing biblical passages such as the instruction to ‘hate… father, 
and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea… life also’7 in order 
to gain an authentic relationship with God, Kierkegaard’s thought largely focuses on 
this relationship between God and the single individual. This is not to say that he 
endorsed a nihilistic attitude towards the other single individuals within the world, but 
that the individual’s relationship with other individuals is infinitely less important than 
their relationship with God. His Works of Love is perhaps the best refutation of any 
misunderstanding of Kierkegaard as a philosopher preaching loathing for other 
individuals within the finite world. The work explores the duty Christians have to love 
others.
8
 If the two positions seem incompatible or paradoxical, this is more due to the 
biblical source material than to any philosophical erring by Kierkegaard. He goes some 
way towards reconciling these two positions by making a distinction between interested 
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and disinterested love.
9
 Interested love is the love which discriminates – it judges who 
is deserving of love, whether due to actions, familial ties, beauty, need, and so on. 
Disinterested love is the love Kierkegaard understands to be required by the New 
Testament, as it is a love which is directed at all, whether or not they are deemed 
deserving of it. It is a non-judgemental love. Yet it is questionable whether there is a 
great deal of difference between this levelled form of love, and the other forms of 
levelling Kierkegaard had argued against. If love is gained solely by the very fact of 
being human, does love maintain any meaning? In this area, it does seem that Stirner’s 
support of interested love is more satisfactory and meaningful than Kierkegaard’s 
disinterested love. 
 The philosophical problems of Kierkegaard’s subjectivism are nowhere more 
apparent than in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript in which he argued that truth is 
subjective. This was discussed at some length earlier, but it will be useful to briefly 
return to Kierkegaard’s explanation here in order to better highlight the inherent 
problems. Truth is subjective for Kierkegaard because of the individual’s inability to 
abstract from himself. Whenever an individual ascertains a truth, it is always through 
the prism of his self. He can never be a dispassionate observer, because in one way or 
another he is always passionately involved. As such, Kierkegaard argues that whilst it 
is conceivable that truth is objective for God, for finite human individuals it can only be 
subjective. Kierkegaard’s penchant for the paradoxical undoubtedly informs his 
definition, but it is questionable whether complex philosophical questions can or should 
be brushed aside in such a manner. Heidegger in his Introduction to Metaphysics 
appears to have this Kierkegaardian theme in mind when he attacks ‘all the effete 
latecomers, with their overly clever wit, [who] believe they can be done with the 
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historical power of seeming by explaining it as “subjective”, where the essence of this 
“subjectivity” is something extremely dubious.’10 Whilst attempting to combat the 
pretensions of scientifically grounded knowledge found in the works of contemporary 
Danish Hegelians, Kierkegaard seems to have denied philosophy any sort of 
understanding of what truth is. Whilst he is correct to criticise the rampant 
anthropocentric assumptions in metaphysical proclamations of the truth, Kierkegaard is 
still mired in the same subject-object dualism from which these mistaken assumptions 
arise. Whilst admitting that man is not the receptacle for all knowledge (this role is 
played by God), Kierkegaard still understands truth as being when a subject processes 
sensory data about an object. He rejects the realist and idealist positions on truth, but 
only to assert the fallibility of the subject in making judgement on the correspondence 
between Being and thought (and vice versa). Heidegger’s understanding of truth as 
unconcealment (alētheia) provides a much more satisfactory response to this problem. 
 Kierkegaard’s extreme subjectivity, whilst making sense in the context of his 
religious individualism and providing a corrective for much of the objective 
pretensions to be found in the history of metaphysics, means that his philosophy can 
never fully broach the question of Being. In keeping with his Christianity which 
informed the entirety of his philosophical work, Kierkegaard places man in a privileged 
position above all other beings.
11
 This necessarily leads to the understanding of non-
human beings as a resource for achieving human ends. Kierkegaard might not 
explicitly expound this view in such a blunt manner, but throughout his writings man is 
the only one of God’s creations he exalts (albeit in an incredibly lowly fashion when 
compared to the glory of God Himself). Yet it is not only non-human beings who 
receive a less than effusive coverage in Kierkegaard’s thought, he also seems to have 
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little time for his interactions with other human beings. We have already discussed this 
briefly above. As his only focus (as he explicitly states) is the question of how the 
individual is to become a Christian and his only interest is the eternal happiness 
promised by becoming a true Christian through faith, Kierkegaard only strays into 
questions of the relationships between men when they have a bearing on these matters. 
His most direct interventions on worldly matters – his attack on levelling in A Literary 
Review and the prolonged campaign against the state Church towards the end of his life 
– are both defences against tendencies in society leading individuals astray from the 
difficulties and resultant eternal happiness of Christian faith. Kierkegaard’s writings 
have little time for discussing other earthly difficulties, interactions or entanglements. 
Such concerns are in many ways just obstacles to be avoided on the path towards faith. 
Kierkegaard thus manages to achieve a philosophy which is both anthropocentric and 
largely disinterested in earthly human matters (or any other earthly matter). Whilst 
being fully consistent with his existentialist form of Christianity, Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy cannot be satisfactorily translated into a more secular worldview without 
both losing sight of Kierkegaard’s original intentions and ending up with an 
irrationalist’s charter. Without the guiding theme of the struggle towards Christian 
faith, what would be left would be criterionless free choice and asociality in the pursuit 
of the individual’s own happiness. Put more bluntly, Kierkegaard stripped of 
Christianity comes very close to being Max Stirner. Removing Kierkegaard’s thought 
from the very impetus for those writings, as some of those operating under the umbrella 
of existentialism have undoubtedly been tempted to do, is to make a mockery of his 
intentions. Kierkegaard’s writings certainly contain myriad insights to enrich a more 
secular philosophy (his criticisms of Hegelianism for instance), but to utter his words 
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whilst withholding the word “Christianity” would be to make Kierkegaard 
meaningless. Even if one were to acknowledge and accept fully Kierkegaard’s 
Christian worldview, his hyper-subjectivity means that within his thought one will 
never be able to find a truly satisfactory approach to the question Being, even if many 
of the tools to be used towards this end are still to be found here. 
 
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison. 
 
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison´s personal idealism was of particular interest because of 
the way in which he engaged directly in debate with his contemporaries in the largely 
orthodoxly Hegelian school of British idealism. Particularly in his Aristotelian Society 
debate with Bernard Bosanquet, Pringle-Pattison’s personalistic objections to the 
objective pretensions of absolute idealism come to the fore. Pringle-Pattison is adamant 
here, and throughout his writings, that when ordering beings into their place as 
components of the Absolute, one ought not to forget that these beings are individual 
centres of existence. As a thought experiment it is entirely possible to abstract the 
“content” of the Absolute from the beings in which it resides, but this cannot provide 
any sort of satisfactory basis for a philosophy. Pringle-Pattison is correct on this matter 
to insist upon the formal separateness of individual beings whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging that to abstract these beings from the social whole in which they exist 
would be meaningless. Despite the way in which Pringle-Pattison’s thought provided a 
successful corrective against many of the excesses of absolute idealism, his own 
positive contributions remain weighed down by the inadequacies found throughout the 
personalist school of thought. 
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 Although Pringle-Pattison can boast a much greater academic rigour than the 
more famous leading figures of the personalist movement, Mounier
12
 and Bowne,
13
 he 
is not immune from being guilty of making similar philosophical omissions. Heidegger 
succinctly summarises the problem of personalism in Being and Time when he 
complains that for such philosophies of life, ‘‘life’ itself as a kind of Being does not 
become ontologically a problem.’14 Particularly in personalism, the concept of the 
“person” tends to get slipped in with little in the way of explanation of justification. 
Mounier, for instance, introduces man as being ‘wholly body and wholly spirit’15 with 
no attempt at justification of this except for the briefest of attacks on a dualistic, 
antagonistic conception of this pairing. Pringle-Pattison similarly appears to have 
accepted his similar conception of the person a priori. Undoubtedly Pringle-Pattison’s 
Christianity – a Christianity much more sober than that of Kierkegaard – informs his 
understanding of the person, but personal faith cannot be used to excuse the avoidance 
of philosophical questions. In the conclusion to Hegelianism and Personality, Pringle-
Pattison attributes selfhood to a synthesis of subject and object, and attacks the idea 
that because each self has a universal element that it is logical to conclude ‘that it is one 
universal Self that thinks in all so-called thinkers.’16 This is clearly a step forward from 
the avoidance of Mounier, but still does not approach the ontological problem cited by 
Heidegger. Pringle-Pattison is utterly correct, as he does after the above quotation and 
elsewhere, to insist on the formal distinctness of selves. He is correct also to attack 
philosophical realism, but seems still to be stuck in the realism/idealism dualism. Both 
positions have strengths, but both are ultimately flawed ways of approaching the 
question of Being. Pringle-Pattison’s reformist approach to idealism leaves his 
philosophy trapped both within Hegelianism and, more widely, within metaphysics. 
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Pringle-Pattison’s personalism is unashamedly anthropocentric. This is 
unsurprising given the focus in his thought upon the dignity of the person, and the 
person’s relationship with God. In the latter case, Pringle-Pattison describes his 
approach as being a critical anthropomorphism which avoids ‘transferring to God all 
the features of our own self-consciousness´
17
 even if we must rely on the data of our 
own self-consciousness to gain even a cursory understanding about the self-
consciousness of the deity. As has been mentioned above and shall be argued in detail 
below, the anthropocentric approach necessarily results in an only partial and 
incomplete approach to the question of Being. Anthropocentrism also fuels the 
tendency in philosophy to consider non-human beings as being of secondary 
importance, and a resource to be used and ordered to achieve human ends. This is 
clearly not Pringle-Pattison’s intention and no doubt he would be appalled at the 
suggestion, yet this does not alter that this is a consequence of this kind of 
philosophising – a consequence recognised by Heidegger in his later writings. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
The journey through subjectivist reactions to Hegelian objectivity to the anti-
anthropocentrism of the later Heidegger saw  many twists and turns along the way. In 
order to conclude it may be useful to reiterate the position we are in at the end of the 
study. Particular reference will be made to direction in which the study commenced and 
how this relates to the final destination. In the beginning the aim was to discuss and 
evaluate a number of subjectivist philosophies with regards to their approach to the 
question of Being, as well as the political consequences of these approaches. Before 
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briefly returning to the specific approaches covered, we must first return to why it was 
that the subjectivist approaches were ever needed. As the study focusses upon the post-
Hegelian period, it was inevitable that Hegelian philosophy came to represent all that 
was being acted against, yet it might be more accurate to think of Hegelianism as 
marking the culmination of an ongoing trend throughout metaphysics to aim to achieve 
an objective philosophy. Subjectivist philosophies were necessary to counteract the 
phasing out of the role of the individual person in metaphysics. Objective philosophers 
seemingly believed that they could abstract from their own subjectivity to pass 
judgement on the machinations of the whole, simultaneously belittling the role of any 
single individual within the movement of the whole and failing to remember that they 
themselves are just this kind of single individual. Finite individuality should not be 
seen as limit to the understanding of anything beyond one’s self, but any philosophy 
which fails to account for the status of the philosopher himself is built upon less than 
sturdy foundations. 
 Max Stirner’s writings portrayed the resurgent individual at war with anything 
and everything which stands in the way of this individuality. Despite the bravery in his 
unflinching questioning, Stirner fails to adequately account for social relationships and 
other such complexities of existence, seemingly preferring crude sketches in the place 
of a more detailed exposition. Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy adds to Stirner’s myriad 
details which were lacking. His perceptive writings enable us to gain a much clearer 
picture of the individual’s inner existence in all its complexity. Similarly to Stirner, 
Kierkegaard failed to provide a satisfactory account for the individual’s outer existence 
– his dealings with others. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison’s thought is certainly less 
radical than that of Stirner and Kierkegaard, attempting to develop a reformed 
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personalist Hegelianism. Despite clearly recognising many of the faults in the 
philosophies of his more orthodoxly Hegelian contemporaries, Pringle-Pattison’s 
refusal to entirely step outside the Hegelian umbrella closes him off from following the 
consequences of his criticisms to where they lead. The Heidegger of Being and Time 
was certainly the most successful of the subjectivist approaches discussed. Heidegger’s 
understanding of individual human existence was able to achieve a balance between 
explaining the individual’s inner existence and explaining the ways in which the 
individual lives amongst other individuals whose ways of Being are similar to his own. 
Through this explanation of Dasein’s way of Being, Heidegger had hoped to be able to 
gain a better grasp of Being itself, yet this was not to be the case. For this, an anti-
anthropocentricism would be needed as provided in Heidegger’s later writings. 
 Earlier it was remarked that it may seem that by embracing Heidegger’s later 
anti-anthropocentric writings, we have returned to the impersonal objectivity of the 
Hegelians. In place of the abstract Absolute we have substituted the equally abstract 
“Being”. Such objections could not be further from the truth. The later Heidegger’s 
attempts to think of Being without recourse to beings is precisely the opposite of the 
Hegelian Absolute. The Absolute is the whole in which all finite individuality is 
dissolved; the relationship between individual beings and Being is more complex. As 
we saw earlier in the later Heidegger’s thought, beings are grounded in Being, but 
Being itself is without ground: it is the abyss. To attempt to think of the Absolute 
without reference to its constituent parts would be nonsense, but Being is quite separate 
from the sum of existent beings. The later Heidegger does not provide a clear and easy 
answer to this question of Being, but does provide suggestions of the direction in which 
this new non-metaphysical thinking might head, highlighting the importance of 
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appropriation/Ereignis and Being’s relationship with time. Heidegger’s earlier 
achievements regarding the individual’s existence are not washed away by his later 
works. Anti-anthropocentrism does not in any way mean that Heidegger’s explanations 
of Dasein no longer stand, but rather that there is more to understanding Being than 
understanding the kind of Being of human individuals. Human existence does not cease 
to Be, but rather loses its centrality to philosophy allowing for a far less blinkered view 
of Being. The recognition of the limited nature of Dasein with regards to Being in 
general is best illustrated in Nietzsche’s early writings, perhaps ironically given 
Nietzsche’s role in Heidegger’s philosophy as marking the culmination of humanistic 
metaphysics: 
 
In some remote corner of the universe… there once was a star on which clever 
animals invented knowledge. That was the haughtiest and most mendacious minute 
of “world history” – yet only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths the 
star grew cold, and the clever animals had to die. One might invent such a fable and 
still not have illustrated sufficiently how wretched, how shadowy and flighty, how 
aimless and arbitrary, the human intellect appears in nature. There have been 
eternities when it did not exist; and when it is done for again, nothing will have 
happened.
18
 
 
In the grand scheme of Being, Dasein is of limited importance. Yet it is this limited 
nature which in the end heralds our freedom of possibility. 
 It is difficult to read Heidegger’s later philosophy without sensing a degree of 
pessimism not present in his earlier work. Where Being and Time made a great deal of 
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Dasein’s openness to possibility, the later works seem to be more interested in 
chronicling Dasein’s limitations. Pessimism is too strong a term, and certainly one 
Heidegger himself rejected. Instead in the later works, Heidegger displays a modesty 
about Dasein’s importance. This modesty provides an adequate shield against the 
projects of metaphysical philosophy which always harboured some design or other 
about how man should live and what his mission should be. Heidegger’s later thought 
does away with such hegemonic ideas, leaving a void in their place. This anarchism 
may deprive the individual of the apparent certainty of philosophical grounding and the 
sense of a calling higher than oneself, but in its place is left freedom. This freedom is 
modest due to the limited nature of Dasein – it is because of this that Heideggerian 
anarchism is perhaps best thought of as a kind of conservative anarchism – but it is a 
freedom against which nothing may trespass. Government is always grounded 
explicitly or otherwise in a philosophical ideal, an ideal from which government 
acquires its legitimation to coerce individuals who are in opposition to the 
government’s philosophically grounded mission, be this mission economic equality, 
racial purity, utilitarian calculations or any other purpose for claiming coercive 
authority against those who do not consent. By removing from philosophy its ability to 
ground and therefore justify particular actions, Heidegger has removed all legitimacy 
from any form of coercion. Governments can no longer legitimately coerce the 
unwilling to obey in order to achieve a philosophically validated goal. Consensual 
cooperation for mutually agreed upon ends is perfectly acceptable, but after 
Heidegger’s leaps forward in his later works, any government which lacks an 
acceptance of individuals seceding from being governed can no longer be acceptable. 
The later Heidegger still demands a passionate and yet modest decisionism, but no 
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individual’s decision is any stronger or valid than any other individual’s, and as such it 
cannot be acceptable for any individual to coerce another into any action or inaction. 
 Thinking does not and should not come to an end with the later Heidegger. 
Much can still be done to extend upon Heidegger’s attempts to think of Being without 
recourse to beings, as well as to elucidate Dasein’s limited role within anti-
anthropocentric philosophy. In place of the arrogance which claims to have explained 
scientifically the processes of totality, we have arrived at a modest position which not 
only makes radically modest claims regarding the reach of philosophy, but also makes 
modest claims about man’s place in the context of Being. It seems unlikely after 
millennia of metaphysical thinking that the later Heidegger’s advances will be mirrored 
anytime soon outside of academia. Yet rather than end another chapter with a note of 
pessimism, it seems more appropriate to conclude by sharing for a moment in the 
optimism of Angelus Silesius: 
 
 God dwells in light supreme, no path can give access; 
 Yourself must be that light, if you would there progress.
19
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